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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Political ideology is one of the most studied subjects in political science (Jost, et al, 
2009). Scholars have tried to assess and explain the determinants, consequences, and structure of 
political ideology across both time and space (Green, 1988; Feldman & Johnston, 2014). 
Political ideology influences a citizens’ political behavior in many ways. It motivates them to 
vote, protest, participate in political events, and in some cases pick up arms and die for a cause. 
Studies of political ideology have concluded that the concept is dynamic, varying temporally and 
geographically (Stoll, 2010; Dalton, 1985; Thomassen, 1994).  
 Most analyses of political ideology assume that the structure of the subject is uni-
dimensional (Carmines, et al, 2012; Jost, et al, 2009; Benoit & Laver, 2012). This line of 
research suggests that the determinants of this dimension are composed of socio-economic 
factors, where citizens are placed on either end of the liberal-conservative (in the US) or left-
right (in Europe) spectrums. Many empirical investigations conclude that the determinants of 
political ideology at the elite level in the US and Europe compose an unitary socio-economic 
structure (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007; Duckitt, 2001; Poole & Rosenthal, 1984). Despite the support 
for the unidimensional hypothesis, recent research has shown that it is insufficient to describe 
political ideology with a unitary structure when applied to the mass public level in both the US 
and Europe (Kriesi, et al, 2006; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Moreno, 1999). Empirical research 
from both political science and psychology indicates that while citizens’ attitudes on socio-
economic and cultural issues correlate, they form statistically independent dimensions. This 
alludes to the fact that the structure of political ideology is multidimensional, composed of two 
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distinct dimensions: the economic and the social (Shafer & Claggett, 1995, Carmines, et al, 
2012).  
 Research on political ideology has assumed that the elite structure of the construct 
influences its counterpart on the mass public, where both are expected to be similar (Lupton, 
2015). This assumption that the structure of elite political ideology translates into the same, or a 
very similar, structure for the public masses has been challenged by a number of analysts (Stoll, 
2010; Shafer & Spady, 2014). For instance, Leyman and Carsey (2002) concluded that elite 
polarization along the liberal-conservative continuum, informed by socio-economic determinants 
between 1972 and 2000, has not yielded the same one-dimensional structure for the mass 
populace. Lupton (2015) concluded that only sophisticated voters, those who are well engaged in 
politics, exhibit a similar unitary structure to the American political elite. More recently, 
however, theoretical models of ideology have suggested that social and economic determinants 
of ideology originate from distinct worldviews. Schwartz’s (2012) value model suggests that 
core human values, an equivalent of ideology, can be reduced to two broad dimensions. The first 
is determined by issues of respect for authority, tradition, security, and conformity on the one 
hand and individual autonomy or self-direction on the other. The second is determined by human 
desire for achievement, power acquisition, and prestige on one end, and social justice and 
equality on the other.  
 Political science research has noted two mechanisms by which the determinants and 
structure of political ideology may change (Kriesi, et al, 2006; Stoll, 2004; Enyadi & Deegan-
Krause, 2010). First, structural societal change brought on by modernization or globalization 
generates shifts in citizens’ preferences, altering the structure of attitudes in a given society 
(Inglehart & Bakker, 2000). Second, political actors may utilize a wide range of tactics, 
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heuristics, manipulation, or charisma, attempting to change the structure of preferences among 
either the elite or the mass public (Riker, 1986). Kriesi (2008) showed that globalization has 
resulted in the transformation of political ideology in six European countries. Although the 
socio-economic dimension structures parties’, as well as citizens’, preferences across Europe, 
immigration has become a second dimension. Many studies, such as Inglehart and Baker (2000) 
and Inglehart and Welzel (2010), have concluded that modernization has led to the decline of 
specific dimensions such as the religious—state cleavage.   New divisions have emerged in 
several polities, notably the post-materialist conflict that surrounds new political issues. Inglehart 
(1997), Moreno (1999), and Stoll (2004) believe that modernization changed the determinants of 
political ideology across Western Europe and Latin America in the past few decades, adding a 
new political dimension to that of socio-economics. Riker (1986), and Enyadi and Krause 
(2010), have pointed to the effects of political manipulation and charisma in changing the 
determinants and composition of ideology across time and space. Nevertheless, there is only 
limited empirical research that exhibits this link.  
 There are no scientific studies of political ideology in the Arab World and its 
determinants and structure. This study fills this gap by being the first to investigate the 
determining factors and framework of political ideology in the Arab World.  It does so at two 
levels: the elite or political party level and that of the mass public. The following questions are 
answered: what are the determinants and structure of political ideology in the Arab World at both 
the elite or political party level and at the mass public level? Are those determinants and 
structures different or similar and why? How have the structures of political ideology in Algeria, 
Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco evolved? Have they changed due to levels of modernization or 
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globalization? Have they been influenced by political actors’ heuristics, manipulation, or 
charisma?  
 
Statement of the Problem 
 Much of the description of political ideology in the Arab World is journalistic and 
conjectural (Ciftci, 2012; De Miguel, Jamal, & Tessler, 2015; Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Telhami, 
2013). A search of the literature failed to find any empirical study of political ideology in the 
Arab World, either at the elite or mass levels, where the investigator used survey data and other 
methods used by scholars in studying political ideology in Western democracies. Further, there is 
a dearth of empirical studies on party systems in Arab countries. Thus, there is severely limited 
knowledge on political ideology in the Arab World that is based upon scientific evidence.      
 
Nature and Significance of the Problem 
Political ideology is the configuration of political attitudes at a given place and time (Jost, 
et al, 2009). Erikson and Tedin (2003) broadly refer to ideology as a “set of beliefs about the 
proper order of society and how it can be achieved” (p. 64). The concept of political ideology fell 
victim to researchers’ linguistic promiscuity (Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Iyyer, Enns, Boyd-
Graber, & Resnik, 2014; Leach, 2015). Political scientists, as well as other social scientists, have 
defined the term in multiple ways (Converse, 1964; Stoll, 2010; Dalton, 1985; Erikson & Tedin, 
2003; Jost, et al, 2009; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Iyyer, Enns, Boyd-Graber, & Resnik, 2014; 
Leach, 2015; Eagly & Chaiken, 2007). This dissertation understands political ideology at a given 
time or space as the structure of political attitudes among a set of actors. Political ideologies 
serve as lenses through which groups of individuals can describe, interpret, and view the 
5 
 
 
 
dynamic and complex world around them (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007). Ideologies simplify and 
spread widely held attitudes, opinions, and beliefs of groups, classes, and constituencies (Lane, 
1962; Adorno, et al, 1950; Tetlock, 1983).  
Political scientists view ideology as an organizing device by which political parties and 
citizens simplify the political worlds surrounding them (Green, 1988; Feldman & Johnston, 
2014). Converse (1964), states that ideology is a “configuration of ideas and attitudes in which 
the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence.”  In 
other words, political ideology exists only if the set of attitudes composing it are logically, 
coherently, and empirically related (Converse, 2000).  Acknowledging the ideology of a given 
polity helps in testing models of political representation, voting behavior, and political activism 
(Stoll, 2010; Dalton, 1985; Thomassen, 1994). 
Scholars have found that political ideology is correlated with major political outcomes, 
including the onset of war, voting participation, party affiliation, and political protest. Wiesger 
(2011) investigated the link between political ideology and the onset of war. He concluded that 
“ideological difference [between countries] is closely connected to the probability of conflict.”  
Palfrey (1987) and Jacoby (2010) observed that Americans who identify with the elites’ 
ideological structure (sophisticated citizens) are more likely to vote compared to other 
Americans in national elections.  In his analysis of anti-immigrant voters in Europe, Van Der 
Brug (2000) concluded that ideological proximity was one of the best predictors of party 
affiliation in European nations. Hoffman and Jamal (2014) concluded that political ideology 
played a significant role in inciting and sustaining political protest throughout the Arab Spring. 
They argued that religious and political elites used the Islamic-Secular division among ordinary 
citizens to motivate them to take over the public square in the name of their ideology.    
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Due to ideology's importance for political outcomes, researchers have developed and 
used a number of methods to measure and analyze political ideology within different contexts 
(Hare, et al., 2015; Jacoby & Armstrong, 2014). There are a very large number of studies by 
political scientists measuring ideology at different levels including the mass public level and the 
elite level (political parties, legislators, and other sets of political actors) (Moreno, 1999; Shafer 
& Claggett, 1995; Stoll, 2010). Most researchers, however, try to measure the political ideology 
of either the mass public or of political parties (Enyedi & Deegan-Krause, 2013). This is 
understandable given the visibility and importance of political ideology for both the mass public 
and political parties, coupled with the large amounts of data on political attitudes at both levels 
(Carmines, et al, 2012). One of the most popular methods of studying political ideology at a 
given time, space, or level is conducting multivariate analysis (e.g., multi-dimensional scaling, 
factor analysis) to identify its dimensions, the meaning of those dimensions, and the correlations 
among them (Aldrich, Montgomery, & Sparks, 2014; Fatke, 2016; Lupton, Myers, & Thornton, 
2015).  
 The first concern for political scientists conducting such analyses regards ideology's 
number of dimensions.   Is political ideology mono or multi-dimensional (Stoll, 2010)? The 
second concern is the meaning of those dimensions (Bakker De Vries, et al., 2015; McDonald & 
Budge, 2014). What is common about the issues, load heavily on a dimension, and give the 
dimension meaning (Gemenis, 2013)?  Third, looking at the dimensions, their meaning, and the 
correlations that exist among them, if any, what does the structure of  political ideology, now 
revealed by multivariate analysis, say about a country's politics (whether at mass, elite, or both 
levels) at a particular time (Jost, et al, 2009). Political scientists with access to cross-sectional 
survey data from multiple time points, and from surveys using the same or similar questions, can 
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also investigate whether the structure of political ideology in a country has remained stable or 
has changed over time.   
To illustrate how political scientists have measured ideology in a particular region and 
timeframe, Kriesi’s (2006) analysis of the structure of Western European political ideology 
during the past four decades at the political party level is outlined.  Kriesi and his colleagues 
collected data on parties’ attitudes toward a set of political issues including market regulation, 
cultural liberalism, welfare, and others. He obtained a correlation matrix for his twelve variables, 
measuring the positions of political parties as gauged by their platforms.  Multidimensional 
scaling (MDS) was then utilized to produce a simple picture that showed two meaningful 
dimensions: economic and cultural. 
Most quantitative research on political ideology uses the same method as outlined above.  
It starts with a dataset measuring a wide range of political attitudes, then uses a data reduction 
technique such as MDS or factor analysis to determine the dimensionality of such data. In the 
next step, the researcher assigns a substantive meaning to each of the extracted dimensions. 
Finally, the researcher examines the correlations between the dimensions to determine whether 
they are independent of each other or not (Stoll, 2004; Stoll, 2010).  If two dimensions are 
positively correlated, a high score on one is associated with a high score on the other, and if 
negatively correlated, a high score on one is associated with a low score on the other (and vice 
versa).  If two dimensions are uncorrelated, scores on the dimensions are independent of each 
other.  As an example, since economic and social dimensions are uncorrelated in the countries of 
Western Europe, scores on these dimensions (whether high or low) are independent of each 
other.   
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The extensive research by political scientists on the measurement of political ideology 
across temporal and geographic dimensions resulted in few controversies regarding the 
dimensionality, meaning, and structure of political ideology. First, political scientists disagree on 
whether political ideology is uni-dimensional or muti-dimensional (Hinich & Munger, 1996; 
Gerber, et al, 2010). Second, the meanings of these dimensions vary across time and space (Jost, 
et al, 2009; Benoit & Laver, 2012). Finally, analysts disagree on whether political ideology has 
the same dimensionality, meaning, and structure across different levels of analysis on a given 
polity or time point (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007; Duckitt, 2001; Poole & Rosenthal, 1984).  
Political scientists have paid particular interest to the dimensionality and type of political 
ideology (Jost, et al, 2009).  Studying polities across time, space, and levels of analysis, 
contradictory findings have been generated. This has led to a lengthy and continuing controversy 
regarding the number of dimensions which structure political ideology.  For instance, many 
studies investigated the dimensionality of American politics on the elite as well as the mass 
public levels. A few studies found that American political ideology, on both levels, was uni-
dimensional with the Left-Right continuum organizing both the parties' and the citizens' political 
worlds (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007; Duckitt, 2001; Poole & Rosenthal, 1984). Other researchers 
have concluded that the American ideological structure is multi-dimensional, with an economic 
as well as a social dimension.  
 A number of political scientists, largely from Western Europe, have also argued that 
political ideology is multi-dimensional (Kriesi, et al, 2006; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; 
Moreno, 1999). One view is that the Left and Right are two orthogonal dimensions composing 
political ideology rather than the opposite ends of a single dimension (Kerlinger, 1984).  Another 
view is that political ideology is composed of a cultural, as well as an economic, dimension 
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(Shafer & Claggett, 1995; Carmines, et al, 2012). Issues concerning government spending, 
welfare, and the market form the economic dimension, while issues concerning gender roles, the 
environment, social groups, and immigration make up the cultural dimension (Jost, et al, 2009). 
 
Political Ideology in the Arab World 
This study is motivated by the contemporary debate concerning the most salient political 
issues throughout the Arab World in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (Howard & Hussain, 2013; 
Salamey, 2015; Stein, 2014). On the one hand, most political analysts have concluded that the 
role of religion in politics divides politicians, as well as citizens, into Islamists and Secularists 
(Ciftci & Tezcür, 2016; Spierings, 2014). Indeed, individuals embrace varying positions along 
this continuum.  Nevertheless, this view holds that all political actors, charismatic leaders, 
candidates or political parties, and citizens, affiliate with either the Islamist or the secular camp 
(Fox, Alzwawi, & Refki, 2016; Hamid, 2014). On the other hand, a small and emerging number 
of experts argue that the salience of the Islamist-Secular cleavage is diminishing in favor of new 
conflicts resulting from divisive issues (Bayat, 2013; Rutherford, 2013). The divisive issues 
include the way the economy should be run, the amount of westernization that should be allowed 
within Arab countries, and the extent to which governments should implement political reform.  
The Arab World has witnessed sweeping political transformations in the past seven years 
(Steinert-Threlkeld, 2017). Long established authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and 
Yemen have been ousted by intensely mobilized electorates (Roberts, Willis, McCarthy, & Ash, 
2016). Competitive, free, and fair elections have taken place in Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, 
Tunisia, and Libya.  New political parties have emerged with more sophisticated policy 
positions, and compete for the votes of highly politicized electorates (Cammett, Diwan, Richards 
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& Waterbury, 2015; El-Said & Rauch, 2015). One of the clearest manifestations of the Arab 
Spring is the rise of ideological wars within the Arab World (Ismael, Ismael, & Perry, 2015; 
Landau, Özbudun, & Tachau, 2015; Watenpaugh, 2014). Mobilized citizens and parties alike 
have initiated campaigns advocating for drastically different political agendas, trying to appeal to 
and win the hearts and minds of the so called Arab street. Thus, the exploration and description 
of political ideologies in the Arab World gained much attention following the Arab Spring. 
Much of this writing has been conjectural, subjective, and without supporting evidence however.   
Some scholars have argued that political ideology in the Arab World is uni-dimensional 
and defined by an Islamist-Secular divide (Achilov, 2016; Benstead, 2015; Ciftci, 2012). This 
divides political parties and citizens into two distinct groups. One advocates Islamic values, 
teachings, and policies. Another wants the retreat of Islam from society and politics, and 
advocates for liberal, secular, values within all domains of life. Others have indicated that the 
contemporary ideological space in the Arab World has been shaped by a new ideological conflict 
referred as the Islamist-Post-Islamist divide (Al Azzawi & Gouda, 2016; Bakker & Rotondi, 
2016; Ozen, 2017). The former wants a strong place for Islam in the state, while the latter wants 
less influence.   Another description of political ideology in the Arab World suggests that 
ideology in the Arab World is idiosyncratic and possesses no discernable worldview. This view 
argues that political ideology in the region is shaped by multiple policy divides on economic, 
cultural, foreign relations, and religious issues.  
Unlike the enormous literature on political ideology in Western Europe and North 
America, such on ideology in the Arab World is almost non-existent. Despite the outgrowth in 
survey research in the Middle East ushered by the Arab Barometer, World Values Survey, and 
the Annual Polls of the Anwar Sadat Center at the University of Maryland, scientific analysis of 
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the dimensionality meaning and structure of citizens' policy preferences in the Arab World is 
lacking. The situation is not much better when considering the dimensionality, meaning, and 
structure of political parties’ policy preferences. No datasets with variables that measure political 
parties’ policy preferences exist in the Arab World. Given this drawback, analysis of political 
ideology at the party level becomes daunting, if not impossible.  Overall, the literature on 
political ideology in the Arab World is based upon conjecture, lack of empirical measures, and 
variable perspectives.     
The empirical study of party systems in the Arab World is also limited. This dissertation 
has collected data on relevant political parties and their policy preferences in Algeria, Egypt, 
Jordan, and Morocco, allowing the investigation of party systems in those countries. Using this 
information, this study will assess the level of party institutionalization in the four countries. 
Party institutionalization refers to the extent to which individual political parties within a polity 
have acquired stability and value overtime (Basedau & Stroh, 2008). The sum of individual 
parties’ institutionalization represents the overall level in the party system as a whole.  
 
Objectives of Research 
 This research aims to: 
1. Present measures of ideology on the political party and mass public levels in Algeria, 
Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco.  
2. Describe the dimensionality, meaning, and structure of political attitudes in Algeria, 
Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco at party and mass public levels.   
3. Conduct and present the findings of an empirical analysis of the party systems in Algeria, 
Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco.  
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4. Describe the relevant parties, ideological fit, ideological polarization, and party system 
institutionalization in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco.  
5. Situate the findings of this research on these four Arab countries in the larger political 
ideology literature in the West.  
 
Research Questions  
1. What are the dimensions, meaning, and structure of political ideology at the political 
party level in the Arab World? 
2. What are the dimensions, meaning, and structure of political ideology at the mass public 
level in the Arab World? 
3. Is the Islamic-Secular dimension the most dominant in organizing political parties’ and 
ordinary citizens’ political preferences in the Arab World? 
4. To what extent are political parties’ ideology in the four different countries similar to that 
of their citizens?  
5. To what extent has the party system become institutionalized in each respective country? 
 
Hypotheses 
1. Political ideology at the political party level in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco is 
multidimensional.  
2. Political ideology at the mass public level in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco is 
multidimensional.  
3. The Islamic-Secular dimension is the dominant dimension of political ideology at the 
political party and mass public level in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco.  
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4. The degree of similarity between ideology at the party level and that at the mass public 
level is low in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. 
5. The level of party system institutionalization is low in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and 
Morocco. 
 
Dissertation Outline  
 The second chapter of the dissertation uses a newly collected dataset on the policy 
preferences of political parties to test the hypothesis suggesting that political ideology at the 
party level in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco is multidimensional. The choice of starting 
with political parties is informed by the fact that parties provide the mass public with ideological 
structures. In this study, political parties refer to relevant parties winning electoral seats in the 
national elections following the Arab Spring in the four countries. The political ideology 
structure on the party level in the four countries is expected to be two-dimensional; economic 
and cultural. Economic dimension refers to whether parties advocate for a free market, neo-
liberal, economic policy or favor a controlled economy with an active role by the government in 
regulating the market. The cultural dimension refers to whether parties advocate for the 
introduction of Islamic principles and laws into the public sphere, or favor the introduction of 
secular, modern, and western lifestyle into the public sphere and political processes.  Using a 
newly collected dataset based on the quantitative content analysis of party manifestos in the four 
nations, this chapter demonstrates that the political ideology structure at the party level in the 
Arab World is two-dimensional. The chapter lends support to the hypothesis that the two 
dimensions are economic and cultural.  
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 The third chapter utilizes the Sixth Wave of the World Values Survey data to investigate 
the political ideology structure of the mass public in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. The 
chapter also compares the political ideology structure of the mass public to that found in chapter 
two on the party level. This chapter suggests that ordinary citizens in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and 
Morocco do not organize their attitudes based on the same two dimensions as parties. The 
findings support the hypothesis that the ideological structure at the mass level is 
multidimensional. The findings suggest that the political attitude structure in Egypt is six-
dimensional, consisting of foreign affairs, welfare, corruption, culture, democracy, and economy. 
The results also indicate that the Algerian political attitude structure is six-dimensional, with 
foreign affairs, democracy, culture, economy, corruption, and social groups composing the 
dimensions. Jordanian political attitude structure was found by the analysis to be composed of 
seven independent dimensions: Foreign Affairs, Welfare, Culture, Corruption, Democracy, 
Social Groups, and Economy. Finally, the chapter determined that the Moroccan political 
ideological structure is composed of five dimensions: Foreign Affairs, Welfare, Culture, 
Democracy, and Economy. The results confirm the proposition suggesting that the mass public 
has a more varied dimensional structure compared to parties or elites. It also demonstrates that 
this structure is consistent (rather than incoherent), and ordinary citizens derive their attitudes 
from many more dimensions compared to their party representatives.  
The findings of chapters two and three go against the third proposed hypothesis: the most 
influential factor in organizing political preferences is the Islamist/Secular dimension. While the 
Islamist/Secular dimension explains the meaning of the socio-cultural factor in determining the 
structure of party positions, as well as the cultural dimension composing part of the mass 
publics’ ideological space, it is not the most influencing. First, the economic dimension is 
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equally, if not more, important in a few cases compared to the Islamist/Secular factor in 
organizing party and mass publics’ preferences in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco.  
 Chapters four, five, six, and seven empirically evaluate the extent to which party 
positions match their voters’ preferences.  In Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, levels of 
ideological fit between parties and their voters are low. Political parties in many cases have taken 
more extreme views compared to their voters. For instance, almost all parties called for a more 
liberal cultural outlook compared to their voters. This is especially true when it came to foreign 
affairs and the extent to which political parties advocate the advancement of relations with 
Western nations. Voters in the four nations favored a less friendly standing on establishing 
relations with the United States, European Union, and international organizations. Further, on 
gender equality, political parties promote egalitarianism more forcefully compared to their 
voters.  
 Chapters four, five, six, and seven also investigate the level of party system 
institutionalization in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. All four party systems possess low 
levels of party institutionalization. The evidence from the World Values Survey indicates that a 
significant portion of the population eligible to vote in the four nations chose to answer will not 
vote or did not identify as a party voter. Further, many relevant parties in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
and Morocco are not old established parties (more than fifty years old). Many relevant parties, 
such as the Green Alliance in Algeria, Stronger Jordan in Jordan, and the Al Nur party in Egypt, 
have only formed following the Arab Spring. Therefore, Arab nations are found to have a weakly 
institutionalized party system.  
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
Conceptualization  
 Prior to introducing the research design, data collection, measurement, and data analysis, 
it is important to define the concepts, constructs, and terms used in this research. The following 
list contains the most important concepts and their definitions utilized throughout this 
dissertation.  
Table 2.1 Definitions of Terms 
Term Definition Source  
Political Ideology “...set of beliefs about 
the proper order of 
society and how it can 
be achieved” (p.64). 
And  
“ideologies are the 
shared framework of 
mental models that 
groups of individuals 
possess that provide 
both an interpretation 
of the environment and 
a prescription as to 
how that environment 
should be structured” 
(p.24). 
Erikson & Tedin (2003) And  
Parsons (1951) 
Ideological Structure  “...the manner and 
extent to which 
political attitudes are 
cognitively organized 
according to one or 
more dimensions of 
preference or 
judgment” (p.310). 
Jost, Federico & Napier,  (2009) 
Dimensionality  “The number of 
separate and 
interesting sources of 
variation among 
objects (variables in a 
dataset)” (P. 27). 
Jacoby, (1991) 
Political Party  “...any political group Sartori (1976) And  
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identified by an 
official label that 
presents at elections, 
and is capable of 
placing through 
elections (free or 
nonfree), candidates 
for public office" (p. 
63). And  
“an organization that 
pursues a goal of 
placing its avowed 
representatives in 
government positions” 
(p.5). 
Janda (1980) 
Polarization 
Hypothesis  
The claim that political 
parties and citizens are 
divided on whether 
Islamic rules and 
principles should be 
incorporated into 
legislation and public 
policy. 
Self-developed 
 Islamism “It is a religious 
ideology with a 
holistic interpretation 
of Islam whose final 
aim is the conquest of 
the world by all 
means” (p.21). 
Mozaffari, (2007). 
Secularism The lack of belief, 
belonging and 
behaving in 
accordance to a 
religious doctrine.  
Zucherman (2014) 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-
secular-life/201407/what-does-secular-mean  
Dimension A meaningful and 
interesting source of 
variation in a dataset 
that is also the latent 
factor causing a set of 
items to highly 
correlate with each 
other, forming a single 
construct in a dataset.  
Jacoby (1991), Acock (2013) 
Party Ideological 
Space 
The number, meaning, 
and structure 
(orthogonal/oblique) 
of policy dimensions 
defining political 
competition among 
Self-developed 
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parties in a given 
country, election, or 
political event. 
Mass public 
ideological sphere 
The number, meaning, 
and structure 
(orthogonal/oblique) 
of policy dimensions 
defining ordinary 
citizens' political 
preferences in a given 
country, election, or 
political event. 
Self-developed 
Issues Any political or policy 
item political parties or 
ordinary citizens may 
take a position on such 
as relations with 
foreign countries, 
privatization or 
funding for schools. 
Self-developed 
Policy Domain A collection of policy 
items or political 
issues concerning a 
major category of 
political contestation 
such as foreign affairs, 
democracy, economy, 
culture, or welfare.  
Self-developed 
Unidimensional A dataset with a single 
source of meaningful 
and interesting 
variation is said to be 
unidimensional 
Self-developed 
Multi-dimensional A dataset with two or 
more sources of 
meaningful and 
interesting variation is 
said to be 
multidimensional. 
Self-developed 
 
Research Design  
 This research utilizes correlational descriptive designs to answer the proposed research 
questions in chapter one. Correlational designs are appropriate for investigating relationships 
among quantitative variables (Babbie, 2015). The aim of this research is to explore whether there 
are latent sets of correlations among variables in each dataset. This design is preferable over 
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other available strategies such as experiments or case studies (Creswell, 2013). Experiments 
would be impossible to administer since the researcher may not be able to obtain the necessary 
information to complete the research. Elections cannot be manipulated by researchers, nor do 
peoples’ preferences change processes, rendering experiments out of the scope for this study. 
Case studies provide detailed information for finding answers to the research questions proposed 
in the first chapter.  However, the depth and breadth of such information will not allow the 
generalization of results on broader sets of cases in the region. In addition, each case possesses a 
wide array of unique circumstances, political history, demographic make-up, and electoral rules, 
making it impossible to apply results arising from one case to all others. On the contrary, 
correlational research allows the generation of cross-country results that are more probable in 
comparison to findings from case studies, making it a more appropriate design for this research 
(Neuman, 2002).  
  The purpose of this study is the exploration of a neglected area in political science 
scholarship, namely, political ideology in the Arab World. New methods of measuring political 
ideology on the political party and mass public levels have been designed in this study for use in 
subsequent research. A non-representative sample of countries in the region (Algeria, Egypt, 
Jordan and Morocco) was used to discover the feasibility of developing metrics of political 
ideology on the party and mass public levels. More importantly, the original motivation of the 
study was to explore the dimensionality of political ideology at both levels in the region, which 
had been neglected prior to this study. For these reasons, the purpose of the study is exploratory 
rather than descriptive, explanatory, or predictive. Descriptive research is concerned with the 
provision of a detailed description of a particular case, event, or phenomenon (Creswell, 2013). 
Oftentimes, qualitative methods of data collection and analysis are involved when conducting 
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descriptive research in order to gain in-depth insights into the studied object. This research has 
elements of description, since it describes various aspects of datasets, parties, and party systems.  
However, its purpose is not the simple description of an object, but rather the exploration of the 
structure of a dataset. Finally, this study does not attempt to explain the relationships between a 
set of predictors and a single outcome (regression or structural equation modeling based studies), 
but rather it explores the relationships between a set of variables measuring different constructs. 
For these reasons, the appropriate approach for this research is exploratory design.  
 This study is also cross-sectional, considering several political parties and sampling units 
at a single point in time. Thus, findings of this research are a single point in the dimensionality of 
political ideological trends in the Arab World, exemplary of contemporary times. Cross-sectional 
research is weaker in comparison to other designs such as longitudinal or panel (Neuman, 2002). 
However, the lack of historical data on political attitudes in the Arab World coupled with the 
time and effort necessary for translating original documents from earlier elections in the regions 
makes the use of panel or longitudinal designs very difficult. Therefore, given the scope of this 
research, available resources, and timeframe, cross-sectional research constitutes the most 
appropriate research design for the study (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2013).  
 
Data Collection 
 This dissertation utilizes two primary data sources. Chapter three uses a newly collected 
dataset, measuring political parties’ positions in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. This data 
is based on a quantitative content analysis of relevant party manifestos in the elections 
immediately following the Arab Spring. Final representation will feature political parties as the 
rows of the dataset, and political issues such as relations with the West, Israeli-Palestinian 
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conflict, and privatization as the columns. The cells of the dataset will contain the frequency at 
which each political issue has been mentioned by a manifesto. This allows the measurement of 
policy emphasis within the manifestos during the elections season. To measure policy positions, 
a related dataset is constructed containing party policy positions. Each party receives a score 
between -1 and +1, where higher scores represent agreement with the policy issue, per political 
issue.  
Data for chapter four is derived from the Sixth Wave of the World Values Survey 2010-
2014: nationally representative samples from Algeria (2014), Egypt (2012), Jordan (2014) and 
Morocco (2011). The sampling design for each country has been set and implemented by local 
principal investigators working with the World Values Survey, ensuring that the samples 
obtained are representative and have at least 1,000 respondents. All interviews were administered 
face-to-face within the respondents' own environments. Respondents were asked a core set of 
questions in all four Arab nations.  
 
Data Sources  
The data used for chapter three is a modified version of the Comparative Manifesto 
Project (CMP) data set.  This dataset includes relevant party positions on 56 policy items. Each 
party’s national elections manifesto (since the end of the Second World War) has been retrieved 
and analyzed using quantitative content analysis. The analysis was performed by human coders 
who were previously trained by the CMP staff in order to ensure the reliability and accuracy of 
the coding procedure. The CMP is focused on measuring the policy positions of political parties 
in democracies. Issues considered are related to foreign affairs, democracy, political systems, 
economy, culture, social groups, and welfare. Each party manifesto is dissected into sentences, 
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which are then assigned to a policy issue within the 56 categories of the pre-prepared coding 
scheme. Following the assignment of sentences, coders discard all others which do not 
correspond to any of the 56 categories, and then calculate the frequency for each policy issue. 
The result of the process is the generation of 56 frequencies representing the amount of emphasis 
each policy category receives in the party’s manifesto. The numbers have then been used by 
CMP researchers to measure a variety of variables. First, policy category emphasis by parties can 
be measured directly by the calculated frequencies. Second, the 56 categories are distributed on 
seven policy domains, allowing researchers to calculate each domain’s emphasis. This permits 
researchers to investigate whether parties emphasize economic more than political issues. Third, 
and most importantly, the frequencies allow researchers to measure the liberal-conservative (or 
left-right) scores for political parties, permitting them to locate each party on a uniform political 
scale and provide for ideological comparisons.   
The CMP coding scheme has been modified by removing one set of political categories 
while adding new ones in order to make the policy items more applicable to the Arab World. The 
CMP conducts quantitative content analyses to derive parties’ emphases and positions on policy 
items distributed over seven domains: foreign affairs, democracy, political systems, economy, 
welfare, culture, and social groups. The CMP collects and codes party manifestos across 
Western, Eastern, and Central European countries, and has promised to expand its geographic 
span to include Latin America as well as Asia. There are no existing datasets that measure Arab 
political parties’ policy positions.  The CMP coding scheme can be accessed by visiting the 
projects’ site at https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/coding_schemes/mp_v4. Coders dissect 
manifestos into a unit of analysis, referred to as a quasi-sentence, then place each into its 
corresponding category. The final product is a table of frequencies, for each party, that shows the 
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real and relative emphasis that it gives to each of the 56 policy issues. To measure a party's 
position on these issues, each unit of analysis is coded as either positive or negative. For 
example, a party's position on relations with a foreign country can receive one of two scores, 
positive or negative. This allows the CMP framework to obtain a measure of a party's policy 
positions. 
 
Codes and Measurement 
 Table 2.1 displays the new coding scheme developed for this analysis. There are a few 
noticeable differences from that of the CMP. First, in the foreign relations category, the EU 
reference is replaced by an Arab/Muslim one. Second, a new policy item--Palestine—is included 
concerning the Palestinian statehood question. Third, in the democracy category, 
constitutionalism was dropped in favor of institutional reform since the latter is more applicable 
to authoritarian regimes, particularly those allowing electoral contestation. Fourth, in the political 
systems category, federalism and political authority were exchanged for political elites. Fifth, in 
the economy category, free market, free enterprise, and incentives were merged under the free 
market item. Additionally, items of growth and the Marxist and Keynesian positions were 
dropped. Sixth, in the culture category, two items were added:   religious influence and women. 
The decision to drop and add items was made in order to make the coding scheme more 
applicable, and thus to be a more valid sampling of the policy content of Arab polities. Table 2.1 
below shows the new coding scheme.   
Table 2.2: New Coding Scheme 
Dimensions: Issues: Label:  
1 Foreign Relations: West 
Mention and position related to the United States, Western 
European Countries and the EU.   
 
Palestine Mention and position related to the Palestinian question in a  
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positive or negative manner. 
 
Muslim Mention and position related to relations with Muslim nations  
 
Internationalism 
Mention and position related to international organizations, 
treaties or agreements or similar institutions.  
 
Army 
Mention and position related to the armed forces or any other 
law enforcement apparatus.   
 Arab Mention and position related to relations with Arab nations.  
2 Democracy Democracy 
Mention and position related to democracy as a whole concept 
and practice, procedure/substance.  
 
Freedom/Human 
Rights 
Mention and position related to basic personal freedoms and 
civil rights  
 
Institutional Reform Mention and position related to institutional reform.  
3 Political System Centralization Mention and position related to centralization   
 
Political Corruption Mention and position related to Political Corruption   
 
Elites Mention and position related to political elites  
4 Economy Free Market 
Mention and position related to free market, enterprise or 
incentives.  
 
Market Planning 
Mention and position related to market planning and 
regulation.   
 
Protectionism 
Mention and position related to pro or anti protectionist 
economic policies  
 
Nationalization 
Mention and position related to Nationalization of enterprises 
or sectors.   
 
Privatization 
Mention and position related to favorable and unfavorable 
views on privatization  
 
Tech and Infra-
structure 
Mention and position related to technology and infrastructure 
in an economic sense.   
5 Culture Women Mention and position related to gender equality  
 
Equality 
Mention and position related to equality, all groups and sectors 
excluding women  
 
Pride Mention and position related to national way of life  
 
Modernity Mention and position related to modernity and westernization  
 
Religious influence Mention and position related to Islamic laws and principles  
 Sharia Mention and position related to Sharia laws and principles  
6 Welfare     
 
Welfare 
Mention and position related to expansion or downsizing 
welfare programs  
 
Environment Mention and position related to environment  
 Education Mention and position related to environment  
7 Social Groups Labor 
Mention and position related to support for labor unions and 
organizations  
 
Farmers Mention and position related to support for farmers  
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SME owners 
 Mention and position related to support Small medium size   
business owners  
 
Non Econ social 
groups 
Mention and position related to support for Disabled, old and 
similar groups  
 
 
There have been critics of the CMP and its theory, conceptual grounding, document 
selection methods, reliability of the data, and scaling techniques utilized (Gemenis, 2013). The 
developers argue that party competition is characterized by the proliferation of valence issues, 
that is, issues where elites within a party (i.e., elected public officials and high level officials 
within the party organization) have established significant levels of agreement. These issues 
include better conditions for education, healthcare, law and order, and employment.  
Consequently, there is great similarity in party positions, since all parties desire the same 
outcome on valence issues. To distinguish themselves, parties emphasize a given set of issues 
over which they claim ownership. Therefore, the CMP data measures political party emphasis 
across 56 political issues.   The CMP coding methods have been used in this study to gather data 
on the policy positions of political parties in the Arab world. 
 The underlying theory of party competition in the CMP--that it's mainly the different 
emphases that parties give to valence issues that distinguish between them-- has been severely 
critiqued. Laver (2003), suggested that multiparty systems provide incentives for niche parties to 
take unpopular positions on a particular issue. Further, he argues that while the CMP's theory of 
competition may be applicable to single district electoral systems of countries like England and 
the United States,  it fails to predict party competition in proportional representation systems 
elsewhere. To overcome the limitations of the CMP’s approach, this study modified the coding 
technique used within the original framework. In addition to recording proportions, or mentions 
of issues, the study also relies on a content analysis technique used by Kleinnijenhuis (2001) to 
measure policy positions based upon party manifestos.  
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The CMP allows researchers to measure policy emphasis on the 56 categories found in 
the schemes. This does not provide direct measures of policy positions of political parties. To 
generate measures of policy positions, another method developed by Kleinnijenhuis (2001) is 
used. The logic of this measurement technique is simple and straightforward. Each assigned 
sentence in the manifesto begins by receiving a score. The average of all sentences in one 
category represents the policy position of the party on that particular political issue.  Each 
sentence in the manifesto is assigned a value on a scale ranging from -1 to +1 indicating the 
position of the political party on that specific issue. This continuum also includes three 
intermediate values -.5, 0 and +.5 indicating the strength of the relationship.  If the party is an 
advocate of an issue or policy, the position will be coded positive depending on the intensity of 
the position, with 1 representing the greatest intensity in favor of that policy. On the other hand, 
if the party is against an issue or policy, it will receive a negative number depending on the 
intensity of its opposition, with -1 being the most opposed position. For example, if a party 
claims that “Islam is the solution” then the party will receive a +1 on the policy item religious 
influence. Whereas if a party states that “We should respect Islamic values at large,” that party 
will receive a +.5 since the statement includes a positive gesture not a definite call for 
implementation.  This method of coding used in this study overcomes the main criticism of the 
CMP codes since there is less measurement error.  They also allow for the measurement of more 
variation in policy positions.  
Another criticism of the CMP is its collection and selection of documents. Hansen 
(2008), suggested that the Danish documents represented a wide range of proxy documents, 
party leaders speeches, newspaper articles, think tank reports, and others, rather than party 
platforms (or party issue positions) in national elections.  Similar arguments are found in 
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Gemenis (2012). Finding party platforms for all parties participating in national elections is a 
challenge. Despite the absence of platforms for some parties, proxy documents are likely to 
exhibit parties’ ideologies in varying degrees. For the present study, all documents used are the 
original language (Arabic) party manifestos produced by the political parties included in the 
analysis. The only exception is the Islamic Action Front in Jordan that boycotted the elections, 
yet produced an action plan outlining its political vision for Jordan. The IAF action plan was 
similar to earlier party manifestos.   
One of the most prevalent criticisms for the CMP data is its lack of coder reliability. 
Despite the quality control measures taken by the project leaders in recent years, researchers 
have questioned the reliability of the data. Recent CMP publications, however, have presented 
the results of many inter-coder reliability tests, indicating satisfactory degrees. To assess the 
reliability of the present dataset, two graduate students whose native language is Arabic were 
trained by the researcher to code the Freedom and Justice Party manifesto. The interclass 
correlation coefficient between the researcher data and the two graduate students’ data was 
calculated and found to be 0.72, indicating an acceptable level of reliability for the data used in 
this analysis.  
The CMP has produced an estimate of the Left-Right Scale for political parties. Despite 
the simplicity of the scale, it has received criticism for its choice of policy items, scaling 
technique, and the inferences made with it. Despite the criticism, many researchers have used the 
Left-Right scale estimates as simple summary measures for parties’ policy positions. This 
chapter includes policy items relevant to four domains: western relations, economic liberalism, 
cultural liberalism, and Islamism. Table 2.2 presents the specific items used for each domain.  
Table 2.3 displays the reliability of the measures across Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco.  
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Table 2.2 differs from Table 2.1, however, because it provides possible dimensions on which 
political parties in the Arab World could be divided. Table 2.1 merely lists all political issues that 
are coded when conducting the content analysis. The dimensions in Table 2.2 may include 
political items from more than one policy domain. For instance, the economic liberalism 
dimension contains items from the economy and welfare policy domains. Those dimensions are 
equivalent to the Left-Right scale or conservative-liberal continuum in the West.  
Table 2.3: Summary Measures and Items 
Measure Items 
Relations with West  West 
Internationalism  
Economic Liberalism Free Enterprise 
Privatization 
SME Owners 
Cultural Liberalism Women 
Equality 
Modernity 
Islamism Religious Influence 
Sharia 
 
Table 2.4: Reliability of Measures for Different Domains 
Measure Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
Jordan 
 
Western Relations 0.816 
Religious Influence 0.898 
Economic Liberalism 0.743 
Cultural Liberalism  0.804 
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Morocco  
Western Relations 0.751 
Religious Influence 0.708 
Economic Liberalism 0.796 
Cultural Liberalism  0.764 
Egypt  
Western Relations 0.711 
Religious Influence 0.911 
Economic Liberalism 0.740 
Cultural Liberalism  0.897 
Algeria  
Western Relations 0.802 
Religious Influence 0.798 
Economic Liberalism 0.843 
Cultural Liberalism  0.704 
 
Selection of Parties 
This dissertation includes all relevant parties in the four countries that participated in the 
first election after the Arab Spring. But, what is a relevant party?  What criterion was used for 
this determination?  First, all parties included in the analysis, with the exception of the Islamic 
Action Front in Jordan, won at least 5 percent of the total number of seats. Second, parties such 
as the IAF were included due to their potential influence on party competition within the system, 
which was a criteria used by Sartori (1976) to determine relevant parties in a system. In the case 
of Jordan, it was difficult to determine relevant parties (5 percent or more of vote), as all parties 
collectively won only 18 percent of the total seats in the elections. The parties included in the 
study are shown in Tables 2.4-2.7, along with their original language names, seats won, and the 
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year of the elections. Jordanian parties included are those who won five percent or more of their 
27 allocated seats rather than the total 150 seats of the parliament.   
  
Table 2.5: Algerian Parties: Election May 10, 2012 
Party  Seats  Percentage  
 National Liberation Front (jabhat alttahrir alwatani) 208 47.93 
National Democratic Rally(alttajammue alwatani alddimuqrati) 58 13.36 
Green Algeria Alliance (taktul aljazayir alkhadra') 49 11.29 
Socialist Forces Front (jabhat alquaa alaishtirakia) 27 6.22 
Workers' Party (hizb aleummal) 24 5.53 
Algerian National Front (aljabhat alwataniat aljazayiria) 9 2.07 
 
 
Table 2.6: Egyptian Parties: Election November 28, 2011-January 11, 2012 
Party  Seats  Percentage  
   
 
Freedom and justice (Ḥizb al-Ḥurriya wa al-’Adala) 235 49.89 
Al-Nur (Party of The Light) 123 26.11 
New Wafd Party (Ḥizb Al-Wafd Al-Jadīd )) 38 8.07 
Egytian Bloc (al-kutla al-miṣrīya) 34 7.22 
Al Wasat (Centre Party) 10 2.12 
Reform and Development Party (Hizb Al-Islah wa Al-Tanmiyah)) 9 1.91 
Revolution Continues Allaince (Taḥaluf al-ṯẖawra mustamirra) 7 1.49 
Egytian National Party (Masr al-Qawmi) 5 1.06 
Freedom Party (Hizb al-Horreya) 4 0.85 
Egyptian Citizens Party (hizb almuatinin Egytian) 2 0.42 
Al Ettihad (sharikat al'iithad) 1 0.21 
Al Mohafezeen (Protector) 1 0.21 
Justice (eadala) 1 0.21 
Arab National party (alhizb alqawmi alearabi) 
 1 0.21 
 
 
Table 2.7: Jordanians: Election January 23, 2013 
Party  Seats  Percentage  
 Islamic Centrist Party(hizb alwasat al'iislami) 3 11.11 
Stronger Jordon (aqwaa al'urdun) 2 7.41 
The Homeland (alwatan) 2 7.41 
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National Union Party (hizb alaittihad alwatani) 2 7.41 
National Current Party (hizb alttayar alwatani) 1 3.70 
Salvation (khilas) 1 3.70 
Labor and Professionalism (aleamal w alaihtiraf) 1 3.70 
Cooperation (taeawun) 1 3.70 
Dignity (karama) 1 3.70 
United Front (aljabhat almuttahida) 1 3.70 
National Unity (wahdat watania) 1 3.70 
Construction ('iinsha'at) 1 3.70 
The People (alnnas) 1 3.70 
People of Determination (alnnas min tahdid) 1 3.70 
Free Voice (sawt hurr) 1 3.70 
Voice of the Nation (sawt al'umm) 1 3.70 
National Labor (aleamal alwatani) 1 3.70 
Al Quds  1 3.70 
Al Bayareq (sharikat albayariq) 1 3.70 
The Dawn (alfajr) 1 3.70 
Shabab Al wifaq (shabab alwifaq) 1 3.70 
Citizenship (almuatana) 1 3.70 
 
Table: 2.8: Moroccan Parties: Election November 25, 2011 
Party  Seats  Percentage  
 Justice and Development Party (hizb aleadalat walttanmia) 107 27.23 
Istiqlal Party (Ḥizb Al-Istiqlāl) 60 15.27 
 
National Rally of Independent (alttajammue alwatani lil'ahrar)  52 13.23 
Authenticity and Modernity Party (Hizb Al-Asaleh Wal-
Hadatheh) 47 11.96 
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (alaittihad alaishtiraki 
lilquwwat alshshaebia) 39 9.92 
Popular Movement (alharakat alshshaebia) 32 8.14 
Progress and Socialism Party (hizb alttaqaddum walaishtirakia) 23 5.85 
Labour Party (hizb aleummal) 
 18 4.58 
Democratic and social Movement (alharakat alddimuqratiat 
walaijtimaeia) 4 1.02 
Renewal and Equity Party (Renewel w hizb aleadala) 2 0.51 
Party of Environment and Sustainable Development (hizb albiyat 
walttanmiat almustadama) 2 0.51 
Moroccan Green Left Party (hizb alyasar al'akhdar almaghribi) 1 0.25 
Freedom and Social Justice Party (hizb aleadalat alaijtimaeiat w 
alhurria) 1 0.25 
Democratic Forces Front (jabhat alquaa alddimuqratia) 1 0.25 
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Action Party (hizb aleamal) 1 0.25 
Unity and Democracy Party (alwahdat walddimuqratia) 1 0.25 
 
Measurement 
The goal of this chapter is to explore the dimensionality, type, and structuration of 
political ideology in the Arab World. Many analyses prefer the selection of a small number of 
survey items in order to generate a simple mono-dimensional or two-dimensional structure. 
While this is parsimonious and illustrative, it misses the target outcome of generating the real 
structure composing political ideology at the mass level. For instance, if this analysis chooses 
eight questions from the current surveys, say four economic items and four cultural items, the 
expectation is to have a two-dimensional political ideology defined by two general factors: an 
economic as well as cultural dimension. To avoid falling into this trap, this analysis uses at least 
20 items in each analysis, measuring seven dimensions. This approach, while more time 
consuming and complex, is likely to produce more realistic and empirically supported results 
compared to the technique described above.  
Choice of items in the analysis was informed by an extensive body of comparative 
research on political ideology. After reviewing the literature on political cleavages, most studies 
concluded that political actors, elites, or citizens, are likely to be divided along 7 policy domains. 
These include foreign policy, democracy, political systems/corruption, economy, culture, social 
welfare, and social groups. This expectation has been confirmed by other investigations of 
political ideology at the elite, as well as the mass, level. In addition, this approach allows the 
comparison between the structure of political ideology at the mass level with that of the political 
party level (chapter 2) in the Arab World. Exploring the similarities and differences between the 
two is important when inferring conclusions regarding the effect of elites on mass citizens, as 
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well as the quality of political representation. Exact wording for the items is presented in Table 
2.9.  
Table 2.9 Items Used in the Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Dimension Items 
Foreign Affairs The Armed Forces 
 
Charitable or Humanitarian Organizations 
 
The United Nations 
 
Women’s Organizations 
 
Democracy 
 
Having a democratic political system 
 
People choose their leaders in free elections 
 
Civil rights protects people from state 
oppression 
 
How important is it for you to live in a 
country that is governed democratically? 
 
Political Systems  
 
Voters are bribed 
 
Rich people buy elections 
 
Journalists provide fair coverage of elections 
 
Political systems scale for Morocco 
 
Having a strong leader who does not have 
to bother with parliament and elections 
 
People choose their leaders in free 
elections 
 
Civil rights protect people from state 
oppression 
 
How important is it for you to live in a 
country that is governed democratically? 
 
Economy Government should take more responsibility 
to ensure that everyone is provided for 
 
Competition is good.  It stimulates people to 
work hard and develop new ideas. 
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In the long run, hard work usually brings a 
better life. 
 
Culture When jobs are scarce, men should have more 
right to a job than women. 
 
One of my main goals in life has been to make 
my parents proud 
 
When a mother works for pay, the children 
suffer. 
 
On the whole, men make better political 
leaders than women do. 
 
Culture for Egypt v45, 50, 51 52 reverse 
coded 
 
Welfare  
 
Governments tax the rich and subsidize the 
poor 
 
People receive state aid for unemployment 
 
Social Groups Labor Unions 
 
Charitable or humanitarian organizations 
 
Major Companies  
 
This study assumes that political ideology possesses a latent variable structure. The 
analysis is carried out using SPSS version 23, utilizing the built-in Exploratory Factor Analysis 
feature. While all items were measured on ordinal scales, the models were estimated using 
Principal Axis Factoring which assumes a continuous nature of the variables under 
consideration. For ease of interpretation, all items that have loadings below 0.4 were removed 
from the rotated tables shown in the results section. Prior to the analysis, items with reverse 
coding were recoded to where higher scores reflect positive responses. Table 1 above includes 
the measurement of each item in the analysis.  
35 
 
 
 
Each sample was analyzed individually, and an overall analysis was carried out on the 
entirety from the four countries. Analysis began with the introduction of all items into the model, 
and obtaining the oblique rotated solution (Direct Oblimin being used as the rotation technique). 
Items with lower than 0.4 loadings or cross-loadings were removed from subsequent analysis. 
An iteration of this procedure is conducted till each item is loaded onto a single factor, with a 
loading of at least 0.4. While this is a strict approach to EFA, it reflects the empirical structure of 
the data set at hand. To assess the predictive weight of demographic and predisposed 
psychological variables, regression analysis was used. 
 
Data Analysis  
Multidimensional Scaling.  
 Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) is “a general methodology for producing a geometric 
model of proximities data” (Jacoby & Armstrong, 2014). Political scientists have applied the 
technique to many subfields, including American government, comparative politics, and public 
policy.  MDS is used to describe the latent structure of a dataset, as well as test hypotheses 
related to that structure.  An exploratory technique, MDS does not specify any assumptions 
regarding the ways in which the data is organized. A researcher using MDS is engaged in 
exploratory analysis, and does not begin with any A priori expectations regarding a country's 
political party system.  Using the structure generated by MDS, the researcher infers the 
dimensionality, meaning, and structure of a country's party system.  
 MDS begins with similarities or dissimilarities of data on a set of objects, say k. In this 
research, the set of objects are the policy items, so k= 30. MDS presents each object as a point in 
dimensional space (m). This space may be one-dimensional, two-dimensional, or multi-
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dimensional. In this context, m is the number of dimensions required to represent   political 
ideology at the party level.   Normally, m is unknown prior to the MDS analysis, as it determines 
m.  The similarities or dissimilarities are represented as distances between the objects. Thus, the 
smaller the distance between two objects the closer they appear in the model and vice versa. The 
algorithm of MDS yields a parsimonious solution that determines the number of dimensions, and 
orientation between them, that maximizes the fit as gauged by the distances of objects from each 
other.   
 Political scientists have applied MDS algorithms to generate interesting geometric 
structures. In most applications, researchers detect the similarities and differences in distances 
among the k objects in the m dimensional space in order to produce descriptions and inferences 
about the way in which such objects are positioned. For this study, the positions of parties on the 
policy items was used as the objects and MDS analysis was conducted to see whether their 
locations in the dimensional structure provided a basis for inferring political ideology at the party 
level. While the number of dimensions can range from one to k-1, 29 here, it is desirable to 
obtain a parsimonious solution.  
 Researchers look at the placement of objects in the MDS solution to make inferences 
about the meaning of such placement. For example, if a group of objects form a cluster, the 
distances between them are small, leading to the inference that they are all indicators of the same 
position on an ideological dimension.   For example, a number of economic issues might be 
located in a cluster, leading to the inference that these issues are components of this dimension of 
political ideology.  Therefore, MDS solutions have been inspected in this study to determine the 
dimensionality, meaning, and structure of political ideology at the party level in the Arab World.  
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MDS analysis begins with the construction of a multivariate data matrix for each country, 
with the parties being the rows and the policy items as the columns. For example, the data matrix 
for Jordan has four rows, one for each of the four political parties, and thirty columns for each of 
the thirty policy items. Each entry in the matrix represents a single policy position of a party, 
having a score ranging from -1 to +1. To obtain proximities, correlation analysis is conducted 
using the policy position as the variable and the party as the case.  This generates a 30 x 30 
matrix, although with only (30 x 29)/2 distinct correlations.   For each country, therefore, a 
correlation matrix using the data matrix for that country (the number of parties varying from 
country to country) was calculated.  To conduct the MDS analyses, each matrix was inputted 
separately into SPSS, and the PROXSCAL procedure was used to estimate the graphical model 
for each case.   
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis. 
 Exploratory Factor Analysis is a widely used data reduction technique in the social 
sciences. Tabachink and Fiddel (2007) point out that the method is used to reduce a large set of 
variables into a smaller set of components or factors. Factors are unobserved constructs that are 
causes of the observed variables. For instance, if measured variables such as policy positions on 
relations with the west, on international treaties, on Arab unification, and on normalization with 
Muslim majority countries were highly and positively correlated,  an inference from factor 
analysis is that there is an unobserved factor, namely foreign affairs, that is an underlying cause 
of  these measured variables.   Therefore, it is helpful, although not necessary, that Exploratory 
Factor Analysis be informed by theory about the existence and causal effects of underlying but 
unmeasured factors.   EFA is similar to PCA, yet it is capable of reducing the covariation among 
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a set of variables into a smaller number of dimensions. The two analytic methods are not 
identical since they involve different algorithms, although each offers researchers multiple 
options for determining a solution.   
 Many political scientists have used Factor Analysis to determine the ideological structure 
of a polity at a given time. A researcher chooses a set of items, usually survey questions or policy 
items, because they believe that there are underlying ideological factors that account for them.   
Factor Analysis then extracts dimensions from the covariances or correlations among these 
items.  In this study, the input data is the same as that for the MDS context. SPSS version 23 was 
then used, along with Principal Axis Factoring as the estimation technique. This algorithm 
extracts only factors that are causes of the common or shared variance among the variables.  
 As is the case with MDS, Factor Analysis solutions can be rotated to make their 
interpretation easier. This study used an oblique rotation, Direct Oblimin, since latent factors are 
likely to be correlated. Using orthogonal rotation requires the strong assumption that factors are 
uncorrelated, something that is unlikely for ideological dimensions in the Arab world. In 
presenting the results, for ease of reading, factor loadings less than 0.4 are not shown in order to 
make the results easier to understand. 
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CHAPTER 3: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY ON THE POLITICAL PARTY LEVEL IN THE 
ARAB WORLD 
 
What is the dimensionality of political ideology at the party level in the Arab World? Is 
the polarization among political parties, the basis of electoral competition and institutional 
conflict, driven by a single division or multiple ones? What is the nature of these divisions? One 
possibility is division over how much Islamic law should be incorporated into state policies.   
Another is whether the state should enact economic policies that favor the private sector and 
markets, or whether it should enact policies that favor government ownership and regulation.  
Are these dimensions related to or independent of each other?  Political scientists have used 
survey data to identify the dimensionality, nature, and independence of political ideology in 
different countries, regions, and time periods (Bornschier, 2009; Deegan-Krause, 2007; Moreno, 
1999).   Not surprisingly, given the wide variety of polities, regimes, and political cultures across 
time and space, they have found many differences.  Knowing the number of, meaning of, and 
relationships between issues defining the space of party competition aids political scientists in 
testing hypotheses relevant to the quality of political representation, levels of party system 
institutionalization, and changes to the political preferences structure overtime (Dalton, 2008; 
Kitschelt, et al., 2010; Kriesi, et al, 2006). 
 This chapter contributes to the ongoing debate regarding ideological polarization in the 
Arab World (Browers, 2009; Cifci, 2012; Achilov, 2016).   It does so by presenting a model, in 
the form of a figure, that displays the number, nature, and structure of the dimensions of political 
party ideologies in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. This model is developed using data 
from a content analysis of party manifestos.   These manifestos include information regarding the 
parties’ favored policies and their positions on thirty salient political issues in the region. Many 
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scholars have argued that political ideology in the Arab World is uni-dimensional and involves 
intense polarization between Islamists and secular elements (Rutherford, 2013; Stepan & Linz, 
2013; Roy, 2013). This thesis is referred to here as the ideological polarization hypothesis. Other 
assessments of parties’ political ideology have argued that the Islamic-Secular division is eroding 
before other emerging divisions due to policy conflicts along economic and cultural lines (Bayat, 
2003; Hamid, 2014).  
At the mass level, the ideological polarization hypothesis claims that citizens are 
increasingly divided politically on a single division, the Islamic-Secular policy conflict. On the 
party level, this hypothesis claims that political parties emphasize the Islamic-Secular division in 
their policy agendas.  Consequently, the polarization hypothesis posits that the space of political 
competition among parties in the Arab World is uni-dimensional, defined by the degree to which 
Islamic law should be incorporated into state policies. Another central claim of the polarization 
hypothesis is that political parties across the Arab World are divided on whether Islam should 
play a crucial role in public policy making or be restricted to the private lives of citizens. 
Nevertheless, the political polarization hypothesis has not harnessed unanimous support. An 
emerging view postulates that party politics in the Arab World is less ideological and more 
idiosyncratic. This hypothesis contradicts the assessment of the polarization hypothesis because 
it perceives the structure of the space of political competition to be multi-dimensional and less 
structured (Bayat, 2003; Hamid, 2014). Some analysts even go as far as describing party politics 
in the Arab World as non-ideological, whimsical, and not possessing any coherent structure 
(Muasher, 2013). 
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Political Ideology in the Arab World: How many Dimensions? 
This chapter presents findings about the dimensionality, meaning, and structure of 
political ideology at the party level in the Arab World.  The following hypotheses are proposed: 
1.  Political ideology among political parties in the four Arab countries is 
multidimensional.   It is not unidimensional, as would follow from the ideological 
polarization hypothesis.   
2.  The Islamic-secular dimension is not the most dominant dimension in composing 
political parties’ ideology in the four Arab countries.  
Table 3.1 displays the average proportions of political issues in party manifestos in the 
first elections after the start of the Arab Spring in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. Note that 
political parties in all countries emphasized the economic policy domain more than others. 
Political parties, except for Jordan's, put the second most emphasis on the welfare policy domain. 
Jordan's parties, on the other hand, emphasized cultural issues more than the parties in other 
Arab countries. The evidence also shows that the parties in all four Arab countries emphasized 
issues of democracy about the same. Jordanian and Egyptian parties put more emphasis on 
foreign relations than those in Morocco and Algeria.  
The table provides clear evidence that the parties in these four Arab countries put more 
emphasis on economic issues than cultural ones. It is especially noteworthy that the political 
parties, in their manifestos, put the most emphasis on the welfare of various social groups. The 
parties put more emphasis on economic and welfare issues than on cultural or religious issues. It 
is also noteworthy that the policy domain democracy gets similar emphasis by the parties of all 
four countries.    
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Table 3.1: Parties Emphases on 30 Policy Items in  
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco 
Issues Jordan 
     
Morocco Egypt  Algeria  
Foreign Affairs 16 7 10 8 
West 3.6 2.2 2.3 1.8 
Palestine 4.6 0.1 1.2 0.5 
Arab 5.8 1.9 2.3 2.3 
Internationalism 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Army 1.7 1.1 3.1 1.9 
Democracy 15 16 15 13 
Democracy 4.8 5.0 4.3 4.2 
Freedom/Human Rights 3.5 4.7 5.1 4.5 
Institutional Reform 6.4 7.1 5.4 5.5 
Political Systems 8 13 7.5 9 
Centralization 2.9 3.9 2.1 3.6 
Political Corruption 2.3 5.5 4.1 4.3 
Elites 2.6 3.5 1.3 1.3 
Economy 22 23 22 30 
Free Enterprise 8.3 5.8 5.4 5.2 
Market Regulation 3.5 4.3 4.7 6.6 
Protectionism 0.8 1.1 1.4 2.6 
Nationalization 1.4 2.8 2.4 3.3 
Privatization 3.3 3.8 3.9 4.2 
Tech and Infra-structure 3.3 4.2 5.0 6.5 
Culture 21 13 15 12 
Women 5.8 2.5 3.0 1.7 
Equality 4.8 2.3 3.3 1.9 
Pride 2.7 2.0 1.3 1.0 
Modernity 4.4 1.9 2.7 1.6 
Religious influence 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 
Sharia 1.9 1.2 2.0 2.3 
Welfare 12 17 16 16 
Welfare 5.2 1.05 8.0 7.9 
Education 5.4 5.5 5.7 7.3 
Environment 1.7 2.1 1.9 2.1 
Social Groups 7 10 13 11 
Labor 0.9 2.7 1.8 2.0 
Farmers 0.8 2.5 3.7 2.3 
SME owners 0.7 2.0 3.4 3.6 
Non Econ social groups 4.6 2.8 4.1 3.4 
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The polarization hypothesis claims that religious and cultural issues will dominate more 
space in party manifestos compared to other policy domains. Based on the evidence above, 
political parties have devoted more emphasis to economic issues in all four countries. Religious 
and cultural issues were ranked the third or fourth in policy emphasis in all countries but was 
second in Jordan. This evidence indicates that the polarization hypothesis lacks empirical support 
at the party level in the Arab World. Across all countries, economic, democratic, and welfare 
items received more attention and emphasis at the party level than religious items.  
One may argue that party manifestos are a special class of documents which require 
detailed descriptions of policy items and domains. This could lead a party to devote more space 
to a specific policy domain, especially economy. Therefore, polarization on the Islamic-secular 
divide could still exist while parties delve into detailed descriptions of their political and 
economic plans. Inspecting Arab party manifestos yields mixed results. Even though many 
parties devoted a considerable amount of their programs to economics and politics, few parties 
(especially Islamist) devoted an equal amount of attention to cultural items, especially in Jordan 
as displayed in table 3.1.  One may then expect Islamist parties to exhibit a different pattern from 
other actors in devoting more space to cultural items. Islamist parties dedicated more attention to 
issues of religious influence and sharia compared to other parties, Nonetheless, they have done 
the same as other parties by emphasizing political and economic items more than cultural issues, 
except in Jordan. This result leads to the conclusion that the polarization hypothesis lacks 
empirical support at the party level.  
 Tables 3.2-3.5 display the proportions of policy items by party across countries. Notice 
that all parties across Islamist, secular, loyalist, or liberal stripes emphasized the economic and 
democracy domains, contrary to the prescription of the polarization hypothesis. Islamist parties, 
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such as the Green Alliance in Algeria, Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, and Justice and 
Development party in Morocco, all awarded more emphasis to economic and democratic items 
compared to religious influence and implementation of Islamic law. Only in Jordan did parties 
emphasize religious influence and applications of Islamic law more than other issues across the 
four cases.  Nevertheless, while this evidence contradicts the claims of the polarization 
hypothesis, it is insufficient to show that polarization does not exist in Arab party politics. 
Further tests are shown below to assess whether polarization structures party manifestos in 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco.  
  
Table 3.2: Jordanian Party Emphases on thirty policy issues  
In the 2013 General Elections 
 
Al Waset Stronger Jordon NUP IAF 
          
Foreign Affairs  13 1 2 25 
West 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.6 
Peace 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.9 
Arab 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.9 
Internationalism 0.4 0.2 0.2 0 
Army 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Democracy 31 19 13 2.8 
Democracy 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.6 
Freedom/Human Rights 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 
Institutional Reform 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 
Centralization 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Political Corruption 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 
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Elites 0.3 0 0.2 0.5 
Economy  15 29 26 1 
Free Enterprise 0.4 1.6 1.2 0.2 
Market Regulation 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.2 
Protectionism 0.2 0 0 0.1 
Nationalization 0.1 0.2 0 0.2 
Privatization 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.2 
Tech and Infra-structure 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.1 
Welfare 
    
Welfare 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.3 
Education 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.2 
Environment 0 0 0.6 0 
Culture                25                                   18       10      25 
Women 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 
Equality 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.4 
Pride 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Modernity 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.5 
Religious Influence 0.5 0 0 0.6 
Sharia 0.2 0 0 0.5 
Social Groups  4 9 9 2 
Labour 0 0 0.3 0 
Farmers 0.2 0 0 0 
SME Owners 0 0 0.2 0 
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Non Econ Social Groups 0.2 0.9 0.4 0.2 
 
Table 3.3: Moroccan Party Emphases on thirty policy issues  
In the 2011 General Elections 
 
Istiqlal NRI  
PAM 
/A&M 
Socialist 
Forces  
PM 
/MP 
Progress 
& 
Socialist 
Party 
Labour 
party 
PJD 
                  
         Foreign Affairs  1 1 13 6 11 4 5 6 
West 0 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0 0.2 
Peace 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arab 0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0 0.2 
Internationalism 0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0 0.5 0.02 
Army 0.1 0.2 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 
  
        Democracy 37 15 33 37 25 28 32 27 
Democracy 0.9 0 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.3 
Freedom/Human 
Rights 0.6 0 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 
Institutional Reform 0.3 0.6 0.5 1.4 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.7 
Centralization 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0 0.3 
Political Corruption 1.2 0.4 0.4 1.2 0.3 0.4 0 0.6 
Elites 0 0 0.9 0 0.2 0.4 1.2 0 
  
        Economy  18 24 33 18 18 27 16 25 
Free Enterprise 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.07 0.6 
Market Regulation 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.6 0 0.6 
Protectionism 0 0 0.5 0.2 0 0.5 0 0 
Nationalization 0.5 0 0.3 0.4 0 0.4 0.2 0.4 
Privatization 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.5 
Tech and Infra-
structure 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.4 
Welfare 3.2 1.9 0.2 0.2 1.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Welfare 2.9 1.1 0.1 1 0.7 0.6 1.2 0.7 
Education 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 
Environment 0 0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.1 
  
        Culture           5     11       22            5    18          19          4    10 
Women 0 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.6 0 0.1 
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Equality 0.2 0.2 0.4 0 0.4 0.4 0 0.2 
Pride 0 0.4 0 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 
Modernity 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0 0.1 
Sharia 0 0 0.3 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 
Religious Influence 0.2 0.1 0.6 0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 
  
          
        Social Groups  5 16 7 9 8 1 15       7 
Labour 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 
Farmers 0 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0 
SME owners 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0.3 
Non Econ Social 
Groups 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 
 
 
Table 3.4: Algeria Party Emphases on thirty policy issues  
In the 2013 General Elections 
 
 
Green 
Alliance Workers party 
RND FLN 
Foreign Affairs  2 13 5 9 
West 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 
Peace 0 0.2 0 0 
Arab 0 0.3 0 0.3 
Internationalism 0 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Army 0 0.3 0.3 0.1 
Democracy 27 2 25 22 
Democracy 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Freedom/Human Rights 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 
Institutional Reform 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.6 
Centralization 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 
Political Corruption 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.3 
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Elites 0 0.2 0 0.2 
Economy  29 27 31 24 
Free Enterprise 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.6 
Market Regulation 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.4 
Protectionism 0 0.5 0.4 0 
Nationalization 0.5 0.3 0.5 0 
Privatization 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.3 
Tech and Infra-structure 0.7 0.4 0.5 1.1 
Welfare 14 14 9 22 
Welfare 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.1 
Education 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.8 
Environment 0.2 0.3 0 0.3 
Culture                       8                     12                  12                   9 
Women 0 0.3 0 0.3 
Equality 0 0 0.4 0.1 
Pride 0.1 0.2 0.1 0 
Modernity 0 0.3 0.3 0 
Religious Influence 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Sharia 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Social Groups  8 14 7 14 
Labor 0 0.7 0 0 
Farmers 0.3 0.1 0 0.5 
SME Owners 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 
Non Econ Social Groups 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 
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Table 3.5: Egyptian Party Emphases on thirty policy issues 
In the 2011/12 General Elections 
  
FJP NewWFD 
Al 
Wasat 
Rev 
Continue 
Ref&Dev 
National 
Party of 
Egypt 
Egyptian 
Bloc 
Nur 
         Foreign Affairs  9 7 21 15 3 1 12 15 
West 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.2 0 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Peace 0 0 0.3 0.2 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Arab 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Internationalism 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.3 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Army 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 
Democracy 24 24 9 15 31 22 3 22 
Democracy 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.4 
Freedom/Human Rights 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.5 
Institutional Reform 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.5 
Centralization 0.2 0.3 0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Political Corruption 0.5 0.6 0 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Elites 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 
Economy  32 18 28 27 21 17 19 2 
Free Enterprise 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 
Market Regulation 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2 
Protectionism 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Nationalization 0.5 0 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Privatization 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.6 
Tech and Infra-structure 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 
Welfare 0 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Welfare 0.5 1.1 1 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.6 
Education 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.5 
Environment 
        Culture 17 11 17 10 18 14 
Women 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.3 
Equality 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.2 
Pride 0 0 0.1 0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Modernity 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 
Religious Influence 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 
Sharia 0.4 0.2 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 
Social Groups  13 16 6 1 14 17 15 16 
Labour 0.3 0.2 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 
Farmers 0.4 0.5 0 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 
SME Owners 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.5 
Non Econ Social Groups 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 
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Before the presentation of MDS and EFA solutions, it is noteworthy to highlight a few 
guidelines on the interpretation of both techniques’ results. First, MDS and EFA solutions seem 
to be arbitrary from an analytic point of view since they can be interpreted differently depending 
on what the analyst determines based on the relative positions of the set of points distributed in 
graphical or tabular configuration. Second, MDS and EFA solution can be rotated by the analyst 
to make their interpretation easier. Third, the analyst determines the substantive meaning of the 
displayed dimension(s) in both MDS and EFA, guided by the configuration of points. 
 
Algeria  
 Figure 3.1 presents the MDS solution for Algeria. The figure shows that issues of 
religion, sharia, and religious influence on the right side of dimension 1 are located on the 
opposite side of the issues of cultural liberalization, equality, women, modernity, and freedoms 
on the left side of the same dimension. The positioning of these issues reflects that Islamic-
secular divisions which focus on cultural and social welfare issues constitute a significant 
component of political ideology in Algerian party politics. Also presented in the figure are issues 
of economic control and regulation, market regulation, protectionism, nationalization, and 
support for workers on the upper side of Dimension 2. At the same time, issues of economic 
liberalization, privatization, and free enterprise are on the lower half of the same dimension. The 
positioning of issues on this dimension reflects divisions over political economy. Therefore, the 
Algerian political ideology on the party level seems to be two-dimensional with a political 
economic dimension and a cultural social welfare dimension.  
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 MDS indicates that the political ideology at the party level in Algeria is two-dimensional. 
The type of those dimensions is determined by the relative positioning of the issues within the 
solution. As argued above, economic issues cluster along one dimension while cultural issues 
occupy the other, with Islamic items composing a significant portion of the cultural dimension. 
The structuration of the dimensions seems to be non-orthogonal, alluding to the fact that Algeria 
may be divided along a higher order dimension represented by the Libertarian/Authoritarian 
divide.  
 Note that privatization, an economic item, is adjacent to sharia and elites. This cluster 
locates the issue positions of the Green Alliance, parties that are the main Islamic actors in 
Algerian politics, as well as the governing party, the FLN, which represents conservative, 
traditional, religious, and economically liberal voters. Also, the economic items welfare and 
nationalization are adjacent to the cultural items modernity and equality. This cluster of issues 
locates the socialist and secular parties in Algeria such as FFS, Workers, and the National 
Democratic Rally. Those parties appeal to voters who have values that are more egalitarian, 
western, secular, and favorable towards a controlled economy. Algerian political ideology at the 
party level seems to be clearly structured along the political economy dimension and the cultural-
social welfare dimension.    
 Table 3.6 presents the EFA results for the Algerian data. The table shows a two-
dimensional solution where policy items loaded on the political-economy and cultural-social 
welfare dimensions. The political economic dimension seems to divide the parties that advocate 
for liberal economic policies such as privatization and free markets, and parties that favor a more 
extensive welfare state. The cultural social welfare dimension seems to divide the parties on 
religious and cultural liberalization issues. Algerian Islamist parties, belonging to the Green 
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Alliance, are advocating for the implementation of Islamic principles in both the public and 
private spheres, whereas other parties such as the Workers party, FFS, and NRD are trying to 
keep religion out of politics. The EFA solutions corroborate the Libertarian/Authoritarian 
narrative presented above.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Multi-Dimensional Solution for Party Ideological Structure:  Algeria 
 
 
Table 3.6: Dimensions and Factor Loadings for Political Ideology in Algeria Obtained from EFA 
Analysis 
 Political Economy  
         Cultural/Social   
Welfare 
 Centralization political system .995  
Elites political system -.989  
Political Corruption political system .960  
Market Planning economy .956  
Institutional Reform democracy .935  
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Nationalization economy .934  
Education  welfare .885  
Free Market economy .871  
Democracy  .856  
Freedom/Human Rights  democracy .805  
Sharia culture .786 .615 
Religious Influence culture .775 .624 
Pride culture .552  
Environment  welfare  .990 
Arab foreign relations  .967 
Internationalism foreign relations  -.959 
West foreign relations  .926 
Equality culture  -.912 
Woman culture  -.901 
Army foreign relations  -.869 
Palestine foreign relations  .815 
Farmers social groups  .773 
Welfare  -.743 
Modernity culture  -.725 
SME Owners social groups .581 .693 
Tech and Infrastructure economy  .525 
Loadings were estimated by Principal Axis Factoring 
 
Figures 3.2-3.5 display parties’ positions with respect to relations with the west, 
economic liberalization, cultural liberalization, and Islamism. Inspecting the figures, one may 
conclude that Algerian parties are polarized on how much Islam should be incorporated into 
politics, as well as whether the country should espouse a regulated or free market based 
economy. Figure 3.2 indicated the extent to which parties advocate for the implementation of 
Islamic values and laws in the public and private spheres. Note that the Green Alliance, a 
conglomerate of Islamist parties, as well as the FLN, the government party, call for the 
implementation and respect of Islamic values and principles whereas the more socialist Workers’ 
party and socialist forces possess less favorable views towards the incorporation of Islamist 
ideals into politics.  
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 The Green Alliance/FLN camp and FFS/NRD/Workers’ group are divided on economic 
issues. The FLN (the government party), alongside the Green Alliance, prefer a more liberal 
economic market whereas the socialist camp advocates for a regulated and more controlled 
economy. By the same token, this division persists on cultural issues where the FLN/Green 
Alliance camp emphasizes traditional Arab conservative values while the socialist bloc 
(FFS/Workers) prefers a westernized, modern, more egalitarian society. Despite the popularized 
media portrayals of Islamist parties harboring less favorable attitudes toward the west, the Green 
Alliance along with the FLN have more favorable views on striking better relations with the west 
compared to the Workers and FFS.  
 The evidence does not support the polarization thesis in Algeria, since Algerian political 
ideology at the party level is multi-dimensional. The main dimension is political economy.   
Nevertheless, the extent to which Islamic values and laws should be incorporated into politics is 
an important basis of a cultural dimension. The Green Alliance, as well as the FLN, constitutes 
the advocates for the conservative/Islamist camp in Algerian politics whereas socialist parties, 
the Workers, and FFS represent the secular camp. More importantly, Algerian parties are divided 
by fundamental values, with Islamist/conservative parties at the authoritarian extreme and 
socialist/secular parties at that of the liberal.  
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Figure 3.2  
Figure 3.3  
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Figure 3.4  
Figure 3.5 
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1. Islamism, 1= Complete introduction of Islamic laws, principles 
and norms into legislation and public policy and -1= complete 
opposition to the introduction of Islamic laws, principles and 
norms into legislation and public policy, i.e. advocacy for 
secularism.  
2. Western Relations, 1= Complete Normalization of Relations with 
Western Nations and Institutions and -1= Complete withdrawal 
of relations with Western nations and institutions. 
3. Economic liberalization, 1= complete support to neo-liberal 
economic policies, privatization, incentives for private sector 
and less market regulation and -1= complete support for market 
regulation and active governmental rule in regulating the 
economy.  
4. Cultural liberalization, 1=complete support for modernity, 
westernization and multiculturalism and -1= complete 
opposition for modernity, westernization and advocacy for local 
and national cultural lifestyles.  
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Egypt  
 Figure 3.6 presents the results of MDS for the Egyptian parties. The figure shows 
nationalization, protectionism, and market regulation positioned against free enterprise and 
privatization. This indicates the existence of a political economy dimension similar to Algeria. 
By the same token, one may inspect the positions of religious influence, sharia, and army where 
they are directly opposed to equality, women, freedoms, and free enterprise. This indicates the 
existence of a cultural dimension at the party level in Egypt.  
 The Egyptian ideological structure at the party level is two-dimensional, with political 
economy and cultural dimensions. Islamist parties, the FJP and Al Nur, seem to advocate for 
more Islam in politics with higher degrees of economic openness, while socialist/liberal parties 
favor less Islam and a more regulated economy. This pattern, evident in the figures below, points 
to the emergence of the Liberatarian/Authoritarian divide in Egypt. Conservative Islamist parties 
prefer a political order where Islam is not only an inspirational social instrument, but also a 
source of legislation. They also appear to be advocates of economic liberalization. On the other 
hand, liberal/secular parties, including socialist, seem to desire a less Islamic order with a highly 
controlled economic environment where redistribution plays a pivotal role.  
 Table 3.7 displays the results of EFA for Egypt. The pattern of loadings confirms the 
above MDS findings. Political ideology at the party level in Egypt is two-dimensional, with a 
political economy and a cultural factor. The factors are not orthogonal, but are distinct.  The EFA 
solution shows that political economy items load on the first factor, while cultural items load on 
the second.     
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Table 3.7: Results of EFA on Egypt Data 
 Political Economy  
Cultural/Social   
Welfare 
Centralization political system .737 -.574 
Elites political system   
Political Corruption political system .775 -.535 
Market Planning economy .862  
Institutional Reform  .801  
Nationalization economy .660 .625 
Education  welfare .885  
Free Market economy  .722 
Democracy  .949  
Freedom/Human Rights  democracy .879  
Sharia culture   
Religious Influence culture  .884 
Pride culture .552  
Figure 3.6: Results of MDS for Egypt 
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Environment  welfare   
Arab foreign relations  .861 
Internationalism foreign relations  .867 
West foreign relations  .690 
Equality culture .724  
Woman culture  .867 
Army foreign relations   
Palestine foreign relations  .803 
Farmers social groups .748 -.529 
Welfare   
Modernity culture   
SME Owners social groups .581 .693 
Tech and Infrastructure economy .735  
Noneconomic Groups .938  
Labor .860  
Privatization .829  
Protectionism .779  
   
 
Figures 3.7-3.10 presents Egyptian parties’ positions on relations with the west, economic 
liberalization, cultural liberalization, and Islamism. Note that Islamist parties, AlNur, AlWasat 
and the FJP, clearly support proposals increasing the role of Islam in legislation and society. On 
the other hand, the Egyption Bloc and AlAhrar (liberals/socialists), prefer an order where Islam 
does not play a role and modern secular values prevail. This is also clear when one looks at 
cultural liberalization. Islamist parties tend to prefer a less open cultural order where 
conservative traditional religious values play a significant role in preserving the Arab/Muslim 
identity of Egypt.  
 With respect to economic liberalization, Egypt seems to be similar to Morocco where 
there has been a great deal of privatization and other market reforms.   The only party that seems 
to be apprehensive of economic liberalization is Revolution Continues, a coalition of youth 
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founded to advocate the basic principles of the 25
th
 January revolution. This party calls for 
redistribution and greater welfare benefits.  
 On the international level, Egyptian parties seem to be less divided. Again, there is no 
evidence to support the argument that Islamist parties are less friendly toward the West. 
AlWasat, FJP, and even the Salafi AlNur possess positive attitudes toward relations with the 
West and how such relations can improve the security and prosperity of the region. Egyptian 
parties seem to be mostly divided on the question of religion rather than economics or foreign 
relations.  
 The Libertarian/Authoritarian divide in Egypt seems to revolve mostly around Islamist 
and non-Islamist parties. Islamist parties desire a more conservative culture with open economies 
while socialist/liberal parties advocate for a stronger role of government in keeping Islam out of 
politics and reinstituting welfare oriented policies. The events unfolding after the coup in July 
2013 confirm this. Endorsed mostly by secular/liberal parties, the military took over and crushed 
Islamist political activists and groups while instituting an order characterized by modern, secular, 
values and supportive of a welfare state.  
 The evidence again does not support the polarization thesis in Egypt. Political ideology at 
the party level in Egypt is multi-dimensional, and the Islamic-Secular value divide does explain a 
large portion of the cultural dimension.  Still, political economy emerged as an equally important 
dimension. It is noteworthy to mention that Egyptian political parties differ the most with respect 
to Islamism. From the figures below, it can be observed that Egyptian parties do not differ 
greatly with respect to western relations or cultural liberalism. Most Egyptian parties desire 
better relations with Western nations and institutions, as well as embrace many elements of 
modernity. With respect to whether Islam should inform legislation, it appears that Islamist 
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parties advocate strongly for making Egyptian public policies similar to Islamic prescriptions 
while liberal and emerging secular parties vehemently oppose such moves. This lends strong 
empirical support to the hypothesis that the Islamist-secular divide still matters in separating 
Arab political parties, a central claim of the polarization hypothesis.  
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Figure 3.7  
Figure 3.8 
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Figure 3.9  
Figure 3.10  
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1. Islamism, 1= Complete introduction of Islamic laws, principles 
and norms into legislation and public policy and -1= complete 
opposition to the introduction of Islamic laws, principles and 
norms into legislation and public policy, i.e. advocacy for 
secularism.  
2. Western Relations, 1= Complete Normalization of Relations with 
Western Nations and Institutions and -1= Complete withdrawal 
of relations with Western nations and institutions. 
3. Economic liberalization, 1= complete support to neo-liberal 
economic policies, privatization, incentives for private sector 
and less market regulation and -1= complete support for market 
regulation and active governmental rule in regulating the 
economy.  
4. Cultural liberalization, 1=complete support for modernity, 
westernization and multiculturalism and -1= complete 
opposition for modernity, westernization and advocacy for local 
and national cultural lifestyles.  
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Jordan  
 Figure 3.11 presents the MDS solution for Jordan. Note that economic items such as 
welfare, market regulation, and nationalization occupy the bottom of the y-axis whereas the 
items privatization (support for small and medium size enterprises) and advocacy for free 
enterprise occupy the upper end of the same dimension. This reflects a conflict over the type of 
economy the country should have, whether it should involve a large or small amount of 
government intervention.   Also, items related to the support of Islamic values and laws, religious 
influence, and sharia are placed in opposition to items related to cultural liberalization, women, 
modernity, and freedoms. This is the cultural dimension, with one group of parties advocating 
for an Islamic driven society while others call for the removal of Islam from the public sphere 
and replacing it with western, modern, ideals. The MDS solution indicates that the dimensions 
are distinct and represent two different sets of issues, economic and cultural.  
 The results indicate that the Jordanian political ideology at the party level is two-
dimensional. These dimensions are political economy and cultural. The political economy 
dimension concerns whether the state should implement a free or controlled economic system. 
The cultural dimension concerns whether the government should implement more Islamic laws 
or not. These dimensions are not orthogonal however. They appear to be related as the figure 
indicates, and relationships between the factors are similar to those found for Algerian. A group 
of parties, mainly the Islamic Center and Islamic Action Front, calls for the implementation for 
more Islamic laws within the public and private spheres, whereas Stronger Jordan calls for the 
implementation of western values. Stronger Jordan and NUP also advocate for a freer market 
economy, while the IAF calls for a welfare-oriented state. This division contributes to the 
emergence of the Libertarian/Authoritarian divide in Jordanian party politics.  
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 Table 3.8 presents the results of EFA on the Jordanian data. The solution confirms the 
above description of the MDS analysis. The results indicated that political ideology at the party 
level in Jordan is two-dimensional, with political economy and cultural factors.  The table 
suggests that the cultural factor not only includes items related to religion, but also those related 
to foreign policy. It seems in Jordan that parties who espouse a less Islamic agenda, for example 
Stronger Jordan, also advocate for better relations with the West.  However, Islamist parties, 
such as the Islamic Center/Islamic Action Front, emphasize the role of Arab nations in molding 
Jordan’s place in the international arena. The second factor is political economy, where welfare 
items and free market policy issues such as privatization constitute the main variables. Jordanian 
parties are divided on the cultural dimension.   Islamic parties are at the conservative, traditional 
pole while the smaller liberal, westernized, parties espouse culturally modern worldviews. On 
the political economy factor, a more interesting pattern emerges. New Islamic parties (Islamic 
Center), westernized smaller parties (like the SJ), and the palace advocates (NUP) espouse a 
freer market outlook, whereas the IAF prefers a more controlled economy. Those patterns are 
reflected when one inspects policy differences on the four constructed measures presented 
below.  
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Table 3.8: Results of EFA on Jordan Data 
 
Political Economy  
Cultural/Social   
Welfare 
 Centralization political system  .958 
Elites political system  .978 
Political Corruption political system  .935 
Market Planning economy .849  
Institutional Reform   .674 
Nationalization economy  .971 
Education  welfare .939  
Free Market economy .753  
Democracy   .997 
Freedom/Human Rights  democracy  .930 
Figure 3.11: MDS Solution for Jordan 
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Sharia culture  .968 
Religious Influence culture  .998 
Pride culture .621  
Environment  welfare .685  
Arab foreign relations  .665 
Internationalism foreign relations .733  
West foreign relations  .952 
Equality culture  .924 
Woman culture  .880 
Army foreign relations  .916 
Palestine foreign relations  .827 
Farmers social groups  .635 
Welfare .910  
Modernity culture  .913 
SME Owners social groups .958  
Tech and Infrastructure economy .979  
Noneconomic Groups .980  
Labor .753  
Privatization .601  
Protectionism  .935 
 
 
 Figures 3.12-3.15 present Jordanian parties’ policy positions on relations with the West, 
economic liberalism, cultural liberalism, and Islamism. Jordanian parties are divided along the 
Liberatarian/Authoritarian division. On the political economy dimension, the IAF (the main 
opposition party), is aligned with newer opposition parties consisting of small parties espousing a 
non-Islamist rhetoric while promoting modern western ideals. Those parties espouse a welfare 
state outlook where redistribution is a key element. On the other hand, the palace supported 
parties, represented by the NUP and new Islamist parties along the lines of the Turkish AKP 
model, espouse free markets.  
 On the role of Islam in politics, Jordanian parties differ noticeably. At one end of the 
cultural dimension, Islamist parties such as the Islamic Center and the IAF desire an order where 
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Islam as a body of laws and values inform decision-making at all levels. At the other, the 
establishment parties, though conservative, would like to undermine and liberate Jordan from the 
Islamist rhetoric and cultural outlook. Stronger Jordan, the representative of the new opposition 
parties, espouses a more westernized style of opposition.  The value of egalitarianism defines its 
core program. This is evident in the cultural liberalization figure where SJ is the most culturally 
liberal party within the nation. Jordanian parties emphasize equality in general, especially with 
respect to women. In contrast to the stereotype portrayed by the media and pundits that Islamist 
parties oppose an equal role for women in society, the evidence here is that both Islamist parties 
and non-Islamist parties in Jordan emphasize women’s equality.  
 One of the most interesting divisions in Jordan is differences among parties with respect 
to relations with the western world. Stronger Jordan, a modern liberal party, espouses a view like 
that of the Islamic Center, a new Islamist party, which holds a positive outlook toward western 
nations and institutions. On the other hand, established parties such as the IAF/NUP hold less 
favorable views towards the west. One may ask how new Islamic and liberal parties could show 
favor towards the west, while established Islamist and conservative liberal parties are in 
opposition? The answer lies in party leadership. Newer parties are formed, run, and maintained 
by a new group of politicians that embrace a positive outlook on partnering with western nations 
in order to uplift the monarchy economically and culturally. On the contrary, more experienced 
party leaders from established parties still maintain a more cautious, pragmatic, approach toward 
the west. In addition, many of the established party leaders hold antagonistic views toward the 
state of Israel and perceive western nations and institutions as support elements of the said 
nation, thus creating a preference for a less open relationship with western partners.  
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 Political ideology in Jordan at the party level is multidimensional, including both a 
political economy and cultural dimension.   Both dimensions are correlated.  On the cultural 
dimension, Islamist parties favor traditional, authoritarian, values while west-supportive parties 
at the other of the dimension favor secular values.   On the political economy dimension, 
establishment parties, such as the NUP and others, support the monarchy and advocate for the 
government's free market program. Opposition parties (whether Islamist or liberal), however, 
prefer more government control of the economy albeit to varying degrees.  
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Figure 3.12 
Figure 3.13 
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Figure 3.14  
Figure 3.15 
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Morocco  
 Figure 3.16 presents the MDS solution for Morocco. The figure shows market regulation, 
welfare, support for workers, and protectionism are some distance from privatization. Less 
noticeable, the figure places sharia and religious influence some distance from women and free 
enterprise. Once again, as in the three other Arab countries, political ideology at the party level 
in Morocco is two-dimensional with both political economy and cultural dimensions.  
 The political economy dimension covers the controversy over whether the government 
should pursue a stronger version of its neo-liberal economic policies.  Both establishment and 
main Islamist parties advocate for these policies.   At the other end of the dimension are parties 
that would modify the policies by favoring greater welfare and redistribution.  The cultural 
 
1. Islamism, 1= Complete introduction of Islamic laws, 
principles and norms into legislation and public policy and -
1= complete opposition to the introduction of Islamic laws, 
principles and norms into legislation and public policy, i.e. 
advocacy for secularism.  
2. Western Relations, 1= Complete Normalization of Relations 
with Western Nations and Institutions and -1= Complete 
withdrawal of relations with Western nations and 
institutions. 
3. Economic liberalization, 1= complete support to neo-liberal 
economic policies, privatization, incentives for private sector 
and less market regulation and -1= complete support for 
market regulation and active governmental rule in 
regulating the economy.  
4. Cultural liberalization, 1=complete support for modernity, 
westernization and multiculturalism and -1= complete 
opposition for modernity, westernization and advocacy for 
local and national cultural lifestyles.  
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dimension refers to whether the country should promote western style secular values or preserve 
the nation's Islamic Arab identity.  In Morocco, Islam is less influential in politics, but is still an 
important source of social values.  
 The cultural dimension divides Islamist parties that are conservative and support the 
monarchy from the socialist and newer liberal parties that are more secular. Cultural 
conservatives advocate for a free market economy and privatization while the socialist and new 
secular liberal parties advocate returning the country to a welfare state.  
 Table 3.9 presents the EFA results for the Moroccan case. The EFA confirms the findings 
of the MDS presented above. Two factors appear again, political economy and culture, and are 
correlated. Economic items, whether social or free market oriented, have loaded on the economic 
factor and cultural items, whether religious oriented or culturally liberal, loaded on the cultural 
factor. Those findings cement the belief that Moroccan party politics may be divided along the 
higher order factor referred to as the Libertarian/Authoritarian divide.  
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Table 3.9: Results of EFA on Morocco Data 
 
Political Economy  
Cultural/Social   
Welfare 
 Centralization political system  .797 
Elites political system   
Political Corruption political system   
Market Planning economy .874  
Institutional Reform  .513  
Nationalization economy .739  
Education  welfare .596  
Free Market economy  .682 
Democracy  .657  
Freedom/Human Rights  democracy .947  
Figure 3.16: MDS Solution for Morocco 
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Sharia culture .862 .762 
Religious Influence culture .806 .703 
Pride culture  .870 
Environment  welfare   
Arab foreign relations .623 .514 
Internationalism foreign relations .714  
West foreign relations  .869 
Equality culture .619  
Woman culture  .559 
Army foreign relations  .514 
Palestine foreign relations   
Farmers social groups  .940 
Welfare   
Modernity culture .521 .665 
SME Owners social groups .858  
Tech and Infrastructure economy  .883 
Noneconomic Groups .863  
Labor  .856 
Privatization .764  
Protectionism   
 
 
Figures 3.17-3.20 present Moroccan party positions on relations with the west, Islamism, 
cultural liberalization, and economic liberalization. Moroccan parties are divided on the role of 
Islam in politics. Islamist parties, such as the PJD and the Popular Movement, prefer a more 
conservative social order where Islam plays a role in legislative policy making.  Socialist leaning 
parties such as the SUPF and the Progress and Socialism Party favor a less religiously informed 
cultural vision. Parties of the establishment such as the Istiqlal and Constitutional Union are 
more neutral about Islam and what role it should play in Moroccan society. Moroccan parties 
overall are less divided on political economy.  They advocate for a free market economy. The 
country has witnessed a great deal of privatization and economic liberalization, and these 
policies have produced faster economic growth.  Islamist and non-Islamist parties alike support a 
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free market economy. The only exceptions are socialist parties such as the Progress and 
Socialism Party.  
 Morocco’s parties are more divided on the question of foreign affairs. Islamist parties 
favor establishing better relations with the west. This goes against the prevalent assumption in 
western media outlets that Islamist parties aspire to have hostile relations with the west. On the 
contrary, socialist parties including the Labor Party, Socialism and Progress, and Istiqlal favor 
less friendly attitudes toward western nations. Moreover, Islamist parties in Morocco emphasize 
the role of equality, especially women’s involvement, in all aspects of life.   Islam in Morocco is 
culturally more liberal than in other Arab countries.  The PJD and Popular Movement seem to 
score relatively high on the cultural liberalization scale.  
 Moroccan political ideology at the party level is two-dimensional, with political economy 
and cultural dimensions shaping ideological party politics in Morocco. The Islamist parties favor 
a more Islam-informed society that is economically and internationally open. Socialist parties, 
however, prefer a return to a welfare state where Islam does not play an important role and 
Morocco maintains a less open foreign policy.  
 The Moroccan case is not different from the other three countries in this study. The 
polarization hypothesis is not supported, since there are two dimensions.   Still, the cultural 
dimension does evidence the familiar Islamic-secular division. However, the political economy 
dimension may be even more important in structuring and giving meaning to party politics.  
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Figure 3.17 
Figure 3.18  
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Figure 3.19 
Figure 3.20 
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Islamism, 1= Complete introduction of Islamic laws, principles and norms into legislation 
and public policy and -1= complete opposition to the introduction of Islamic laws, 
principles and norms into legislation and public policy, i.e. advocacy for secularism. 
5. Western Relations, 1= Complete Normalization of Relations with Western Nations and 
Institutions and -1= Complete withdrawal of relations with Western nations and 
institutions. 
6.   Economic liberalization, 1= complete support to neo-liberal economic policies, 
privatization, incentives for private sector and less market regulation and -1= complete 
support for market regulation and active governmental rule in regulating the economy. 
7. Cultural liberalization, 1=complete support for modernity, westernization and 
multiculturalism and -1= complete opposition for modernity, westernization and 
advocacy for local and national cultural lifestyles. 
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CHAPTER 4: DIMENSIONALITY OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY  
ON THE MASS LEVEL  
 
 The study of American voting behavior exhibits the absence of a coherent structure of 
attitudes among ordinary citizens when organizing their political beliefs, leading to the 
conclusion that the public masses have no coherent ideology (Campbell, et al., 1960; Converse, 
1964; Kinder, 2006; Converse, 2006). One example is Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes’ 
book The American Voter (1960), which was a seminal contribution to research on the political 
ideology of the mass public. The authors suggest “some individuals . . . know what they want 
their government to do and they use their vote in a very purposive manner to achieve within their 
power the policy alternatives that they prefer. Such people do not make up a very large 
proportion of the electorate.” Recent survey data confirms this early finding by concluding that 
Americans, are innocent, confused about conventional ideological labels, and most importantly 
lack a coherent structure of political attitudes (Kinder, 2006). Many political scientists exhibit 
sheer pessimism about the low competence of the American voter due to their insufficient 
understanding of ideology (Converse, 2006).   
 Despite this bleak portrayal of the mass publics’ lack of ideology, studies have 
established that under certain conditions there is structure to the political attitudes of the mass 
public (Lupton, Myers, & Thornton, 2015; Knight, 1985). Where such structure exists, and 
amounts to ideology, it is found only among sophisticated voters (Lupton, Myers, & Thornton, 
2015; Knight, 1985). These are individuals who possess a great deal of knowledge about political 
issues.  While evidence for this claim is weak, there are experts on American politics and 
scholars who study political ideology who support it (Goren, 2004; Dassonneville & Dejaeghere, 
2014). Further research on the structure of political ideology of the American public has led to 
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the view that the mass public possesses a less coherent ideological structure, with more 
dimensions, than that of political elites (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009).  
 Several scholars have conducted studies of available survey data using a variety of 
elaborate data reduction techniques, such as item response theory methods and data mining 
approaches.  These studies have demonstrated that the political ideology of the mass public is 
multi-dimensional (Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Kriesi, et al., 2008; Thorisdottir, et al., 2007; 
Moreno, 1999). Most of these studies have found that political attitudes are organized along two 
dimensions: economic and socio-cultural. The hypothesis that there is only a single dimension of 
political ideology is incomplete and inaccurate (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). Thus, at a 
minimum, two dimensions are required to describe the structure of the mass publics’ political 
attitudes.  
 Although a one-dimensional structure of political ideology for the mass public would be 
parsimonious, research conducted across various regions including the U.S., Western Europe, 
East-Central Europe, and Latin America spanning many time periods furnishes evidence that 
political ideology on the mass level is multi-dimensional (Markowski, 1997; Jost, Federico, & 
Napier, 2009).  The literature on political values argues that individuals may possess two sets of 
correlated but distinct preferences. The notion here is that political ideology is multidimensional 
because political preferences are generated by distinct ideas or dimensions (Duckitt, 2001; Shook 
& Fazio, 2009; Feldman & Johnston, 2014). This argument may seem circular; however, it 
constitutes a distinct theoretical line of thought perceiving ideology as multi-dimensional rather 
than uni-dimensional as is the case of many American political scientists. Finally, researchers 
have concluded that just because it is possible to extract multiple dimensions when analyzing the 
mass public's political attitudes, this does not necessarily represent the existence of a hierarchal 
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or higher-order factor (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). The extracted dimensions may stem from 
different independent or correlated factors rather than representing opposing poles of a single 
factor.  This evidence points to the possible multidimensional nature of the mass public's 
political ideology across time and space.  
 
What is the Content of Political Ideology on the Mass Level? 
 Much of the research on mass level political ideology begins with the hypothesis that 
mass political ideology is structured on a single dimension, the liberal-conservative (left-right) 
continuum (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985; Choma, et al., 2012). This 
continuum includes economic, social, and cultural issues and possesses two clear poles, the 
conservative and liberal (Jost, 2006). Researchers have defined liberals as those advocating for 
social change and equality, and defined conservatives as those resisting social change (and for 
preserving traditions), even in cases of inequality. The liberal-conservative ideological 
continuum reflects a long history of economic, political, and social conflict in Western countries. 
Liberals were those who advocated for change, civil rights, liberties, and economic equality.  
Conservatives opposed any form of egalitarianism that threatened stability, security, and 
tradition (Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009). Despite the robust theoretical and empirical support for 
the liberal-conservative uni-dimensional structure of political ideology on the mass level, many 
challenges have been raised as to its validity and utility (Carmines & D'Amico, 2015; Hare, et 
al., 2015). 
 First, many authors have argued that liberalism and conservatism are two distinct, rather 
than a single, dimensions (Kerlinger, 1984; Sidanius, 1985; Feldman, 2003; Moskowitz & 
Jenkins, 2004). Many investigations utilizing a variety of data reduction methods have found that 
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economic and socio-cultural items are two separate, although weakly correlated factors 
(Carmines & D'Amico, 2015; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). It's argued that the dimensions are 
generated by separate lines of thinking. A recent survey of the American mass ideological space 
concluded that citizens can be classified into five separate groups: liberals, conservatives, 
libertarians, populists, and centrists (Carmines & D'Amico, 2015). Liberals and conservatives are 
groups who possess either liberal or conservative attitudes on both economic and social issues. 
Libertarians are those who are conservative economically while socially liberal. Populists are 
liberal economically while conservative socially. Centrists are those who are moderates on both 
economic and social issues (Zaller, 1992; Nelson & Kinder, 1996). Analyses of political 
ideology on the mass level in the developing world have noted the existence of political reform 
and democratic consolidation as dimensions separate from the economic or social (Moreno, 
1999). Other studies have also found three to four dimensions of political ideology that are 
statistically independent while linking them to higher order dimensions such as the Libertarian-
Authoritarian divide (Flanagan & Lee, 2003).  
 
Political Ideology on the Mass Public Level in the Middle East  
Following the Arab Spring, a great deal of writing has been devoted to the exploration 
and description of existing political conflicts across the Arab World (Heydemann, 2015; 
Costello, Jenkins, & Aly, 2015; Asseburg & Wimmen, 2015; Dalacoura, 2013).  Many have 
described political ideology in the region as unidimensional, organized by the Islamic-Secular 
dimension (Bayat & Cifci, 2012; Pellicer & Wegner, 2015). Islamist citizens desire a social, 
political, and economic order informed by religious norms and practices; secular citizens do not.  
Another view depicts political ideology in the region as multidimensional with economic, social, 
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and cultural dimensions (Kanbur, 2013; Bogaert, 2013; Malik & Awadallah, 2013; Robbins & 
Jamal, 2016). This view classifies Arab citizens as Islamist fundamentalists, modernists, liberal 
secularists, and liberal authoritarians (Frederiksen, 2013; Gerges, 2013; Robison, 2014; Somer, 
2016; Zeghal, 2013; Volpi & Stein, 2015; Stepan, 2012). Nevertheless, much of this writing is 
journalistic, conjectural, and lacks empirical support.  
 The Arab world has witnessed profound changes in political ideologies during the past 
century (Browers, 2009; Cefci, 2013). The transformation began with a movement away from 
the Ottoman's vision of a caliphate led theocratic empire to a post-colonial vision, in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, of the Arab nation state.  This was followed in the 1950s 
and 1960s  by a Pan-Arab vision that dreamed of uniting all of the Arab states, followed by a 
renewed vision of political Islam during the late 1970s (Salim, 1994).  All the while, the political 
views of the citizens of Arab countries were subject to the influence of rising globalization and 
its package of modern secular, post-modern, and neo-liberal political ideologies.  These 
ideologies, such as secularism, sometimes entirely foreign to Arab citizens, began to appear and 
spread among citizens in the Arab countries (Roy, 2012).  
Studies of political ideology in the Arab World argue that the region has passed through 
several distinct periods, each dominated by a single ideological dimension, in the past half 
century (Salim, 1994; Roy, 2012; Browers, 2009; Cefci, 2013). These studies argue that from the 
1920s through the 1940s, the political ideology of Nationalism organized party platforms and 
citizen preferences. During the 1950s and 1960s, the political ideology of Arabism dominated 
and was the worldview of Arabs.  This ended with the rise of Islamism from the 1970s onwards.  
Supporters of Nationalism called for state control of the economy, society, culture, and foreign 
policy, while opponents called for protecting the economic status quo and for cultural autonomy 
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(Khalidi, 1991). Advocates of Arabism fiercely promoted the unification, or at least integration, 
of the Arab polities on economic, political, and cultural grounds while opponents called for 
preservation of the existing political and cultural orders, monarchies, and republics, instead of a 
unified Arab state (Ajami, 1978). Islamism simply divided the political community into those 
who support the implementation of Islamic principles in the organization of politics and society 
and those who called for more secular forms of economic and cultural societal organization 
(Ayoob, 2009). In the wake of the Arab Spring, the study of political ideology in the Arab World 
has reemerged as an important element in understanding the complex political dynamics of the 
region. 
 Bayat (2013) suggested that the Arab World is witnessing a shift from Islamism as the 
single most coherent dimension structuring political ideology in the region, to Post-Islamism. 
Post-Islamism simply refers to a departure from the traditional and authoritarian interpretation of 
Islamic principles to a more liberal worldview (Bayat, 2011). Post-Islamism divides the political 
community into those who espouse a traditional Islamic outlook, including fundamentalists, and 
those who advocate for a pluralist, democratic, and liberal worldview.  Detailed case studies of 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco indicates that the structure of political ideology in these 
countries, however, is multi-dimensional (Schwedler, 2006, Rutherford, 2013, Blaydes & Linzer, 
2012). 
 Schwedler (2006) analyzed party cooperation and coalition building in Jordan and 
Yemen, and found large differences between the ideologies of Islamist and liberal actors within 
these countries. Her in-depth interviews with party leaders have also indicated that the mass 
public bases for the parties align to a moderate extent with party agendas. Her study suggests that 
two competing political ideologies, namely Islamist and liberal, structure party preferences. This 
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evidence has been reached through here analysis of party agendas, media outlets and anecdotal 
public opinion surveys. She concludes her book with arguing that the Islamist-secular division 
not only divides parties, but also their mass public bases.  
 More recently, Rutherford (2013) analyzed competing political programs in Egypt after 
the fall of the Mubarak regime. He found that Islamism and liberalism are the most noticeable 
contending political visions in the country. Using primary and secondary documents, such as 
court records, newspapers, and interviews with party elites and the mass public, his research 
showed the extent to which Islam, democracy, institutional reform, and market reform compose 
the main dimensions along which political parties, media outlets, and the mass public compete. 
Such studies produce valuable information, not only assisting in the testing of multiple 
hypotheses regarding the dimensionality, meaning, and structure of political ideologies on the 
mass level, but also informing whether political parties and citizens in the Arab World possess 
the same ideological structure. A body of political science research has established that political 
parties influence mass public opinion on political matters, and there is a high likelihood to 
observe the same ideological structure among parties and mass publics in each time and location. 
This logic stems from top-down approaches of political representation where political elites use a 
variety of techniques, persuasion, heuristics, manipulation, and strategic positioning to alter 
public opinion.  Further, the fine details provided by the in-depth case studies points to the wide 
variation among Islamists and liberals, alluding to the existence of more than just the two 
ideological classes. This lends support to the hypothesis claiming that political ideology in the 
Arab world is multi-dimensional rather than mono-dimensional and structured based on the 
Islamist-secular divide.  
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Existing literature on political ideology in the Arab World consists largely of detailed 
case studies and field research. A major problem with case studies is that they may not be 
generalizable.   That is, a finding from one Arab country may not be valid for another.    Despite 
the growth of public opinion research in the Arab World, the study of political ideology in the 
region lags behind that of other developing areas of the globe such as Latin America and Eastern 
Europe. This study breaks new ground by being the first cross-national, empirical, study of 
political ideology in the Arab World in the aftermath of the Arab Spring at the popular level.    
 
Analysis 
Algeria.  
 Table 4.1 displays Algerians’ distributions on all items utilized for the Exploratory Factor 
Analysis. Concerning the foreign affairs dimension, Algerians seem to place lower trust levels in 
their armed forces compared to Jordanians and Moroccans. Similar to Jordanians, Algerians also 
do not seem to greatly value the United Nations, humanitarian and governmental organizations, 
and women’s organizations. They seem to be more similar to Jordanians than Moroccans on this 
last dimension. Regarding democracy, Algerians also seem to value the pluralist political system 
less favorably than their Jordanian and Moroccan counterparts. While this difference is slight, it 
exhibits the lower confidence of citizens in Algeria regarding democratic procedures and 
practices. On corruption, Algerians believe that there is a degree of political corruption in their 
country, represented by their relatively high agreements with statements such as rich individuals 
buying elections is a frequent practice or voting bribes occur frequently during the election 
seasons. Algerians and Jordanians seem to believe that the elections taking place in their 
countries do not constitute free and fair elections based on this dimension.  
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 On the economic dimension, Algerians believe that government should take 
responsibility over economic issues. They also believe that, to an extent, competition is a healthy 
feature of the economic system. While those were shared by Jordanians, as well as Moroccans, 
Algerians gave a higher rating on the statement hard work brings success, indicating their 
inclination toward individual economic autonomy in the economy. On cultural items, Algerians 
seem to be more similar to Jordanians than Moroccans, where they believe that men have priority 
over women in terms of jobs and leadership. While all countries exhibited conservative cultural 
tendencies, Algerians seem to be more conservative than Moroccans, and less conservative 
compared to Jordanians.  Finally, Algerians seem to favor support for social groups in a 
comparable fashion to the two kingdoms of Jordan and Morocco.   
Table 4.1 Items’ Descriptive Statistics (N=399) 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
Confidence in Armed Forces 2.72 1.03 
Confidence in NGOs 2.32 .99 
Confidence in UN 1.61 .77 
Confidence in Women’s' 
Organizations 
2.02 .86 
Democracy   
Having Democracy as a Political 
System 
3.45 .89 
Democracy: People choose their 
leaders in free elections. 
7.97 2.49 
Democracy: Civil rights protect 
people’s liberty from state oppression 
7.49 2.66 
Importance of democracy 7.95 2.16 
Corruption   
Voting Bribes 2.70 1.06 
Rich Buying Elections 2.72 1.03 
Journalists Cover Elections Freely 2.48 .98 
Economy   
Government should not take 
responsibility 
3.51 2.47 
Competition is harmful 3.66 2.63 
Hard work brings success 4.45 3.01 
Culture    
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Men should have priority over 
women in jobs 
3.43 .72 
Make my Parents Proud 3.62 .56 
Men are better Political Leaders 3.11 .81 
Mother work leads to suffering 
children 
3.22 .89 
Social Groups    
Confidence: Labor Unions 2.84 .93 
Confidence: Major Companies 2.71 .89 
 
 Table 4.2 presents the Chrombach alphas for all constructs used in the Exploratory Factor 
Analysis. All coefficients exceeded 0.6, indicating an acceptable level of reliability for each 
dimension. Note that welfare was the only construct with a reliability score below 0.6 since it 
had only two items. As previously mentioned, constructs with fewer items will necessarily have 
lower reliability coefficients.  Also, items within each construct were positively correlated with 
each other, with moderately strong associations indicating an acceptable level of construct 
validity.  
Table 4.2 Reliability scores for the seven constructs of Algerian political attitudes 
Construct Chrombach’s Alpha N 
Foreign Affairs 0.60 869 
Democracy  0.63 874 
Political Systems  0.70 891 
Economy 0.60 1095 
Culture 0.65 1032 
Welfare 0.55 1018 
Social Groups 0.67 835 
 
 Table 4.3 shows the findings from the Exploratory Factor Analysis on the Algerian data. 
While the sample size was relatively small for the analysis, N= 399, a solution has emerged. The 
table indicates that the Algerian political attitude structure is six-dimensional, with foreign 
affairs, democracy, culture, economy, corruption, and social groups composing the dimensions. 
The first factor, foreign affairs, represents the level Algerians trust international organizations. 
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Higher values correspond to more favorable views of such institutions. The findings indicate that 
confidence in NGOs, Women’s organizations, and the UN negatively correlate with the factor 
indicating lower levels of trust among Algerians for such organizations, as evident in the 
descriptive statistics table above.  
 Second, democracy constitutes the second most important factor constructing Algerian 
political attitudes structure. This factor represents Algerian views on democracy as a political 
system, namely higher scores represent more favorable attitudes. It seems that most items 
measuring democracy positively correlate with the factor, indicating a strong support for 
democracy as a political system in Algeria. One item, confidence in the UN negatively correlated 
with the factor indicating that Algerians do not view international organizations as democratic 
institutions. Third, culture represents the third factor making up the political attitudes structure in 
Algeria. This dimension relatively measures how much Algerians believe that conservative 
values should govern gender relations. All items loading on this factor positively associated with 
it, indicating that Algerians are conservative and desire women to assume traditional gender 
roles.  
 Fourth, the economy seems to compose the next dimension of the structure of Algerian 
political attitudes. This dimension seems to represent how much intervention the government 
should take in regulating the economy. All items loading on this dimension have positive 
correlations, indicating that Algerians believe that the government should take an active role in 
economic control and planning. Fifth, corruption seems to constitute another factor in the 
structure of political attitudes among Algerians. Two items, rich people often buy elections, and 
bribes are frequently given during elections season, have positive associations with the factor, 
indicating that higher scores of the dimension correspond to the agreement with corruption 
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occurrence in Algeria. This is also evident in the negative correlation with the item “journalists 
cover elections freely,” which indicates that this positive feature is likely limited in scope during 
Algerian elections. Finally, the sixth dimension composing the Algerian attitude structure seems 
to correspond with trust in conventional social groups such as the armed forces, major national 
organizations, or labor unions. It seems that Algerians do not trust national government 
sponsored organizations such as the army or national enterprises, major companies, and lend 
support to labor unions.
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Table 4.3 Factor Loadings for Algerian Six-Dimensional Structure of Political Attitudes 
Structure Matrix 
 
Component 
Forei
gn 
Affai
rs 
Democr
acy Culture Economy 
Corruptio
n 
Social 
Groups 
Confidence in NGOs -.95      
Confidence in Women’s' 
Organizations 
-.74      
Confidence: Major Companies .69      
Democracy: People choose their 
leaders in free elections. 
 .77     
Democracy: Civil rights protect 
people’s liberty from state 
oppression 
 .75     
Having Democracy as a Political 
System 
 .67     
Importance of democracy  .60     
Confidence in UN -.40 -.52    -.42 
Men are better Political Leaders   .82    
Mother work leads to suffering 
children 
  .67    
Men should have priority over 
women in jobs 
  .59    
Make my Parents Proud   .59    
Competition is harmful    .81   
Hard work brings success    .72   
Government should not 
responsibility 
   .68   
Voting Bribes     .79  
Rich Buying Elections     .77  
Journalists Cover Elections Freely     -.59  
Confidence: Labour Unions      .79 
Confidence in Armed Forces      -.64 
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Table 4.4 displays the correlation matrix between the six extracted factors making up the 
Algerian political attitude structure. Note that none of the correlations, except one, exceeds 0.2, 
indicating that each factor measures a distinct construct. The only correlation that was above 0.2 
was between foreign affairs and social groups. The social groups dimension represented trust in 
national organizations, while the foreign affairs concerned international organizations. Trust in 
national organizations (ie. the army or national enterprises) are likely to correlate with trust in 
international organizations such as the UN or NGOs. This is because both represent citizens’ 
trust in political organizations. While this may be the case, the evidence clearly shows that such 
an association is weak at best. The Scree Plot also indicates that six factors possessed 
Eigenvalues exceeding 1.0, indicating a degree of reliability. The trend starts to be very similar 
after the sixth factor in the diagram.  This suggests that the Algerian political attitude structure is 
likely to be composed of six dimensions.  
Table 4.4 Factors Correlation Matrix for Algerian political attitudes 
 Correlation Matrix 
Factors 
Foreign 
Affairs Welfare Economy Culture Corruption 
Social 
Groups 
Foreign 
Affairs 
1.00 .16 .13 -.06 .19 .20 
Welfare .16 1.00 .07 -.17 .08 -.06 
Economy .13 .07 1.00 -.04 .07 .03 
Culture -.06 -.17 -.04 1.00 -.11 .01 
Corruption .19 .08 .07 -.11 1.00 .07 
Social Groups .20 -.06 .03 .01 .07 1.00 
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Figure 4.1 Scree Plot for Table 3.13 
 
Egypt. 
 Table 4.5 displays Egyptians’ political views on the items used in the Exploratory Factor 
Analysis. Concerning foreign affairs, the question on the level of confidence in the armed forces 
was not asked, likely due to the hard conditions suffered by the country during the survey 
administration period. Overall, Egyptians do not possess favorable views toward international 
organizations such as the United Nations or Women’s organizations. They do maintain better 
ratings for non-governmental organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which perform 
charitable and humanitarian work. Egyptians seem to support democracy as a political system. 
They believe that free elections, civil rights protections, and provision for the vulnerable are 
positive features that should define their political system.  
 Similar to their fellow Arabs in Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria, Egyptians expressed 
concern for corruption during election seasons. They believe that buying votes and bribing voters 
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occurs frequently during elections. They also believe that journalists do not have great freedom 
in covering political events such as elections in the country. On economic issues, Egyptians 
suggest that the government should take responsibility over economic regulation, control, and 
wealth redistribution. They also believe that hard work does not necessarily bring success, 
indicating that the government should provide more favorable conditions to make hard work 
bring more economic independence for Egyptians. Like their Arab brothers in Jordan, Morocco, 
and Algeria, Egyptians indicate that competition is a good feature that the government should 
encourage in economic transactions within the country.  
 On cultural terms, Egyptians seem to support a more conservative cultural outlook where 
females assume traditional roles and men serve as the main economic actors. Egyptians also 
espouse similar views to citizens in Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria on modernization, where 
authority, tradition, and conservative values define the general parameters of cultural legislation. 
Egyptians seem to be more conservative than both Moroccans and Algerians and more similar to 
Jordanians when it comes to culture. Finally, Egyptians have high confidence levels in social 
organizations such as labor unions and somewhat lukewarm views on National Enterprises and 
major corporations within the country, which often enjoyed close links to the Mubarak regime 
prior to the January 25
th
 revolution.  
Table 4.5 Items’ Descriptive Statistics (N=1236) 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
Confidence in NGOs 2.58 1.13 
Confidence in UN 1.41 .66 
Confidence in Women’s' 
Organizations 
1.94 .94 
Having Democracy as a Political 
System 
3.70 .49 
Essential: Free Elections for Officials 8.70 1.72 
Essential: Civil Rights and Liberties 8.06 1.94 
Importance of democracy 8.82 1.62 
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Voting Bribes 2.53 1.01 
Rich Buying Elections 2.51 .98 
Journalists Cover Elections Freely 2.55 .93 
Government should not responsibility 3.15 2.69 
Competition is harmful 2.44 1.94 
Hard work brings success 2.61 2.19 
Essential: Taxing the Rich and 
Helping the Poor 
7.16 2.92 
Essential: Unemployment Benefits 7.16 2.82 
Confidence: Labor Unions 3.06 .87 
Confidence: Major Companies 2.74 .97 
Men should have priority over 
women in jobs 
3.76 .60 
Mother work leads to suffering 
children 
2.90 .93 
Men are better Political Leaders 3.39 .77 
 
 Table 4.6 shows the reliability coefficients of the constructs used in the analysis of the 
Egyptian data. All Chrombach Alphas seem to be acceptable with most being equal to 0.6 or 
higher. Only the culture construct had a value below 0.6; however, this construct was only 
composed of three items rather than four as it was in the Jordanian, Moroccan, and Algerian 
cases. This is because one item was not asked in the data, the extent to which citizens believed in 
making their parents proud of them. Inter-item correlations among the set of items composing 
each construct were relatively high, indicating an acceptable degree of construct validity.  
Table 4.6 Reliability scores for the seven constructs of Egyptian political attitudes 
Construct Cronbach’s Alpha N 
Foreign Affairs 0.65 1469 
Democracy  0.60 1523 
Political Systems  0.63 1259 
Economy 0.62 1523 
Culture 0.58 1523 
Welfare 0.70 1523 
Social Groups 0.63 1450 
 
99 
 
 
 
 Table 4.7 displays the solution of the Exploratory Factor Analysis for Egypt. Mass 
political ideology in Egypt is six-dimensional: foreign affairs, welfare, corruption, culture, 
democracy, and economy. The dimension of foreign affairs reflects Egyptians’ level of trust in 
national and international organizations, with higher scores being favorable views on national 
organizations "labor unions," "major companies," and negative scores unfavorable views of the 
"United Nations" and "Women's Organizations"   Egyptians . The second dimension is welfare. 
The two items loading on this factor include "people receive state aid for unemployment" and 
"governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor."  The third factor, political system, in Egypt 
means corruption. The two items loading on this dimension are "rich people buy elections" and 
"voters are bribed." The fourth dimension is culture. The three items loading on this factor the 
three items related to gender roles:  "when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job 
than women," “when a mother works for pay, the children suffer," and "on the whole, men make 
better political leaders than women do."    It's plain that mass political ideology in Egypt reflects 
traditional, conservative, views about women's role.    
 The fifth dimension is democracy.   Two items, "having a democratic system" and people 
choose their leaders in free elections" had positive loadings.  On the other hand, the item 
"journalists provide fair coverage of elections" had a negative loading, indicating   Egyptian's 
cynicism about fairness of the media and doubts about its support for democracy.   Finally, the 
sixth dimension is economy. Three items loaded on this factor, "government should take more 
responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for," "competition is good," and "hard work 
brings a better life." Positive scores on the factor represent the belief that government should 
take an active role in regulating and controlling the economy, as well as redistributing wealth.  
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Table 4.7 Factor Loadings for Egyptian Six-Dimensional Structure of Political Attitudes 
 FA Welfare Corruption Culture Democracy Economy 
Confidence in NGOs -
.80 
     
Confidence in Women’s' 
Organizations 
-
.77 
     
Confidence: Labor Unions .67      
Confidence: Major Companies .64      
Confidence in UN -
.58 
     
Essential Governments tax the 
rich and subsidize the poor. 
 .82     
Essential: People receive state 
aid for unemployment. 
 .78     
Essential: Civil rights protect 
people’s liberty from state 
oppression 
 .65     
Rich Buying Elections   .89    
Voting Bribes   .88    
Men should have priority over 
women in jobs 
   .77   
Men are better Political Leaders    .76   
Mother work leads to suffering 
children 
   .60   
Importance of democracy     .65  
Democracy: People choose their 
leaders in free elections. 
 .   .61  
Journalists Cover Elections 
Freely 
    -.47  
Competition is harmful      .85 
Hard work brings success      .83 
Government should not 
responsibility 
     .50 
 
 Table 4.8 displays the correlations among the six factors. Note that few of the 
correlations are .2 or higher or -.2 or smaller, indicating that the factors are nearly independent. 
Figure 4.2 displays the Scree Plot. Six factors have Eigenvalues of 1 or greater. Egyptian 
political ideology at the mass level has six-dimensions: foreign affairs, welfare, political system, 
democracy, culture, and economy defining its dimensions.  
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Figure 4.2 Scree Plot for Table 3.17 
 
Table 4.8 Factors Correlation Matrix for Egyptian political attitudes 
Factor 
Foreign 
Affairs Welfare Economy Culture Corruption 
Social 
Groups 
Foreign Affairs 1.00 .07 -.04 -.01 -.06 -.12 
Welfare .07 1.00 .06 .13 -.11 -.20 
Economy -.04 .06 1.00 .06 -.04 -.09 
Culture -.01 .13 .06 1.00 -.08 .03 
Corruption -.06 -.11 -.04 -.08 1.00 .20 
Social Groups -.12 -.20 -.09 .03 .20 1.00 
 
Jordan 
 Table 4.9 displays, for Jordanian respondents, the mean and standard deviations of all 
items used in the analysis. Please note that descriptive statistics for all countries in this section 
did not differ greatly when all cases were used for each variable, case-wise deletion versus list-
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wise deletion.  Overall, Jordanian citizens have high levels of confidence in their armed forces, 
the Arab Legion. On the other hand, they seem to be reluctant to support international and 
humanitarian organizations. This is evident in the lukewarm attitudes toward the United Nations, 
advocacy groups for women, and humanitarian agencies. While democracy is favored, with a 
mean of 8.32 on a 10 point scale, Jordanians do not overwhelmingly support key features of 
democracies, such as choosing leaders in free elections and civil rights protections.   Jordanians 
also believe that there is a high degree of political corruption, with a mean of 3.2 for voters are 
bribed and rich people buying elections on a 4 point scale where 4 equals very often.  
 Jordanians also believe that the government should take an active role in the economy.  
They think that "...hard work usually brings a better life" (the words between quotations are 
exact wordings of the WVS items) and that "Competition is good....It stimulates people to work 
hard and develop new ideas,"   and that the "Government should take more responsibility to 
ensure that everyone is provided for." Culturally, Jordanians seem to be conservative, believing 
that "...men are better political leaders than women." And they also believe that "When a mother 
works for pay, the children suffer."  Jordanians believe that "Governments [should] tax the rich 
and subsidize the poor”. They believe that "People receive state aid for unemployment."  Finally, 
Jordanians seem to possess favorable views on older individuals, laborers, and people working in 
the non-profit world. This indicates Jordanians are accepting of a variety of social groups in their 
society.   
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Table 4.9 Items’ Descriptive Statistics (N=715) 
 Mean 
                                        
SD 
Foreign Affairs    
Confidence in Armed Forces 3.49 .77 
Confidence in NGOs 2.35 .94 
Confidence in UN 1.69 .87 
Confidence in Women’s' Organizations 2.19 .88 
Democracy   
Having Democracy as a Political System 3.38 .76 
Democracy: People choose their leaders in 
free elections. 
7.01 2.63 
Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s 
liberty from state oppression 
6.68 2.44 
Importance of democracy 8.32 2.12 
Political System   
Voting Bribes 3.25 .91 
Rich Buying Elections 3.23 .88 
Journalists Cover Elections Freely 2.64 .88 
Economy   
Government should not take responsibility 3.51 2.60 
Competition is harmful 3.15 2.36 
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Hard work brings success 3.93 2.96 
Culture   
When jobs are scarce, men should have more 
right to a job than women 
3.67 .71 
One of my main goals in life has been to make 
my parents proud  
3.79 .51 
When a mother works for pay, the children 
suffer. 
3.45 .75 
On the whole, men make better political 
leaders than women do 
3.34 .87 
Welfare   
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and 
subsidize the poor. 
7.62 2.68 
Democracy: People receive state aid for 
unemployment. 
6.66 2.84 
Social Groups   
Confidence: Labor Unions 2.85 .89 
Confidence: Major Companies 2.76 .87 
Confidence: Charitable or humanitarian 
organizations 
2.65 .94 
Older people are not respected much these 
days 
2.57 1.04 
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Table 4.10 displays the reliability scores for the seven constructs used in the analysis.  
Cronbach alpha is a measure of internal consistency that tells a researcher the degree of 
similarity of a set of items that are indicators of the same construct. Methodologists advise that 
Cronbach's alpha be 0.6 or higher to conclude that the set of items has acceptable reliability. 
Most of the Cronbach's alpha reported below fall above this guideline.  
 
Table 4.10 Reliability scores for the seven constructs of Jordanian political attitudes 
Construct Chronbach’s Alpha N 
Foreign Affairs 0.67 968 
Democracy  0.61 1083 
Political Administration  0.65 1007 
Economy 0.73 1192 
Culture 0.62 1173 
Welfare 0.59 1173 
Social Groups 0.60 921 
 
 Table 4.11 displays for Jordan the solution for the first iteration of the Exploratory Factor 
Analysis. It shows that the Jordanian mass public's ideological structure includes seven 
dimensions. Supporting the theory, Jordanians are divided over foreign affairs, welfare, 
democracy, economy, corruption, culture, and social groups. The foreign affairs dimension 
reflects the extent to which Jordanians trust international organizations. Most humanitarian and 
charitable organizations working in the country, including the United Nations, enjoy extensive 
ties to foreign assistance, aid, or governments. Jordanians do not trust such organizations. At the 
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other pole of the dimension, Jordanians do trust local businesses and organizations.  They have a 
positive feeling for major companies, including several owned by the state or Jordanian citizens. 
 The second dimension is welfare, or the extent to which citizens believe that the 
government should provide for the people. This dimension relates to the amount of government 
intervention in redistributing wealth, taxing the rich to help the poor, and paying the unemployed 
state aid. Jordanians believe that democracy and welfare go together as evident from the loadings 
on this dimension. Items corresponding to essential features of democracy, civil rights 
protections, as well as free elections, are correlated highly with items representing welfare 
policies. Most Jordanians seem to be in support of the welfare state.  
 The third dimension is economic, which concerns the extent to which Jordanians believe 
the government should intervene in the economy. Items loading on this factor were government 
responsibility, whether competition is harmful to the economy/society or not, and whether hard 
work brings success. 
 The fourth factor is culture.   Jordanian society is patriarchal.   All items have positive 
loadings with this factor, and higher loadings correspond with patriarchal values. Jordanians 
believe that men deserve priority over women when it comes to jobs, and that men are better 
political leaders compared to women. Also, Jordanians believe that making their parents proud is 
important, signaling the value put on traditional parental authority.    The fifth factor in the 
Jordanian electorate is the political system.  For Jordanians, this means corruption; higher scores 
reflecting higher perceptions of corruption. Two items loaded on this dimension, and both are 
indicators of elections fraud.  
The sixth dimension is social groups.   Higher values corresponding to increased levels of 
trust in social groups. Jordanians have unfavorable views of labor unions and major companies. 
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On the other hand, Jordanians trust older people, as well as the armed forces, a large 
constituency within Jordanian society. Finally, democracy is the seventh factor. Higher values on 
this factor correspond to greater support for democracy. The positive loadings indicate that 
Jordanians value democracy.
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Table 4.11 Factor Loadings for Jordanian Seven-Dimensional Structure of Political Attitudes 
 
 
Foreign 
Affairs Welfare Economy Culture Corruption 
Social 
Groups Democracy 
Confidence in 
NGOs 
-.94       
Confidence in 
Women’s' 
Organizations 
-.85       
Confidence in 
Major Companies 
.53     -.45  
Confidence in UN -.52       
Essential: Civil 
Rights and 
Liberties 
 .77      
Essential: Free 
Elections for 
Officials 
 .72      
Essential: 
Unemployment 
Benefits 
 .71      
Essential: Taxing 
the Rich and 
Helping the Poor 
 .52      
Competition is 
harmful 
  .79     
Hard work does 
not bring success 
  .73     
Government 
should not take 
responsibility 
  .61     
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Men are better 
Political Leaders 
   .74    
Mother work leads 
to suffering 
children 
   .65    
Make my Parents 
Proud  
   .61    
Men should have 
priority over 
women in jobs 
   .57    
Voting Bribes     .87   
Rich Buying 
Elections 
    .84   
Confidence: Labor 
Unions 
     -.68  
Older people are 
not respected much 
these days 
     .57  
Confidence in 
Armed Forces 
     .44  
Journalists Cover 
Elections Freely 
      .71 
Having Democracy 
as a Political 
System 
      .58 
Importance of 
democracy 
 .40     .49 
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The findings indicate that the Jordanian political ideology at the mass level is composed 
of seven dimensions. Table 4.12 below indicates that the correlations among the seven factors 
extracted are low, indicating that each unobserved factor is the cause of a distinct set of political 
attitudes. Figure 4.3 shows a Scree Plot of the factor eigenvalues, with seven factors possessing 
an eigenvalue of one or greater.  The first three factors account for the largest proportion of the 
variance in the variables.   
Table 4.12 Factors Correlation Matrix for Jordanian political attitudes 
Factors Correlation Matrix 
Factors 
Foreign 
Affairs Welfare Economy Culture Corruption 
Social 
Groups Democracy 
Foreign 
Affairs 
1.00 .10 -.10 .07 .05 -.17 -.18 
Welfare .10 1.00 -.14 .21 .11 .02 .13 
Economy -.10 -.14 1.00 -.11 -.12 -.02 -.08 
Culture .07 .21 -.11 1.00 .18 .00 .08 
Corruption .05 .11 -.12 .18 1.00 -.07 .09 
Social 
Groups 
-.17 .02 -.02 .00 -.07 1.00 .07 
Democracy -.18 .13 -.08 .08 .09 .07 1.00 
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Figure 4.3 Scree Plot for Table 3.5 
 
Morocco 
Table 4.13 displays the mean and standard deviations of all items used in the analysis of 
Moroccan political attitudes. The sample size, deleting cases without complete data, was 345, a 
small number for EFA. Overall, Moroccans have high levels of confidence in their armed forces. 
Contrary to Jordanians, Moroccans give moderate levels of support for international 
organizations including the United Nations as well as other charitable and humanitarian groups.  
All items measuring the foreign affairs dimension had means above 2.00 indicating a positive 
outlook toward the international community. On the cultural side, Moroccans agree with 
Jordanians that men make better political leaders compared to women, and they should have 
priority over women when jobs are scarce. They have also expressed their support for making 
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their parents proud, signaling a commitment to tradition and authority. Moroccans, however, 
exhibit less support for the traditional end of the cultural dimension compared to Jordanians.   
 Moroccans believe that it is important to have democracy as the political system of the 
country, similar to Jordanians. Moroccans believe that having free and fair elections and civil 
rights protections are essential elements of democratic rule. Moroccan support for democratic 
practices was more pronounced than Jordanians.  On the economic side, Moroccans believe that 
competition is a good feature of the economy, and “hard work brings a better life” similar to 
Jordanians. Moroccans would like the government to "take more responsibility to ensure that 
everyone is provided for.”  Moroccans exhibit moderate support for "labor unions" and "major 
companies" operating within the Kingdom. On welfare, Moroccans seem to prefer a stronger 
welfare state where "people receive state aid for unemployment" and the government 
redistributes wealth, in other words "tax the rich and subsidize the poor." This view reflects the 
general economic outlook of Moroccans, which favors an active government in the economy.  
Table 4.13 Items’ Descriptive Statistics (N=35) 
 Mean 
                                  
SD 
Foreign Affairs   
Confidence in Armed Forces 3.07 .93 
Confidence in UN 2.03 1.10 
Confidence in Women’s 
Organizations 
2.58 1.03 
Culture   
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Men should have priority over 
women in jobs 
3.24 .94 
Make my Parents Proud 3.65 .57 
Mother work leads to suffering 
children 
2.73 .94 
Men are better Political Leaders 2.77 1.01 
Democracy   
Having Democracy as a Political 
System 
3.73 .53 
Democracy: People choose their 
leaders in free elections. 
8.21 2.15 
Democracy: Civil rights protect 
people’s liberty from state oppression 
8.05 2.10 
Importance of democracy 8.35 2.18 
Political system: Not Having a strong 
leader who does not have  to bother 
with parliament and elections 
3.12 1.07 
Economy   
Competition is harmful 3.06 2.41 
Hard work brings success 4.10 3.04 
Social Groups   
Confidence: Labour Unions 2.79 .97 
Confidence: Major Companies 2.64 .96 
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Confidence: NGOs 2.28 1.00 
Welfare   
Democracy: Governments tax the 
rich and subsidize the poor. 
7.86 2.41 
Democracy: People receive state aid 
for unemployment. 
8.06 2.47 
 
 Table 4.14 shows reliability scores for the seven constructs used for the EFA to 
investigate the dimensionality of Morocco’s mass public's political ideology. All Cronbach 
alphas are 0.6 or above, indicating an acceptable degree of reliability. In general, the more items 
included in a scale, the higher the reliability scores. The constructs used in the analysis are 
composed of two, three, or four items, a  smaller  number of items than desirable The reliability 
scores achieve an acceptable level of reliability.  
Table 4.14 Reliability scores for the seven constructs of Moroccan political attitudes 
Construct Cronbach’s Alpha N 
Foreign Affairs 0.79 724 
Democracy  0.72 844 
Political Systems  0.73 735 
Economy 0.60 907 
Culture 0.64 934 
Welfare 0.67 967 
Social Groups 0.74 739 
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 Table 4.15 shows the results obtained from the EFA on the Moroccan sample. The 
Moroccan political attitudes structure is composed of five dimensions: foreign affairs, welfare, 
culture, democracy, and economy. The foreign affairs dimension reflects the level of trust in 
national and international organizations. The positive end of the dimension is support for 
international, charitable and humanitarian organizations. The negative end of the dimension is 
support for local organizations such as labor unions and major companies. Many Moroccans 
believe that the international community, that is cooperation with international organizations or 
governments, is a positive feature that brings economic and political change to the monarchy as 
indicated in the descriptive table above. On the other hand, other Moroccans believe that 
international agents desire to disturb the stability of the kingdom, and benefit certain segments of 
the population; thereby opposition to such actors should be encouraged.  
 The second dimension of Moroccan political ideology is welfare, the extent to which the 
government should redistribute wealth. On the positive end of the dimension, Moroccans believe 
that the state should protect and provide for the poor, vulnerable, and needy. It seems that most 
of the sample sides with this view, while a minority group of Moroccans prefer a libertarian state 
model where the government does not engage in wealth redistribution. The third dimension in 
the Moroccan political attitude structure represents a cultural divide between those favoring 
authoritarian values in society and their liberal counterparts. Moroccans generally believe that 
society should be governed with traditional conservative values, reflected in their support for 
patriarchy. All the cultural items positively correlate with each factor; higher scores representing 
authoritarian values. Moroccans seem to believe that women should have traditional roles where 
they serve as housewives, raise children, and refrain from the public sphere.  
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 The fourth factor comprising the Moroccan ideological space on the mass public pertains 
to citizen views on democracy. This dimension seems to measure Moroccans support of 
democracy as a political system, with lower scores corresponding to favoring democracy. All 
items correlated with the dimension have negative correlations, indicating that Moroccans 
overwhelmingly support democracy. Finally, the fifth factor making up the Moroccan political 
attitude structure concerns Moroccans’ perceptions of economic regulation. Both items loading 
on this factor have positive correlations indicating that Moroccans seem to support an active role 
of the government in the economy, competition is not a great quality of the economic system in 
Moroccans’ eyes and hard work alone seems to fail to prosper economic success.  
 Table 4.16 displays the correlations among the extracted five factors from the Moroccan 
analysis. All correlations are below 0.2, indicating that each factor seems to be distinct and 
independent from the others. Second, the Scree Plot indicates that after the fifth factor, the 
pattern of extracted factors becomes very similar, alluding to the fact that there are five stable 
factors within the input data into the EFA. Note that the first five factors also possess 
eigenvalues of 1.0 or higher supplying such factors with a higher degree of stability and 
reliability. All this evidence suggests that the conclusion indicating the Moroccan political 
attitude structure is a five-dimensional one enjoys empirical support. 
Table 4.15 Factor Loadings for Moroccan Seven-Dimensional Structure of Political Attitudes 
 
Foreign 
Affairs Welfare Culture Democracy Economy 
Confidence in NGOs .85     
Confidence in Women’s' 
Organizations 
.75     
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Confidence: Major Companies -.74     
Confidence in UN .62     
Confidence: Labor Unions -.60     
Confidence in Armed Forces .43     
Essential: Free Elections for 
Officials 
 .74  -.42  
Essential: Taxing the Rich and 
Helping the Poor 
 .73    
Essential: Civil Rights and 
Liberties 
 .64  -.51  
Men are better Political Leaders   .83   
Men should have priority over 
women in jobs 
  .80   
Mother work leads to suffering 
children 
  .77   
 Importance of democracy    -.63  
Make my Parents Proud    -.58  
Having Democracy as a Political 
System 
   -.55  
Not Having a strong leader who 
does not have  to bother with 
parliament and elections 
   -.53  
Competition is harmful     .80 
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Hard work brings success                           
.71 
 
Table 4.16 Factors Correlation Matrix for Moroccan political attitudes 
Factors Foreign 
Affairs 
Welfare Economy Culture Corruption 
Foreign Affairs 1.00 .09 -.14 -.13 -.07 
Welfare .09 1.00 -.02 -.11 -.10 
Economy -.14 -.02 1.00 .02 .05 
Culture -.13 -.11 .02 1.00 .12 
Corruption -.07 -.10 .05 .12 1.00 
 
Figure 4.4 Scree Plot for Table 3.9 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
 The analysis in this chapter found that the structure of political ideology in the Arab 
World at the mass level is multidimensional (seven in Jordan, five in Morocco, six in Algeria, 
and six in Egypt). The analysis also found that such dimensions have low intercorrelations and 
approach statistical independence. While the number of dimensions varies slightly across the 
four Arab nations, the type of issues loading on specific factors tended to be similar. The 
ideological dimensions dividing the Arab public are foreign affairs, democracy, culture, 
economy, and democracy. In all countries, foreign affairs is the most important dimension in the 
Arab publics' ideology 
 Political ideology is multidimensional on the mass popular level. Arbitrarily restricting 
Arab mass publics' political ideology to a single dimension is wrong, both theoretically and 
empirically. The fact that all of these factors had inter-correlations of less than 0.2 indicates that 
they are all nearly independent.  To be sure, a major reason for the discovery of multi-
dimensional political ideology among Arab mass publics is that a large array of policy (political) 
issues from different domains was included in the analysis.  This approach has high validity--
including all policy domains and examples of issues within those domains, thus avoiding the 
error of omission or leaving out domains and issues that are important to Arab publics.   While 
the number and type of dimensions across the four cases differed slightly across the Arab World, 
the dimensions of foreign affairs, economy, culture, and economy are the most important. Arab 
citizens, when expressing their political views, have always found foreign affairs to be salient.   
The Arab-Israeli conflict has been the premier issue uniting Arab citizens from various political 
stripes.  It's a conflict in which international actors are deeply involved. Further, the Arab Spring 
has opened the public sphere to debates about alternative political, economic, and cultural views.  
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The Arab Spring was contested in Arab legislatures, in election campaigns, and in the streets.  
Various political organizations advocated for their own cultural, political, and economic views, 
and have tried to get them onto the agenda of newly established governments in the aftermath of 
the Arab Spring. This has led to increased political conflict, greater citizen attention to politics, 
greater political sophistication, and the development of political ideologies with greater structure.   
 The findings of this chapter contradict the polarization hypothesis of a single Islamist-
Secular dimension. The ideology of Arab mass publics is multidimensional.  Arab citizens can 
take Islamist positions on certain dimensions while taking liberal stands on others. For instance, 
a Jordanian voter may advocate for traditional gender roles in his own society, an Islamist 
position, and at the same time hold liberal economic policy and foreign affairs views (such as 
openness to international markets and governments) which are liberal positions. Therefore, 
although Islamic values do influence political ideologies of Arab publics, there is ample evidence 
that Arab publics have political ideologies that are multi-dimensional.   
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CHAPTER 5: PARTY POLITICS IN ALGERIA  
 
 After a long and bloody revolution against France, Algeria gained its independence in 
1962. Revolutionary struggles in Algeria have influenced the ideology, organization, and societal 
impact of political parties throughout the country. Intense levels of mass mobilization within 
Algerian society have allowed political organizations to thrive and solidify their ideological and 
institutional roots within the country’s social fabric. During the 1950s, Socialist, communist, 
Pan-Arab, and Islamist movements simultaneously directed their energies toward achieving 
Algerian independence. After independence in 1962, Algerian party politics has been defined by 
two main phases: the one-party period (1962-1989), and the multi-party period (1989-onwards). 
 In its effort to consolidate political power after independence, the National Liberation 
Front (FLN), as the main actor in the Algerian independence movement, banned all other 
political organizations on August 14
th
, 1963. In September of that year, the government declared 
in its newly constructed constitution that the National Liberation Front was to be the sole party of 
the country and must direct the political goals of the Algerian nation. These dramatic political 
decisions generated vehement opposition within the FLN, especially among socialist leaning 
leaders preferring a modern secular Algerian state. Many prominent revolutionary figures left the 
FLN and violated the law by forming new political parties in protest, such as the Front of 
Socialist Forces (FFS). Numerous Islamist leaning leaders also expressed concern and outrage on 
the direction of political change in Algeria. Despite this wave of political opposition, the FLN 
proceeded with its decision to ban opposition political parties, and powerful Algerian presidents 
in alliance with the military formed a political force which suppressed any meaningful 
opposition.   
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 The Algerian government has run a state run, centrally planned economy ever since, 
boosting its political position among the mass public. Worsening economic conditions due to a 
drop in oil prices in the 1980s meant that the government did not have the revenues to continue 
its costly social projects. Nevertheless, when the government adopted neo-liberal economic 
policies to mitigate the economic crisis, a spontaneous citizens’ movement waged a series of 
protests. To appease public opposition, the government enacted a constitutional amendment in 
1989 which allowed for the establishment of political organizations and set the stage for multi-
party politics in Algeria. Both old and new parties formally registered in order to bolster their 
chances of winning the scheduled parliamentary elections in 1991. One of the most notable 
developments during this period was the rise of Islamism, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 
particular, as a main political competitor to the National Liberation Front (Mortimer, 1991).  
 The Islamic Salvation Front did well in the free and fair municipal elections of 1989, 
thereby signaling the seriousness of its threat to the National Liberation Front and its entrenched 
political power.   The FIS, in the first wave of Parliamentary elections in 1991, scored an 
unprecedented victory over the FLN, requiring military intervention to undo the election result 
and protect the political status quo from which it benefitted.  As a result, the scheduled elections 
were canceled and the FIS was ordered to halt its political activities.  This drove Algeria into a 
civil war, pitting the government and military against a large segment of its own population who 
supported the continuation of the democratic process that brought the FIS to power.  
During the decade long civil war, with the government restricting political activity, party 
politics in Algeria suffered a significant setback. This period witnessed the persecution of many 
party leaders, dissolution of political parties, and the banning of most forms of meaningful 
political organization. Because of the abrupt protests of the Arab Spring, however, party politics 
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in Algeria witnessed a revival with Islamist, nationalist, communist, and conservative parties 
competing in the relatively free and fair elections held in 2013. Nowadays, Algeria maintains a 
wide variety of political parties which differ greatly with respect to their levels of organization, 
ideological structure, and institutionalization.  
 
Relevant Parties  
Table 5.1: Distribution of Seats in the Algerian Election in 2013 
ALGERIA 
Party  
Total 
Seats 
Share of vote 
  
(sᵢ) 
National Liberation Front 208 0.450 
National Democratic Rally 58 0.126 
Green Algeria Alliance 49 0.106 
Socialist Forces Front 27 0.058 
Workers' Party 24 0.052 
Independents 18 0.039 
Algerian National Front  9 0.019 
Front for Justice and Development 8 0.017 
Algerian Popular Movement 7 0.015 
El Fedjr El Jadid Party 5 0.011 
National Party for Solidarity and 
Development 4 0.009 
Change Front 4 0.009 
AHD 3 0.006 
National Republican Alliance 3 0.006 
National Front for Social Justice 3 0.006 
Union of Democratic and Social Forces 3 0.006 
El Karama Party 2 0.004 
Young People's Party 2 0.004 
Ennour El Djazairi party 2 0.004 
Algerian Rally 2 0.004 
Republican Patriotic Rally 2 0.004 
National Hope Movement 2 0.004 
El-Moustakbel Front 2 0.004 
Party of Algerian Renewal 1 0.002 
National Democratic Front 1 0.002 
National Front of Independents for Concord 1 0.002 
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El Infitah Movement  1 0.002 
Movement of Free Citizens 1 0.002 
Source: IPU database. 
 
 Party politics has been a part of Algerian political life before, during, and after the 
revolution. Early in the twentieth century, many political organizations formed who were calling 
for Algerian independence as well as reforms to the colonial administration. Ideologically, 
Algerian parties can be divided into two main classes prior to the Glorious Revolution in 1954: 
reformist and radical. The reformist camp included the Scholars Association, an Islamist 
organization, as well as a coalition of dignitaries serving in the French controlled Algerian 
legislature. Curiously, the Algerian Communist Party was part of the reformist camp, advocating 
for gradual political change since, arguing that Algerians were not ready for embracing full 
political autonomy. The radical camp included parties that called for Algerian independence and 
elimination of all ties to France. Pioneering this cause was the North African Star Party which 
preceded the governing party today, the National Liberation Front (FLN). In addition, the 
Peoples’ Party called for the complete withdrawal of French forces, officers, administrators, and 
the establishment of Algerian independence and full sovereignty.    
 Following the Second World War, the Algerian independence movement gained 
tremendous momentum due to the French administration's abuses toward and subjugation of 
Algerians. Many radical political organizations formed the Movement for Democratic Freedoms 
Victory, an alliance advocating for Algerian political independence. This alliance officially 
declared its armed resistance to French colonialism by forming a military wing known as the 
National Liberation Front. This evolved later into another political organization, composed of 
different ideological strands, with the same overarching goal of achieving Algerian 
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independence. The Algerian Liberation Front was an amalgamation of various political parties 
and organizations that exhibited drastically different historical formations.  
 As discussed above, with independence in 1962 the Algerian party system witnessed a 
transformational shift from multi-party to a single-party system. The decision by the FLN to ban 
other parties resulted in intense opposition from FLN members, especially the left, and led to the 
formation of several unregistered parties such as the Socialist Forces Front. Many leaders within 
the FLN opted out of the movement, given their desire for establishing a multi-party system. 
With the backing of the military, the cadre supporting the single-party system won and the 
constitution was suspended in favor of a period of emergency laws. Since its early days, the FLN 
leadership included prominent military figures who dominated decision making at both the party 
and governmental levels.  
 On October 5
th
, 1988, a series of youth riots swept the country and resulted in about 500 
deaths and 1000 wounded. The riots occurred due to a deteriorating economy caused by sharply 
declining oil revenues in the 1980s. Many experts have cited political reasons for the riots such 
as continued episodes of repression, uprooting political opposition, and banning political 
participation. The Algerian government's response was to liberalize the political order by 
restoring multi-party competition. Miscalculating its political support, the government allowed 
free and fair elections to take place, resulting in the sweeping victory of the FIS. Fearing that the 
FIS could hold a majority in the parliament and change the constitution, the government, with 
the backing of the military, cancelled the elections and declared an emergency. This resulted in a 
bloody decade long Algerian civil war, and produced a party system dominated by the FLN.  
 After the civil war, the FLN dominated both elections and the government, allowing 
opposition parties only a presence in parliament.   In every national election following the civil 
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war, numerous parties won seats in the parliament, be they Islamist, socialist, or communist. 
Table 5.1 displays the most recent election results for the general parliamentary elections in 
2013. It is clear that the FLN is the dominant party in the country. Despite the FLN’s electoral 
domination, the Green Alliance (Islamist parties), FFS (the radical socialist organization), and 
the National Rally for Democracy (RND), proved their electoral standing in the system. This is a 
clear indication that the Algerian party system was a multi-party system with the FLN being the 
dominant party. 
 After the restoration of multi-party competition, the Algerian party system has more 
relevant parties, such as the FLN, National Rally for Democracy (RND), the Islamist parties 
represented by the Green Alliance, the FFS, and the Workers’ party. These parties have gained 
sizable shares of available seats, with the FLN dominating elections held in 2002, 2007, and 
2013. Most of these parties have established large organizations, and their history of political 
activity binds them with sizable segments of Algerian society. Therefore, these parties impact the 
direction of both party competition and coalition building in Algeria’s parliament. It is difficult 
to conclude that Algeria, after 1989, has a dominant party system, since the FLN has not won 
more than fifty percent of the votes in any single election.  However, it has won a significantly 
higher number of seats than any other party. To better classify the Algerian party system today, a 
reliance on Sartori’s classification is utilized. In explaining Sartori’s party systems 
categorization, Evans (2002) stated that  
Sartori’s initial classification employs the method of counting relevant parties which prove 
themselves non-superfluous over time through their exhibiting either coalition or blackmail 
potential – that is, the ability to influence electoral competition either by their inclusion in a 
viable governing coalition or by their ability to threaten another party or parties with electoral 
losses if this / these former do(es) not follow the latter’s ideological direction. Within competitive 
systems, such counting then distinguishes between low fragmentation two-party systems; medium 
fragmentation-limited pluralist systems with between three and five parties; and highly 
fragmented extreme pluralist systems with five parties or more.2 In addition to these, a final 
competitive system is noted, namely the predominant party system, where a single party is 
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consistently supported by a winning majority of voters (and hence has an absolute majority of 
seats), and thus is able to monopolize power. 
 Given the fact that the National Liberation Front won more votes than the next four 
parties combined in the 2013 elections, and the majority of earlier elections, it can be concluded 
that the Algerian party system is a predominant party system with the FLN as the dominant 
party.  
 
Ideological Fit: Parties and Mass Publics  
Foreign Affairs. 
  Algerian parties and their self-identified supporters show low levels of agreement on 
foreign affairs related issues. Figure 5.1 represents Algerian parties’ positions on the extent to 
which Algeria should deal and partner with western nations and organizations such as the United 
States and the European Union. It appears that most parties do not advocate for an active and 
cooperative relationship with western entities. The governing party, the FLN, seems to be the 
most supportive of an amicable stance toward western partners. Socialist and communist leaning 
parties, such as the Workers Party and Socialist Forces Front, favor decreased collaboration with 
western partners as is evident by the negative values in the figure. The Islamist bloc, the Green 
Alliance, seems to be neutral and in favor of a pragmatic relationship with Western nations and 
institutions.  
 While Algerian parties seem suspicious of Western nations and organizations, they seem 
willing to cooperate with international organizations such as the United Nations and similar 
institutions. Figure 5.2 represents Algerian party positions with respect to the extent to which 
they are willing to engage in activities or deals sanctioned by international organizations. 
Regardless of ideological affiliation, all parties seem to advocate for a more cooperative and 
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friendly stance towards international organizations. The evidence is that Algerian parties favor 
organizations with an international rather than Western orientation.  
 The Algerian public, unlike their political parties that have a modicum of trust in 
international organizations, do not have great trust in the United Nations and similar international 
organizations regardless of their ideological orientations. Figure 5.3 displays the Algerian 
public's opinions of the UN. These opinions indicate mistrust. Socialist, Islamist, and Liberal 
voters in the republic all seem unified in their distrust of, disgust in, and apathy toward both 
international and western institutions. Therefore, those parties that favor cooperation with 
international or western institutions do not represent their supporters' preferences.   This lowers 
the level of ideological fit between Algeria's mass public and its parties.  
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Figure 5.1: Algerian party positions on dealing with the 
West 
Figure 5.2: Algerian party positions on engagement with 
international organizations 
130 
 
 
 
 
 
1= Great Deal, 2= Quite a Lot, 3= Not Very Much and 4= Not at All 
Figure 5.3: Algerian voters’ opinion of the UN 
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Democracy 
 On democracy, Algerian parties and voters also show moderate to high levels of 
agreement. Algerian parties, regardless of their political orientation, favor democracy as a 
political system. All Islamist, socialist, and liberal parties possess highly positive scores close to 
1, exhibiting complete support for democracy. While Algerian voters also believe that it is 
important to live in a democracy, there are a few voters who give lesser support. Supporters for 
the Islamist party, the Movement for Society of Peace (Hamas), display lukewarm support for 
democracy, having the lowest score as displayed in Figure 5.4. This lukewarm support is 
contrary to the high support of the coalition of Green Alliance parties, the Islamist coalition of 
parties that included Hamas, and participated in the 2012 elections as seen in Figure 5.5.  
 Similarly, voters of the Socialist Forces Front gave less support for democracy than their 
party. While their score is positive, it's less than the score for voters of other liberal and secular 
parties such as the FLN, RND, and the Workers Party.  Despite both the Algerian parties and 
their respective voters supporting democracy, Figure 5.6 shows clearly that voters’ support for 
democracy is less than that of their respective parties. Thus, there's moderate to high levels of 
agreement between the Algerian parties and their respective voters on democracy.  
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Figure 5.4: Algerian voter’s views of 
Democracy 
Figure 5.5: Algerian voters’ support of political parties in 2012 
elections 
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Figure 5.6: Algerian voters’ views on the importance of democracy 
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Corruption 
 Algerian parties and voters tend to agree on the need for more efforts to combat 
corruption and institute political reforms. Opposition parties, such as the FFS and GA, more 
often advocate for reforms to the constitution and the political system compared to the governing 
party, the FLN, as demonstrated in Figure 5.7 below. Similarly, Algerian parties advocate for 
taking concrete steps to fight corruption. Algerian voters believe that vote buying occurs fairly 
frequently during national elections. This indicates that Algerians, like their parties, believe that 
the government should do more to curb corruption in the country.  While the World Values 
Survey does not include a question on Algerians’ views about the extent to which government 
should deal with corruption, Figure 5.8 shows that the political parties want more efforts to fight 
corruption in the country.  Thus, there's high agreement between the Algerian parties and their 
respective voters on corruption. 
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Figure 5.7: Algerian voters’ views on combatting 
corruption 
Figure 5.8: Algerian political parties’ stances on corruption 
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1= Very Often, 2= Fairly Often, 3= Not Very Often, 4= Not at All
Figure 5.9 Algerian voters’ views on electoral accuracy 
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Economy 
 Algerian parties and voters possess low levels of ideological fit concerning economic 
policy items. Figure 5.10 demonstrates the position of Algerian parties on the extent to which the 
government should regulate the economy. It appears that the governing party, the FLN, is the 
only Algerian political party advocating for less economic regulation. Socialist (FFS and 
Workers), as well as Islamist (GA), parties favor more government regulation. Figure 5.11 
displays Algerian parties’ standing on the extent to which the government should privatize state 
owned enterprises. It seems that the FLN is the premier advocate for privatization in the republic, 
followed by the Islamist GA coalition. On the other hand, socialist parties favor more state 
ownership and control of enterprises.  
 Unlike its party, FLN’s voters are more in favor of a controlled economy, where the 
government uses its regulatory authority, as evident in Figure 5.12. Algeria voters believe that 
“the government ownership of business and industry should be increased.” Similarly, voters of 
socialist and Islamist parties support more government control of the economy showing similar 
support to FLN voters for an increase of government ownership over the economy. Also, 
Algerian voters believe that the “the government should take more responsibility and ensure that 
everyone is provided for.”  However, the FLN advocates a liberal economic agenda that differs 
from its supporters’ economic views favoring a more regulated economy where the government 
owns critical economic institutions. Algerian parties and voters do not possess high agreement on 
economic items.  
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Figure 5.10: Algerian party positions on government regulation of the economy 
Figure 5.11: Algerian party positions on government privatization of state owned 
enterprises 
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1= Private Ownership of Business and Industry Should be Increased  
10= Government Ownership of Business and Industry Should be increased  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Algerian voters’ views on government regulation of the economy 
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1= Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for  
10= People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves  
 
 
Culture  
 Algerian parties and voters do not agree much on cultural issues. Figure 5.14 displays 
Algerian parties’ positions on the extent to which religious influence, particularly Islam, should 
be incorporated into politics. It is clear that the country is witnessing a polarization between 
socialist forces, the FFS and Workers, and Islamist parties. The ruling FLN party advocates for a 
more conservative culture, where Islam is respected.   The socialist camp differs sharply, and 
calls for the retreat of Islam from the public sphere. Figure 5.15 depicts party standings on the 
Figure 5.13: Algerian voters’ views on government responsibility for the economy 
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extent to which women should be equal to men in society. All the Algerian parties advocate for a 
degree of egalitarianism, but this is high in the socialist camp and low in the Islamist bloc.  
 Unlike their parties, Algerian voters all agree that Islam should have at least a minimal 
role in the making of the political order as evident in Figure 5.16. This indicates that some 
Algerian parties, notably the socialist, are taking an extreme position on the issue compared to 
their voters. Similarly, Algerian parties, regardless of their ideological orientation, possess a 
more extreme preference for gender equality compared to their voters. Algerians prefer a more 
conservative outlook compared to their parties, where women assume traditional roles. Figure 
5.17 displays Algerians’ views on whether men should have priority over women during times of 
job scarcity. Algerians generally believe that men should have priority over women when it 
comes to jobs scarcity.  
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Figure 5.14: Algerian party positions on religious influence on 
the political process 
Figure 5.15: Algerian party positions on female equality 
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1= Agree 
3= Disagree 
 
Figure 5.16: Algerian voters’ views on the role of Islam in politics 
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1= Not an essential characteristic  
10= An essential characteristic  
Figure 5.17: Algerian voters’ views on male prioritization during job scarcity 
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Welfare 
 On welfare, Algerian parties and their voters show low agreement. Figure 5.18 displays 
Algerian parties’ positions on the extent to which they support welfare. It appears that all parties, 
irrespective of their ideological label, favor a welfare state. Socialist parties, the FFS and 
Workers, advocate for a large welfare state. Similarly, the Islamist coalition of parties, such as 
the GA, favors a welfare state. The ruling party, the FLN, seems to be the party not strongly 
backing a welfare state. Nevertheless, it does support an active but perhaps limited role of the 
state in providing welfare services to Algerians.  
 Algerian voters, by contrast, seem to be more pragmatic when it comes to welfare. On an 
item in the World Values Surveys asking Algerians to what extent they support the taxing of the 
rich to provide for the poor.  Many voters seem to give only lukewarm support for poor 
Algerians. Many voters among the FLN, RND, and Workers, appear to possess middle range 
values on the item (4-6 on a 10 point item, where 10 represents an absolute advocacy for taxing 
the rich and subsidizing the poor). This shows that there is a low degree of agreement between 
the Algerian parties and their respective voters on welfare related policies.  
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Figure 5.18: Algerian party positions on welfare 
support 
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1= Not an Essential Characteristic  
10= An Essential Characteristic  
 
Figure 5.19 Algerian voters’ views on taxing the rich to subsidize the poor 
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Algerian parties exhibit great variation with respect to their political ideologies. Algerian 
parties can be classified according to three party families: the Social Democrats, the Liberal, and 
the Islamist. Figure 5.20 displays the distribution of relevant political parties in the most recent 
elections according to their standings on economic and cultural liberalism.  The Social 
Democratic bloc of parties is composed of two main parties, the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) as 
well as the National Rally for Democracy (NRD). They espouse a more protectionist economic 
agenda coupled with a liberal cultural vision. On the other hand, the Islamist bloc is composed of 
the Green Alliance, which is itself an electoral coalition of several other Islamic actors 
(Renaissance/Elnahda, Movement for National Reform/Islah, and Movement for Society of 
Peace/Hamas), advocates for a centrist position on both economic and cultural liberalism (Kapil, 
2015). The National Liberation Front constitutes the Liberal bloc of parties, advocating a liberal 
view on economy and culture. 
 
Figure 5.20 Algerian Parties’ Positions on Economic 
And Cultural Liberalism 
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The National Liberation Front began as a socialist party aiming to preserve the Islamic 
identity of Algeria, with an agenda that defined the governments’ economic policy throughout 
the 1960s and 70s. This is partly due to the strength of the Algerian presidents who controlled the 
party throughout their reign. With the rising economic pressures brought by the decrease of oil 
revenues in the late 1980s, the government needed to reform its protectionist economic stance.  
Thus, the government introduced several liberalizing measures to better deal with the economic 
crisis. The FLN in turn moderated its socialist economic ideology and realigned its rhetoric to a 
more centrist position. Continuing its liberalization of the economy, the government moved away 
from its nationalist program to a free market like economy. Similarly, the FLN moved to become 
the liberal party of the state.  
 The push for liberalization has generated a lot of opposition from different segments of 
the Algerian population. This has been led by the FFS and social democrats, including the NRD. 
Both parties, along with other smaller parties, advocated protectionism for the Algerian 
economy. Interestingly, such parties also called for liberalizing the cultural sphere of Algerian 
society, and wanted to weaken the Islamic parties’ stance. This was clear in the years leading up 
to the triumph of the FIS during the late 80s.  
 The Socialist Forces Front participated in the 2013 elections, breaking its boycotting 
legacy. This may be due to the rising optimism for real political change within the Algerian 
political system following the Arab Spring. The party has represented the oldest, most ardent, 
opposition camp to the Algerian government since independence. It espouses a Marxist cultural 
vision where religion is marginalized to private life. Modernity is also embraced as the 
alternative for the Islamic worldview. Nationalization of the economy and governmental control 
over the market is also called for by the SFF. Party ideology of the SFF has not substantially 
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changed despite the nuanced transformations of the message from being unvarnished Marxism to 
a less strident socialism.  
 Although the NRD presents a similar ideological message to that of the FFS, they differ 
dramatically with respect to their evolution. The NRD was formed by FLN members and 
government supporters during the middle of the Algerian civil war in the late 1990s. The party 
had a platform that advocated for political pluralism, governmental oversight over the economy 
and culture, and an opposition to Islamic dominance in Algerian society. The party's ideology 
differs from that of the FFS, since there's no coherent ideology such as Marxism or socialism that 
drives it.   The party's ideology reflected the desires of FLN leaders, specifically Liamine 
Zeroual, the president at the time. Nevertheless, the party's ideology hasn't changed much since 
the party was founded, differentiating it from the FLN's more liberal vision today. The NRD still 
espouses the 1990s FLN agenda of moderate economic liberalization with increased state 
oversight over the economy. On culture, the NRD does not differ much from the FLN. However, 
the FLN has developed a neo liberal economic standing with the rising wave of liberal economic 
policies that the Algerian government has implemented in the past two decades.  
 The Green Alliance represents Islamist parties of all stripes in Algeria. Most radical 
Islamist parties have moderated their message after the civil war. FIS has dissolved into many 
smaller organizations. A few of these were crushed by the Algerian military, and others changed 
their message from resistance to reform. The product of the civil war was a moderate Islamist 
camp, mainly representing traditional Islamist parties espousing the values of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Two main parties emerged in this family, the Renaissance Movement (Enahda) and 
the Movement for Peace (Hamas). Both parties called for a centrist economic and cultural policy, 
and do not desire an economy completely organized by the state. They are also against a full 
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liberalization of the market (Boubekeur & Amghar, 2006). Espousing a cautious liberalizing 
policy, the Islamist parties still desire the government to be a main actor in driving economic 
activity. Culturally, Islamist parties, especially the FFS and NRD, do not want modernity to 
penetrate ordinary citizens’ lives in Algeria at all levels.  These parties desire a conservative 
cultural policy, protecting the place of Islamic values within the existing social fabric. 
Understandably, Islamist parties in Algeria do not call for the complete implementation of Sharia 
law. This is due to the constant fear that the country will undergo another violent episode similar 
to that of the 1990s.  
 One of the noteworthy observations regarding the family of Islamist parties in Algeria is 
the absence of neo-liberal Islamic parties. Unlike other Arab nations such as Egypt, Jordan, and 
Morocco, Algeria has not yet seen the appearance of neo-liberal Islamist parties. These parties 
call for a total economic liberalization with a protectionist cultural outlook. Islamic rules, 
principles, and teachings will be activated while still allowing for economic liberty, thus 
preserving Islamic values in society. The favored degree of preservation varies from party to 
party.  A few espouse a complete application of Sharia cultural principles, while others simply 
advocate for their respect and appreciation without necessarily applying them. The lack of such 
parties in Algeria is due to the more limited economic liberalization the Algerian government has 
allowed compared to Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco (Roberts, 2015). In the latter states, 
governments have instituted a series of reforms, allowing for privatization of public enterprises 
and relaxation of foreign investment. This allowed certain segments of society, especially small 
and medium business owners, to benefit and organize politically, including the neo-liberal 
Islamic parties, which are often referred to as moderate Islamist parties (Zhang, 2016).  
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Institutionalization  
 Algerian political parties vary with respect to their societal roots. The National Liberation 
Front, the Socialist Forces Front, and the Islamist parties coming out of the Muslim brotherhood 
have deep linkages with Algerian society. The revolutionary movement of the 1950s and 60s 
cemented the link between the FLN and the Algerian population. After the FLN abolished the 
opposition parties, the FFS gained support among Algerians who desired a more democratic and 
competitive multi-party competition. Islamic movements in Algeria culminating in the rise of 
FIS have used mosques as sites of recruitment and organizing for the Islamic cause (Bouandel, 
2003). Following the restoration of multi-party competition in 1989, many new parties have 
suffered because they did not have revolutionary credentials and simply represented the 
ambitions of prominent governmental figures. A frequently used indicator gauging parties’ levels 
of social linkage is the age of the party and its age prior to the restoration of the most recent 
multi-party competition. Algerian parties differ in age and age prior to the restoration, and there 
are three main parties that have dominated since the independence of the country: the state party 
(FLN), the main opposition party (FFS), and Islamist parties with the most recent electoral 
coalition of the Green Alliance (Entelis, 2001).  
 Another indicator measuring levels of party institutionalization is the degree of party 
autonomy. Algerian parties are dominated by revolutionary figures and their successors. The 
FLN, FFS, NRD, and GA were all founded by famous political leaders who had a profound 
effect on the Algerian revolutionary movement. Although many have died, their designated 
successors are still in control of the parties’ decision making apparatus. The FLN and NRD also 
lack the autonomy to make their own decisions, because the Algerian government has significant 
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leverage over both parties (Khemissi, Larémont, & Eddine, 2012). These parties were founded 
and are still dominated by prominent Algeria politicians and bureaucrats.  
 The Islamist family of parties displays more frequent changes in party leadership. 
Younger leaders, not belonging to old party oligarchies, have replaced the leadership of the FIS 
and its splinter organizations so that the Islamist parties are more moderate and thriving.  Third, 
a party’s organizational level represents another indicator of its institutionalization. Algerian 
parties for the most part have large memberships and well-functioning organizations compared to 
other Arab nations. They have organizations and resources at the local level, as well as political 
influence over their supporters. Charismatic leaders are another source of organizational power 
found within Algerian parties. The FLN, FFS, NRD, and GA all have extensive organizational 
networks for mobilizing supporters. All of these parties hold general congresses to set out the 
message and overall strategy of the party. This level of organization that Algerian parties enjoy 
stems from their revolutionary roots in Algerian society. They are also a product of the civil war, 
where mobilization occurred across all segments of society.  
 Finally, the level of cohesion is another indicator of a party’s institutionalization. As in 
the case of autonomy, Algerian parties generally lack cohesion. The level of intra-party tolerance 
for internal opposition is low, resulting in splinters, resignations, and personal politics. 
Politicians and candidates frequently switch allegiance, even within a single election cycle.  . 
The identity of the parties becomes associated with the personality, rhetoric, and policy views of 
their leaders, especially the older parties who were led by charismatic revolutionary figures. 
These party leaders frequently decide their parties’ stances on key political issues. 
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Conclusion 
 Table 5.3 displays the distribution of the Algerian public with respect to their choice of 
parties if elections were held the day following the WVS interview. The evidence shows that 
Algerians prefer the FLN followed by the RND, both of which are state affiliated parties. This 
indicates that the Algerian party system is a multi-party system, with the FLN being the 
dominant party. For most of its history, Algeria has reflected a one-party system, or a 
predominant party system, with the FLN dominating electoral outcomes. Despite this, other 
Algerian parties such as the FFS and the Islamist affiliated organizations have proven their 
significance outside of the legislature, especially in their influence over party competition and 
political mobilization of the mass public. 
 Algerian parties reflect a wide spectrum of ideological orientations. Socialist, liberal, and 
Islamist parties are the most dominant in the country’s party system. The FLN has transformed 
its platform from being the state socialist party to the neo-liberal conservative state party. Algeria 
has not witnessed the development of neo-Islamist parties as is the case of other Arab nations. 
This may be due to the slower pace of economic liberalization which Algeria witnessed, 
compared to other cases covered by the analysis.  
 Algerian parties have developed robust institutions with deep roots in society, as well as 
large organizations and memberships.  However, they suffer from a lack of autonomy and 
cohesion. Most Algerian parties were founded by revolutionary figures and elites who dominated 
party platforms and organization. The future of party politics in Algeria is contingent on a 
number of factors, mainly the governments’ commitment to true multiparty competition in the 
future (Aghrout & Zoubir, 2015).   
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Table 5.2: Distribution of Vote Choice for Algerian Electorate in the 6
th
 WVS dataset 
                               Vote Choice Frequency Percent 
Valid I would not vote 317 26.4 
Other 45 3.8 
FLN 166 13.8 
RCD 45 3.8 
FFS 56 4.7 
RND 108 9.0 
HMS (part of the GA coalition) 66 5.5 
Workers Party 64 5.3 
MNR (Movement for National 
Reform) 
20 1.7 
FNA (National Algerian Front) 15 1.3 
AHD 54 6 .5 
 PNSD (Party of National 
Solidarity and Development)  
6 .5 
Ennahda  11 .9 
FJD (Justice and Development 
Front) 
10 .8 
Total 935 77.9 
Missing No answer: Refused 265 22.1 
Total 1200 100.0 
Source: The Sixth Wave WVS dataset. 
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CHAPTER 6: PARTY POLITICS IN EGYPT  
 
 Party politics has been a defining feature of the political system in Egypt since the 
nineteenth century. During the 1860s and 70s, when the government was under immense 
economic pressures and foreign influence, political groups began to organize, mobilize, and 
demand political changes. Egyptian historians agree that this period stimulated the roots of party 
politics in the country. During the early years of the twentieth century, many new political 
parties emerged. This proliferation of parties was the result of the Constitution of 1923 which 
gave Egypt partial autonomy from Britain. 
 The first period of Egyptian party politics (1919-1952) witnessed mass party 
organization, fierce political competition, and the evolution of party families. First, the 
constitution of the monarchy allowed for parliamentary elections. New parties formed and 
competed vigorously in election campaigns, setting out relatively well articulated platforms. 
During this period, parties in Egypt could be classified into five broad families: liberal, Islamic, 
loyal, women, and communist. Most of these parties, except the loyalist parties and a few liberal 
ones, called for the eradication of British influence, reforming the monarchy, and the 
reorganizing of both society and politics.  In the case of Islamic parties, this was reorganizing in 
a way to support Islamic values, while in the case of communist, women’s, and liberal parties, 
the call was for supporting modern values.   Most notably during this period, mass political 
organizations appeared such as the Wafd, Muslim Brotherhood, and Al Ahrar parties (liberals).  
 The 1952 Egyptian Revolution brought an end to the multi-party system.  The new 
leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, banned all parties and party politics.   Nasser and his associates 
realized that parties posed a threat to their continued rule. From 1952-1976, therefore, Egypt's 
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party politics suffered a significant setback. Nasser consolidated political power in a single 
organization controlled by the state (the Socialist Union and later the Arab Socialist Union). The 
banning of party organizations led to the alienation of the public from politics.   
 During the 1970s, the new president Anwar Al-Sadat realized that the country needed to 
change to escape its economic and political crises and suggested liberalization as the solution. 
The government launched a series of economic reforms, followed by political changes, which 
liberalized the economy and allowed for limited political participation. Among these reforms 
was the reopening of party politics. Assassinated in 1981, Sadat did not live long enough to see 
the fruits of his liberalization efforts. Rising from the ranks of the military, Mubarak 
consolidated his power and became the new president in the early 1980s. Unlike Nasser, but like 
Sadat, Mubarak manipulated and kept close control over party politics. Parties did not enjoy full 
autonomy in the public sphere, and were restricted on many levels. The Egyptian government 
prohibited political parties from meaningfully organizing in public squares, detained opposition 
parties leaders, and supported parties that aligned with the governments’ domestic and foreign 
policies.   During this period, a one-party system emerged. The single party was known as the 
National Democratic Party (NDP) (Al Hizb Al Watani), a conglomerate of political elites 
supporting the Mubarak regime.  The NDP, through its control of the government, rigged 
elections on many occasions. Egyptian party politics was thus dominated by the NDP for almost 
three decades.  Slight opposition did occur, however, mainly from the Muslim Brotherhood and 
later from political coalitions containing Islamic, liberal, and communist elements such as the 
Kifaya movement after the Iraq war.  
 The January 25
th
 Egyptian revolution brought party politics to life. Prior to the elections 
of 2011-2012, the number of parties increased significantly. Preparing for the first fair and free 
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elections to occur in decades, parties developed lengthy platforms and campaigned on particular 
policy goals. In a few cases, programs exceeded forty pages. As during the liberalization of the 
1970s, old parties and organizations reemerged with new labels. The political arena was 
dominated by liberal, conservative, Islamic, and third parties. Despite the euphoria associated 
with this new democratic phase, with citizens becoming engaged in politics and joining parties, 
the military coup led by General El Sisi resulted in a dramatic setback. The banning of Islamist 
parties, mainly the Freedom and Justice Party and the Muslim Brotherhood, marked a significant 
retreat from open and promising party politics to a more controlled system of party politics.   
 
Relevant Parties 
Table 6.1: Distribution of Seats in Egyptian Elections in 2011/12 
EGYPT 
Party  
Total 
Seats 
Share of vote 
  
 
(sᵢ) 
Freedom and justice 235 0.463 
Al-Nur 123 0.242 
New Wafd Party (NWP) 38 0.075 
Egyptian Bloc 34 0.067 
Independents 23 0.045 
Al Wasat 10 0.020 
Reform and Development Party 9 0.018 
Revolution Continues alliance  7 0.014 
Egyptian National Party 5 0.010 
Freedom Party 4 0.008 
Egyptian Citizens Party 2 0.004 
Al Ettihad 1 0.002 
Al Mohafezeen 1 0.002 
Justice 1 0.002 
Arab National party 1 0.002 
Source: IPU database. 
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 Egypt’s party system has observed several transformations in the past century. The 
elections between 1923 and 1952 exhibited the electoral relevance of multiple parties. During 
this period, the Wafd party dominated the parliament and led many governments. The party 
system was multi-party with a dominant party, known in Sartori’s classification as a predominant 
party system, with the Wafd winning a continuing majority. From 1952 through the late 1970s, 
Egypt lacked any meaningful party system since parties were banned. After restoration of the 
parliament, Egypt had a one-party system with the National Democratic Party controlling more 
than eighty percent of the seats from the early 1980s until the fall of the Mubarak regime, a 
predominant party system in Sartori’s classification. The most recent free and fair election, held 
in 2011/12, witnessed the victory of Islamist parties such as the FJP and Al Nour, with almost 
seventy percent of available seats. This indicates that Egypt has a multi-party system with low 
fragmentation, referred to as a two-party system in Sartori’s terms.  
 Egyptian parties reflected distinct ideological, organizational, and institutional 
orientations (different ideologies, forms of organization/mobilization, and variant internal party 
structures) since the first free and fair national elections following the constitution of 1923. 
Egypt witnessed a glorious revolution in 1919, bringing an end to British political control over 
the country. Prominent figures leading the cause such as Saad Zaghloul formed new political 
parties to compete in the upcoming promised elections. Following the ratification of the 
constitution, many political parties were officially registered but with few sizeable ones.  
 The Delegation Party (Hizb Alwafd) was the largest political organization, given its 
affiliation with revolutionary figures such as Zaghloul. The party enjoyed tremendous public 
support with a wide base across Egypt. In many elections during the liberal period between 1923 
and 1952, the party won the largest share of available seats. The Liberal Constitutionalists Party 
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(Hizb Al Ahrar Al Dostoriyoon), controlled by many prominent political figures out of 
Alexandria, formed a rival to the Wafd. Despite this, the Wafd was the most popular and deeply 
rooted party of that era. Besides these two parties, several small parties with little public support 
backed the monarch and his government’s quest for political control. The Khedive allied with 
small parties to weaken the popularity of the Wafd and to control the government. The Egyptian 
parliament was dissolved several times during this period due to the continued conflict between 
the Wafd and the Khedive government.  
 With the Wafd government ratifying a treaty with Britain in 1936, transforming their 
relationship from foes to friends, the popularity of the party dwindled. This also came amidst the 
rise of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as a social organization deeply involved in politics.  The 
MB established offices across the entire country and used mosques to mobilize Egyptians against 
the British presence and the liberal government. Egyptians were frustrated with the political, 
economic, and cultural state of affairs which marginalized Islam to the private sphere. They also 
were concerned about the developing situation in Palestine and the lack of action from their own 
government. All of these gave the MB the ability to attract many supporters from the Wafd into 
their camp.  
 Despite Nasser’s unquestioned allegiance to socialism and Pan-Arabism, he did not 
strengthen Egyptian parties with similar ideological leanings. On the contrary, Nasser banned 
parties of all stripes.   Throughout the 1950s and 60s, Nasser waged a war against the MB by 
detaining its leaders and repressing its supporters. Because of this, the MB transformed itself, 
focusing upon its regional operations while retreating underground. Following the death of 
Nasser, Sadat restored multi-party competition. Nevertheless, this democratizing measure was a 
mere façade to legitimize the unlabeled one party government. The new era witnessed the rebirth 
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of the Wafd as “New Wafd,” the resurgence of the MB, and the establishment of new liberal and 
socialist parties (mainly the liberal Ahrar and National Progressive Unionist, NUNP, parties) 
(Hinnebusch, 1984).  The dominant party in this era was the National Democratic Party (Al Hizb 
Alwatani Aldemokrati), the party ruling the state from 1978-2011.  
 From Sadat’s assassination in 1981 until the January 25th, 2011 revolution, Egypt was 
dominated by a single party controlling the parliament, the government, and the economy 
(Arafat, 2009). Despite this unprecedented control, the New Wafd, Muslim Brotherhood, Al 
Ahrar, and the NUNP won seats in the parliament and influenced Egyptian public opinion to 
varying degrees. This fact shatters the myth that Egypt was a single party system during 
Mubaraks’ reign. Following the revolution, Egypt witnessed tremendous growth in party politics. 
In a recent survey of the number of parties, Al Ahram Weekly found that Egypt has around 90 
political parties, most of which are unknown to the public. During Mohammad Morsi’s brief 
rule, the first elected president of Egypt, the elections of 2011/2012 produced an ideologically 
polarized Egyptian party system, dividing the two main Islamic parties from a number of smaller 
liberal and socialist parties. General Abdil Fattah Al-Sisi was frustrated with the changes brought 
by the Islamic president and parliament. Waging a successful coup, he threw the elected 
president in jail and dissolved the parliament. The new Egyptian leadership, dominated by the 
army, began a wave of repression against the Muslim Brotherhood, weakening its prominent 
position gained following the revolution. In 2014, Egypt witnessed another presidential election 
culminating in the legitimization of Al Sisi’s power through ballots rather than bullets. In 2015, 
Egypt observed the first parliamentary elections after Al Sisi took power in 2013 without the 
participation of any of the Islamist parties that won the majority of the votes in 2011/012.  Thus, 
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since the coup, there's been a retreat from democratization in Egypt, and the military led 
government has been a significant blow to free and fair multi-party competition.  
 
Ideological Fit  
Foreign Affairs. 
 The views of Egyptian parties and voters on foreign policy issues do not exhibit much 
correspondence. Figure 6.1 displays the parties' respective views on the extent to which the 
country should collaborate with Western partners, such as the U.S., European Union, and 
Western European nations. The Islamist parties, such as Al Wasat, Al Nur, and FJP, favor 
minimal cooperation with western countries and institutions. Al Wasat urges against entering 
deals or negotiations with western countries, especially the United States. Al Nur, the more 
extreme Islamist party, favors a centrist view where it does not encourage or oppose entering 
political or economic pacts with the West. The Muslim Brotherhood’s party, the FJP, seems to 
favor a more cautious approach toward the West, where it minimally promotes partnering with 
Western partners. On the contrary, Liberal parties, such as Ahrar, Revolution Continues, and the 
National Party of Egypt, seem to push for a more global role for Egypt in the world through 
collaboration with Western partners.  
 Figure 6.2 demonstrates Egyptian party positions on the extent to which Egypt should 
collaborate with international institutions such as the United Nations, Arab League, and African 
Union. All parties, regardless of their ideological label, favor a more active role for Egypt in the 
world. Al Wasat, the Islamist centrist party, possessed the most extreme position on this issue 
where it advocates for an absolute collaboration with the United Nations, Arab League, and the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Liberal parties, such as the RC, Egyptian Bloc, and Ahrar, 
espouse a similar view to Al Wasat. Other Islamist parties, such as Al Nur and the FJP, 
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supported an active role for Egypt.  However, this was to a lesser degree compared to liberal 
parties.  
 Trust levels in the United Nations held by Egyptian voters is shown in figure 6.3. 
Irrespective of their party of choice, Egyptians clearly have low levels of trust in the United 
Nations. This indicates that Egyptians mistrust international organizations and western 
institutions, favoring a less collaborative role for their country in such arenas. Therefore, 
Egyptian parties generally do not represent their voters’ preferences regarding matters of foreign 
affairs. This evidence points to the low ideological fit between Egyptian parties and the foreign 
affair preferences of their voters.  
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Figure 6.1 Egyptian party positions on Western collaboration 
Figure 6.2 Egyptian party positions on international 
collaboration 
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Figure 6.3 Egyptian voters’ trust in the United Nations 
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Democracy. 
 Egyptian parties and voters agree that democracy is important and constitutes the most 
desirable political system. Figure 6.4 demonstrates Egyptian party positions on the extent to 
which democratic procedures and practices should be incorporated into the contemporary 
Egyptian political order. Regardless of their label, Egyptian parties seem to favor a great deal of 
democratic reforms, making Egypt a democratic state. Likewise, Egyptian voters mostly agreed 
with the statement that it is important to have democracy as the governing political system in the 
country. This leads to the conclusion that both parties and their voters, irrespective of ideology, 
view that democracy needs to be implemented as the constitutional order.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Egyptian party positions on incorporating democracy 
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Corruption. 
 Egyptian parties and voters agree on corruption. Figure 6.6 displays the parties' views on 
corruption and measures that the state should take to curb it. Irrespective of ideological 
orientation, these parties all call for significant reforms (political, economic, and administrative) 
to fight corruption. Similarly, Egyptian voters agree that corruption is a problem plaguing the 
country, such as vote buying. This indicates that voters in Egypt without exception, be they 
Islamist, socialist, or liberal, all agree that more measures should be undertaken to curb 
corruption. All in all, Egyptian voters and their parties agree on corruption.  
Figure 6.5 Egyptian voters’ views on the importance of democracy 
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Figure 6.6 Egyptian party positions on curbing political 
corruption 
Figure 6.7 Egyptian voters’ views on electoral corruption 
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Economy.  
 Egyptian parties and voters do not agree much on economic policy issues. Figure 6.8 
displays Egyptian party positions on the issue of market regulation. A majority of relevant 
parties in Egypt favor a degree of governmental regulation of the market. The Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party seems to be one of the premier advocates for an active 
role by the government in controlling the economy. Likewise, the youth based party, Revolution 
Continues, shares a similar view to that of the FJP where it desires an active regulatory 
framework overseen by the government. On the contrary, liberal parties such as the National 
Party of Egypt and Reform and Development Party (both splinters of the establishment’s 
National Democratic Party), advocate for a neo-liberal economic order. Socialist parties, 
represented by the Egyptian Bloc, seem to favor a modicum of economic regulation within the 
country. Figure 6.9 demonstrates Egyptian parties’ standings on the issue of privatization. It 
seems that all parties, except Revolution Continues, advocate for an open economic order where 
privatization is an indispensable feature of the system.  
 Figure 6.10 displays Egyptian voters’ preferences on whether the government should 
increase its ownership of businesses. Almost all voters favored more government ownership of 
businesses over ownership by the private sector. The National Party of Egypt voters preferred 
high levels of private business ownership, similar to their party. Nevertheless, Islamist voters 
favored a more controlled economy compared to the Islamist parties, yielding a low level of fit 
between Islamist parties and their voters on economic issues. Irrespective of their ideological 
affiliation, Egyptian voters favored more government responsibility in economic affairs such as 
income redistribution as evident in Figure 6.11. Voters' views here contradict those of most 
170 
 
 
 
parties in the country. Overall, Egyptian parties generally favor a more neo-liberal economic 
view while their voters espouse a socialist outlook, generating low levels of correspondence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Egyptian party positions on market regulation 
Figure 6.9 Egyptian party positions on privatization 
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Figure 6.10 Egyptian voters’ preference for government ownership of 
businesses 
Figure 6.11 Egyptian voters’ views on government responsibility for 
economic affairs 
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Culture. 
 Egyptian parties and voters possess moderate levels of agreement on cultural issues. 
Figure 6.12 displays positions of the parties on the extent to which religion should be 
incorporated into the state. Islamist parties, such as Al Wasat, Al Nur, and the FJP, all agreed 
that Islam “should influence the society and political system of Egypt.” Similarly, the 
conservative party, New Wafd, following the January 25th revolution, favored a strong position 
for Islamic law and principles in guiding the construction of the constitution and overall political 
system. On the contrary, liberal socialist parties, such as Ahrar and the Egyptian Bloc, advocated 
for a retreat of Islamic influence from the public to the private sphere. Figure 6.13 shows 
Egyptian voters’ preferences on whether religious leaders should interpret the laws of the land. 
Egyptians, non-voters, and those identifying with Islamist or conservative parties, seemed to 
favor a minimal influence of Islam over the political process. This position is less extreme 
compared to the Islamist political parties’ unwavering support of a political order where Islam is 
a major source of legislation. While Egyptian Islamist parties represent the desires of their 
voters, introducing Islam into the political process, they do so in an exaggerated manner, 
indicating a lower level of fit with their voters.  
 Figure 6.14 displays party positions on modernity. This issue refers to the extent to which 
modern lifestyles from Western nations should be introduced into Egypt. These include, but are 
not limited to, educational systems, dress codes, architecture, and other cultural aspects of 
modernity. It appears that most Egyptian parties favor a degree of modernization, with Islamist 
parties espousing the least support for modernity. Al Wasat and the Islamic Center Party appear 
to be the least supportive of modernity, emphasizing Arab identity and favoring the scaling back 
of modern elements in Egyptian society. While Egyptian parties seem to be fans of modernity to 
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a degree, their voters still embrace inherently contradictory worldviews. Modernity embraces 
gender equality. Figure 6.15 displays views of Egyptian voters on whether men should be given 
priority over women when it comes to employment. Most voters, regardless of their ideological 
orientation, agreed that men should be prioritized over women when jobs are scarce. Therefore, 
on modernity, Egyptian parties fail to represent their voters’ cultural outlook, leading to a lower 
degree of fit on cultural issues.   
 Figure 6.12 Egyptian party positions on Religious Influence 
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Figure 6.13 Egyptian voters’ preference on Religious Interpretation’ 
Figure 6.14 Egyptian party positions on modernity 
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Welfare. 
 Egyptian parties and voters possess high levels of agreement regarding welfare. Figure 
6.16 displays party positions on the extent to which welfare programs and policies should be 
introduced into the current state. Regardless of ideological affiliation, Egyptian parties seem to 
be in favor of more welfare. Likewise, Egyptian voters seem to prefer that the state spend more 
on health, education, and housing indicated by their support for the “governments tax the rich 
and subsidize the poor” item shown in Figure 6.17. Figure 6.17 represents Egyptian voters’ 
opinion on whether the government should tax the rich to subsidize the poor. The clear majority 
of Egyptian voters agreed with the sentiment. Neo-liberal parties, off-shoots of the National 
Democratic Party like the National Party of Egypt and its supporters, seem to be the only 
political actors within the relevant political map that is against the expansion of the welfare state 
in Egypt. 
Figure 6.15 Egyptian voters’ views on male preference for employment 
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Figure 6.16 Egyptian party positions on incorporating welfare 
programs 
Figure 6.17 Egyptian voter opinion on taxing the rich 
to subsidize the poor 
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Ideological Polarization. 
 The Egyptian party system exhibits a high degree of ideological polarization. First, 
socialist democratic parties are represented by the Egyptian Bloc, a coalition of socialist and 
communist leaning parties in the 2011/12 elections, as well as a new party formed by youth 
leading the revolution in 2011.  These parties include Revolution Continues, National 
Progressive Unionist Party, Free Egyptians Party, and the Egyptian Social Democratic Party. 
These parties tend to be secular. Explicitly, they call for the separation of religion from the state. 
They also advocate for governmental oversight over the economy and more welfare for 
Egyptians.  
 On the opposite side of the Egyptian political spectrum are the liberal parties with 
historical roots, represented by Al Ahrar and the NDP. Interestingly, after the revolution of the 
25
th
 of January, these parties did not attract a lot of votes in elections. Nevertheless, they won 
several seats in the parliament, and after Al Sisi took power, they controlled the government as 
they continue to do presently. These parties call for both economic, as well as cultural, liberalism 
in Egypt. They would like Mubarak’s legacy of economic neo-liberalism to continue at a faster 
pace, with the withdrawal of Islam to the private sphere. With the social democratic parties 
mentioned above, these parties waged a vicious war, supported by Sisi’s regime, against the 
Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties accusing the latter of Islamizing Egypt.  
 The Egyptian party system has a new type of Islamist party, the neo-liberal Islamist party. 
These advocates for neo-liberal economic policies while conserving the place of Islam in the 
Egyptian cultural fabric. They do not favor welfare policies that call for more redistribution, as 
do the traditional Islamist parties. On the contrary, these parties desire to see more privatization, 
liberalization, and foreign investment. This support for liberalism dwindles, however, when one 
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looks at culture rather than the economy. Those parties advocate the establishment of Islam as a 
main source for inspiring public policies (Brown, 2011). They also advocate for the promotion of 
Islamic values in schools and governmental institutions. However, these parties differ with 
respect to the degree to which they feel Islamic law needs to be enforced. On the one hand, the 
Al Nour party (Party of Light) calls for a more stringent enforcement, while on the other hand Al 
Wasat (Islamist Center Party) calls for more flexible application of the code.  
 One of the most interesting observations regarding the Egyptian party system is the 
position of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party. The FJP favors economic 
liberalism but with less intensity than the neo-liberal Islamist parties. More importantly, it pushes 
cultural liberalism to a larger degree than the Salafi or Wasat parties, contradictory to most 
Egyptian analysts’ diagnoses of the party’s agenda. Al Wasat is often seen as less radical than 
the Muslim Brotherhood on cultural matters, particularly the enforcement of sharia. The 
programs of both parties indicate otherwise, with the FJP being more culturally liberal than both 
Al Wasat and Al Nur. This makes it extremely difficult to classify the FJP into any party family 
within the Egyptian political system (Wickham, 2011). The party is plainly an Islamist 
organization and thus should be dubbed Islamist. However, the party projects a moderate liberal 
economic and cultural outlook contrary to traditional Islamist parties.  
 The closest party to the FJP on the ideological map of the Egyptian party system is the 
New Wafd, a conservative party. Therefore, one is tempted to classify both in the same 
conservative party category. Those parties call for moderate economic liberalism while 
preserving the Egyptian, mostly Islamic, cultural identity. They do not denounce modernity or 
westernization altogether. On the contrary, they would like to see a modern Egypt, but only with 
an Islamic posture. This model has been referred to as the AKP or Turkish model, where an 
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Islamist party transforms into a conservative party, yet without denouncing the influence of 
conservative cultural values which are mostly Islamic in Muslim majority countries. This 
classification also highlights the interesting shift of the New Wafd from being a liberal party to a 
conservative one.   
 
Figure 6.18: Egyptian Party Positions on Economic 
And Cultural Liberalism 
 
 
Institutionalization. 
 Egyptian parties differ drastically in their levels of institutionalization. Few parties enjoy 
wide spread popularity among the public, with a large majority lacking any meaningful social 
links. Parties also exhibit a wide range of organizational structures, with many still having a 
centralized leadership guiding the party at all levels. Few parties have developed decentralized 
organizational structure where party leaders from the periphery can alter party messages and 
decisions. The level of autonomy that Egyptian parties maintain also varies from party to party 
(Beinin, 2012). For instance, Islamist parties have been greatly influenced by historically 
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powerful Islamist organizations in Egypt such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Trager, 2011). All in 
all, the Egyptian party system is composed of a few mass based, well organized, and cohesive 
parties alongside a large number of smaller parties with no real roots in society, fragile 
organization, and a vague platform.  
 The Muslim Brotherhood, New Wafd, Al Ahrar, and the NPUP represent the most 
powerful parties in Egypt alongside the NDP. Each of these parties has a considerable political 
history. All date back to the pre-Nasser era or Sadat’s infitah period. All of these parties 
contested in several parliamentary elections, witnessing political changes in the country over the 
past four decades (Makram-Ebeid, 1989). The Wafd party of the 1920s was dubbed “the people 
party,” signaling its massive popularity at the time of the restoration of multi-party competition. 
It reemerged as the New Wafd, with many Egyptians backing it in elections. Similarly, the 
Muslim Brotherhood has continued to influence ordinary Egyptian citizens with its massive 
social, religious, and business networks. The communist leaning NPUP has become the place for 
socialist Egyptians who desire change through parliamentary means. State networks of 
businessmen, dignitaries, and their allies find a home in the NDP. All of these parties enjoyed 
support from real constituencies, with varying sizes and intensity. The January 25
th
 Revolution 
brought the end of the NDP, and new parties are establishing bases within the Egyptian social 
fabric, such as the coalition referred to as the Revolution Continues.  
 Egyptian parties reflect a wide array of organizational structures. Most are controlled by 
prominent political figures. Few have developed formal procedures for internal decision making. 
Today, Egypt has a great number of parties that do not possess any meaningful organizational 
resources. Most of these parties lack sufficient memberships that allow them to be relevant in 
parliamentary politics. The Muslim Brotherhood stands out as one of the strongest organizations, 
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and exhibits considerable organizational resources in Egyptian society. The FJP, the short lived 
party of the MB, exhibited a similar decision making organization as the MB with a legislative 
council deciding critical party matters. New Wafd, as well as the NPUP and al Ahrar, have also 
developed considerable party organizations and stable memberships throughout Egypt. However, 
most Egyptian parties do not possess organizational resources and thus are not cohesive.    
 Powerful political leaders, as well as party organizations, have considerable influence 
within Egyptian parties.  This rule has a few exceptions, as is the case of more established parties 
such as the New Wafd and NPUP. The Muslim Brotherhood has influenced the message and 
organization of the FJP. Similarly, powerful Salafi groups have shaped the content and methods 
of political contestation followed by the Al Nour party. Most small Egyptian parties, such as 
Reform and Development, are controlled by powerful figures such as Refaat Al Sadat, Anwar Al 
Sadat’s son.  
 Parties in Egypt also suffer from a general lack of cohesion. Internal disagreements on 
policy positions frequently results in splits. A famous case is the formation of the Al Wasat 
party, which is a splinter of the Islamist movement, with many members coming out of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Members of the parliament do not possess stable allegiances to their 
parliamentary groups. Parties typically lack full control over their representatives, who may 
frequently switch groups or coalitions in the parliament, indicating a lack in the party’s ability to 
discipline its members. All in all, parties in Egypt are not highly cohesive.  
 Table 6.3 indicates that more than sixty five percent of Egyptians do not identify with a 
party, and are not voting for any when asked in the WVS interview “to what party [they] will 
cast their vote with”. Islamist parties seem to be more popular than other parties among the 
electorate. The results of the 2011-12 elections translated this will into a legislature dominated 
182 
 
 
 
by Islamist politicians. This election marked a significant change in the Egyptian party system, 
from a single party system to a multi-party one dominated by two main Islamic parties: the FJP 
and Al Nour.  
Table 6.2: Distribution of Vote Choice for Egyptian Electorate in the 6
th
 WVS dataset 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid No right to vote 1 .1 
I would not vote 31 2.0 
None 1004 65.9 
Other 25 1.6 
Al Nour Party 62 4.1 
Any party except those 1 .1 
Arab Democratic Nasserist Party 5 .3 
Boycott 9 .6 
Building and Development Party 4 .3 
Center Party 13 .9 
Constitution Party 12 .8 
Democratic Front Party 1 .1 
Dignity Party 3 .2 
Do not decide yet I will wait till I see the candidates 1 .1 
Don't decide 2 .1 
Don't decide yet 2 .1 
Don't know any party 1 .1 
Don't know any party in Egypt & have nothing with them 1 .1 
Don't love to join any party in Egypt 1 .1 
Egypt 2000 Party 4 .3 
Egypt Unity Democratic Party 3 .2 
Egypt Youth Party 10 .7 
Egyptian Current Party 7 .5 
Egyptian Social Democratic Party 3 .2 
Free Egyptians Party 9 .6 
Free Republican Party 1 .1 
Free Social Constitutional Party 1 .1 
Freedom and Justice Party 145 9.5 
Freedom Egypt Party 17 1.1 
Ghad El-Thawra Party 5 .3 
Justice Party[6] 13 .9 
Liberal Egyptian Party 1 .1 
Liberal Party 4 .3 
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 National Conciliation Party 2 .1 
New Wafd Party 44 2.9 
No decision for any party in Egypt 1 .1 
No party in Egypt good to stand for election 1 .1 
None should know first each program & think what is good 1 .1 
Party of Liberation 1 .1 
Popular Socialist Alliance Party 2 .1 
Social Justice Party 4 .3 
Socialist Party of Egypt 1 .1 
The Nation's Party (Egypt) 2 .1 
The People's Democratic Party 1 .1 
Tomorrow Party 1 .1 
When at home tell me to vote I will vote but not to any 1 .1 
Will not vote for a party I will vote for a person 1 .1 
Workers Democratic Party 1 .1 
Total 1466 96.3 
Missing Don´t know 57 3.7 
Total 1523 100.0 
Source: The Sixth Wave WVS dataset. 
Conclusion  
 The Egyptian party system observed several traumatic waves in its development. First, 
the 1920s-40s witnessed the first multi-party Egyptian system with numerous mass-based parties 
representing a wide range of ideologies. The New Wafd, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the 
liberals all represented large numbers of Egyptians and competed in the relatively free and fair 
elections under the Khedive’s palace. With the rise of Nasser and Arab nationals, and the state 
banning all parties and their activities, the Egyptian party system saw its demise. Still, Egyptians 
continued their support of free elections and their revolutionary institutions. With the liberalizing 
policies of Sadat, multi-party competition returned to Egyptian politics, but with excessive state 
manipulation and control. The National Democratic Party (the state party), dominated the 
parliament as well as Egyptian political and economic life for more than three decades. The 
revolution of January 25
th
, 2011, has put Egypt back on the path toward democratization, and the 
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restoration of true multi-party competition. Many parties, both old and new, emerged and 
competed in the most free and fair elections in the country’s history (Al-Anani, 2012). 
Nevertheless, two years afterward, the military has inflicted a blow to democracy by annihilating 
the Muslim Brotherhood and its party, the FJP, which had held the highest share of seats.  
 Egyptian parties are highly polarized along the Islamic-secular dimension. On the one 
hand, social democratic parties call for the Islam's retreat from politics. On the other hand, 
Islamist parties, both traditional and neo-liberal, advocate for the institution of Islam as a source 
of legislation and governmental policy. The rise of the neo-liberal Islamist parties in Egypt is a 
noteworthy development. These parties advocate for economic liberalism, unlike traditional 
Islamic parties which advocate for the welfare state. Liberal parties also have figured 
prominently in the most recent elections before the coup with the rise of youth dominated 
organizations such as Revolution Continues. Therefore, the Egyptian party system is the most 
polarized in the Arab world, mostly as the result of the government's severe repression of the 
Islamist camp in the past few years.  
 Egyptian parties reflect a great deal of variation with respect to their degrees of 
institutionalization. The Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the New Wafd, shows profound social 
linkages with Egyptian society. However, many small liberal parties do not possess any 
meaningful connection with society. Parties in Egypt suffer from strong leaders and 
organizations that control all party decisions and actions. Parties in Egypt lack organizational 
autonomy, as well as cohesion. The future of Egyptian parties is not a positive narrative. The 
current regime has severely repressed the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties. 
Furthermore, the increasing polarization is an indication of the worsening political crises that 
could soon put the country through another traumatic experience similar to 2011.  
185 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: JORDANIAN PARTY SYSTEM 
 
 Jordan has a weak party system with many small and irrelevant parties, low levels of 
ideological fragmentation, and low levels of party institutionalization. Despite around 60 
political parties competing in the most recent parliamentary elections in 2013, most Jordanian 
parties do not impact party competition by affecting coalition formation (Bank & Sunik, 2014). 
Although there are small differences in party positions on economic and cultural issues, most of 
Jordan's parties take positions in platforms that are close to those of the monarchy, with the 
exclusion of main opposition parties such as the Islamic Action Front. Indeed, most parties are 
formed by former bureaucrats or politicians loyal to the palace, and thus lack societal roots and 
much organization (Köprülü, 2014). 
The Jordanian party system has observed significant changes since the country gained its 
independence in 1946. During the early 1950s, Jordan had a highly fragmented multi-party 
system. Parties varied greatly with respect to their societal roots, autonomy, and organization. 
This threatened the political hold of the Jordanian monarchy, prompting the King to ban all 
parties in 1957 (El-Said & Rauch, 2015). This traumatic decision led directly to the decline of 
party politics in the country (Dalacoura, 2013).  
The restoration of parliamentary life in 1989 witnessed the emergence of new parties, as 
well as the reconstruction of older ones.  Despite the sudden proliferation of parties and heated 
campaigns during parliamentary elections, nearly all were irrelevant. The parties failed to win 
sizable shares of votes or parliamentary seats despite the relatively free and fair elections held in 
the 1990s and 2000s. Jordanian parties lacked coherent internal organizational structures, agile 
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social bases and clear party platforms, leading to their electoral suffering during the past three 
decades in Jordanian political life (El-Said & Harrigan, 2014; El-Said & Rauch, 2015).  
The Islamic Action Front (IAF) is an exception to this portrayal of parties, and is 
arguably the only relevant party in Jordan. Electorally, the party has been the only one that has 
won modest shares of seats in the legislature. It also possessed a coherent ideology, due to the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The party also has a large organization able to mobilize the public and lead 
the opposition. In spite of its strong position vis-à-vis other parties, the IAF struggles to build an 
autonomous and coherent organization. The Muslim Brotherhood continues to exert tremendous 
influence on the organization.  The party has little tolerance for factions within the party, and 
many within the party have left and formed other Islamist parties such as the Islamic Center 
Party (Al-Wasat) (El-Said & Rauch, 2015; Gerges, 2013).  
The number of relevant parties in Jordan has changed dramatically over time. In 1956, 
the National Socialist Party won nearly thirty percent of the total seats in the parliament (Lust, 
Hourani, & El-Momani, 2011). In the same election, the Arab Constitutional Party won about 
twenty percent, leaving the Muslim Brotherhood in third, with just ten percent of the seats. The 
political parties in Jordan in 1956 won more than sixty percent of the seats in parliament, the rest 
filled by independents, a phenomenon that has not been repeated since. The 1956 election results 
furnish evidence that Jordan once possessed a multi-party system with high ideological 
polarization, with divisions between socialists, loyalists (close to the palace), and rising 
Islamists. The election of the socialist government under Nabelsi in 1956 threatened the 
existence of the Hashemite monarchy.  The subsequent banning of political parties brought an 
end to party politics in the country. Parties were not allowed to compete in elections again until 
1993.  With the disappearance of parties, there was no party system. In 2013, all parties 
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combined won a total of only eighteen percent of the 150 seats (Buttorff, 2015; Budge, 2001; 
Cammett, et al., 2015). 
Jordanian parties are electorally irrelevant.  Despite this, Jordanian parties have always 
exhibited moderate levels of ideological polarization   (Köprülü, 2014). Jordanian parties belong 
to three distinct families: socialist, loyalist, and Islamist. Socialist parties include communist as 
well as Arab socialist parties. Loyalist parties include small parties, usually liberal, that are close 
to the palace and often controlled by tribal chiefs or former, powerful, state dignitaries. Islamist 
parties include the Islamic Action Front (IAF) (the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood), the 
Islamic Center Party (a new party with Islamist leanings), and other smaller radical parties 
calling for Islamic law to be observed in Jordan (Cammett, et al., 2015; Gerges, 2013).  
With the exception of the Islamic Action Front, Jordanian political parties are 
characterized by weak levels of institutionalization. That is, they lack meaningful links to 
Jordanian society. These parties emerge, die, and often merge, changing their names and 
platforms upon doing so. Their organization and message, therefore, is typically incoherent 
(Bayat, 2003a). More importantly, many small parties are vehicles for their founders’ personal 
ambitions and are tribally based. Thus, the Jordanian party system scores low on 
institutionalization (Frederiksen, 2013).   
 
Relevant Parties  
The number of registered political parties in Jordan has steadily increased, reaching 
approximately 40 in 2015.  As indicated above, many of those parties are small in nature, and 
lack any meaningful organization. These small parties are not able to compete effectively in 
elections and cannot unseat governmental coalitions (Beck & Hüser, 2015). For the most part, 
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Jordan has a party system without relevant parties, or ones able to enter government.  The 
Jordanian government realized this struggle of political parties and introduced changes to the 
electoral law, allocating 27 seats of the 150 in parliament to the various parties (Dalacoura, 
2013). Despite this measure, the Jordanian party system still has only a single relevant party, the 
Islamic Action Front (El-Said & Rauch, 2015).  Note that the Jordanian electoral system follows 
the Single-Nontransferable Voting System during the 2013 elections.  
 
Table 7.1: Distribution of Seats in the Jordanian Election of 2013 
JORDON 
Party  
Total 
Seats 
Share of 
vote 
  
 
(sᵢ) 
Islamic Centrist Party 3 0.02 
Stronger Jordon 2 0.013 
The Homeland 2 0.013 
National Union Party 2 0.013 
National Current Party 1 0.006 
Salvation 1 0.006 
Labor and Professionalism 1 0.006 
Cooperation 1 0.006 
Dignity  1 0.006 
united Front 1 0.006 
National Unity 1 0.006 
Construction  1 0.006 
The People 1 0.006 
People of Determination  1 0.006 
Free Voice 1 0.006 
 Voice of the Nation 1 0.006 
National Labor 1 0.006 
Al Quds  1 0.006 
Al Bayareq 1 0.006 
The Dawn  1 0.006 
Shabab Al wifaq 1 0.006 
Citizenship 1 0.006 
Source: IPU Database. 
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  Table 7.1 displays the parties that obtained seats in the most recent elections, taking 
place in 2013. Twenty-two parties won 27 seats. No party had sufficient seats to be considered 
relevant (Bank & Sunik, 2014). The strongest opposition party in the country, the Islamic Action 
Front, boycotted the election.   Although the IAF announced a general election strategy, it 
boycotted them due to government unwillingness to revise the new electoral law. The IAF 
favored the Block Voting System implemented in the 1989 elections, as each voter was capable 
to cast as many votes as was equal to the number of candidates within the district. Still, many 
independents who sympathized with the IAF ran and won seats (El-Said & Rauch, 2015).   
 The table indicates that the Jordanian party system is comprised of a plethora of small 
parties capable of only negligible influence. This phenomenon reflects how parties are formed 
and develop. Most parties are controlled by elites and tribal leaders (Beck & Hüser, 2015). Such 
personalities use their financial, political, and social power to harness votes during elections, and 
thus are based on patron-client relationships rather than party platforms. Party leaders appeal to 
their tribes or networks for the provision of political and economic goods in exchange for votes. 
The monarchy supports such a system, since without any effective opposition, there is no threat 
to its rule.  Only a facade of democracy exists (Dalton, 1985; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007).  
 Although parties are irrelevant electorally, they are able to mobilize the public and 
influence public opinion.  The monarchy pays attention to public opinion, so parties can only 
influence government action indirectly. To express opposition to domestic or international 
actors, the IAF has been the main organizer of massive political rallies. Its candidates receive 
significantly more votes than other parties. The IAF often has led reform coalitions and 
negotiated political change in the Jordanian government. Despite its recent boycott, the IAF 
remains the only relevant political party in Jordan (El-Said & Rauch, 2015; Habid, 2014).  
190 
 
 
 
Ideological Polarization 
 Figure 7.1 displays Jordanian party positions on two main policy domains: economics 
and culture. The figure only includes relevant parties in the most recent elections who had 
discernible electoral programs. The figure indicates that the party system in Jordan exhibits two 
ideological families: Islamist parties (including traditional and neo-liberal Islamist), and Liberal 
(including loyalist and secular) (El-Said & Rauch, 2015).  Arab socialist as well as communist 
parties in Jordan suffered losses in the 2013 election (Weir, 2013).  Note that the left-leaning 
parties in the Kingdom, the communists, have been an established pillar in Jordan’s party politics 
though they have failed to win seats in recent elections.  
 Islamist parties are the strongest and most coherent family in the Jordanian party system. 
It includes two distinct members:  the traditional Islamic party (the IAF) and the emerging neo-
liberal Islamic parties such as the Islamic Center Party. The Islamist parties group also includes 
smaller Islamist leaning parties that did not win electoral seats in the 2013 elections. Islamist 
parties would like to see Islam as a source of inspiration for governmental legislation. However, 
they disagree about the intensity with which Islam should influence policy, as well as the way 
policy should be implemented. On the one hand, the IAF favors a more conservative social order, 
with the government taking an active role in organizing society along Islamic principles. This 
indicates that the government should pursue a balance between the welfare state and a pragmatic 
economic policy. They also seek better relations with Islamic/Arab states, and a more cautious 
foreign policy. The IAF also desires a stronger state and military. Socially, they also advocate for 
gender segregation and fewer women in the public sphere.  Contrary to the IAF, however, the 
Islamic Center Party (ICP) advocates for an economically liberal program that favors the private 
sector and markets. They also seek improved relations with international actors, including the 
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West. Despite their inspiration by Islamic principles, they do not advocate for the 
implementation of Sharia in controlling individuals’ lives. Despite these differences, both IAF 
and ICP advocates for a conservative order inspired by Muslim values. As Figure 8.1 indicates, 
they do not differ much on culture.   Both parties seek to limit the pace and influence of 
modernization and westernization in Jordan (Al-Anani, 2012; Bayat, 2011; El-Said & Rauch, 
2015).  
 Conservative loyalist parties in Jordan have been a defining feature in the country’s party 
system since the early days of the kingdom. Table 7.2 includes many parties that express varying 
degrees of loyalty and commitment to the kingdoms’ regime (Köprülü, 2014; Lust, Hourani, & 
El-Momani, 2011). One of the strongest parties within this camp, as Figure 7.1 shows, is the 
National Union Party. This party, as with other members of its family, advocates for a 
conservative cultural program where Arabic culture and Jordanian heritage are the defining 
features of the system. As the state began to implement the program of privatization in the early 
1990s, the party has espoused a liberal economic policy. The NUP is dominated by personalities 
who served in previous governments or close to the palace, and thus share policy views similar 
to the monarchy (Watanabe, 2014; Susser, 2013).  
 One of the most noticeable changes to the Jordanian party system is the decline of the 
priority of the Palestinian issue in party programs. The category “peace” in the coding scheme 
represents the percentage related to the Palestinian question. All parties, Islamic and non-Islamic, 
devoted less attention to the issue in the 2013 election as compared to previous elections. If 
comparable data were available for elections held over the past sixty years, it's speculated that 
2013 would show the lowest emphasis on Palestine. It's possible that the Arab Spring has 
overshadowed the Palestine issue by presenting parties with more pressing issues such as 
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democracy and economic reforms (Yom, 2015; Stepan & Linz, 2013). More research needs to be 
conducted to investigate the decline and disappearance of the Palestine issue from numerous 
party agendas.  
Figure 7.1: Jordanian Party Positions on Economic 
And Cultural Liberalism 
 
Ideological Fit between Parties and the Public Masses  
Foreign Affairs. 
 There is a weak to moderate correspondence between Jordanian voters and their parties 
of choice regarding foreign affairs issues. First, Jordanian parties are somewhat reserved when it 
comes to opening up to the international community and organizations. Figure 7.2 displays the 
means of Jordanian party views on foreign affairs, using the scale described in chapter two. This 
scale includes items relevant to Jordanian parties' internationalism, relations with the 
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Arab/Muslim nations, the Palestinian question, and the armed forces or other law enforcement 
apparatus. The scale ranges between -1 and +1 (-1= complete disfavor for establishing relations 
with the West and +1= complete favor for establishing relations with the West) where higher 
scores represent greater internationalism and better relations with Arab/Muslim nations. All 
parties possessed scores around 0, indicating a moderate level of openness toward international 
organizations, the west, and Arab/Islamic nations. The Islamic Action Front, the strongest 
opposition party, had the lowest mean, indicating its reluctance to strike better relationships with 
the United States, Western European countries, and the European Union, and less support for 
internationalism as gauged by involvement in the United Nations and the Arab League. 
Similarly, the Islamist moderate party (ICP) possessed a mean value approximate to 0.15, 
indicating a slight degree of support for internationalism. Stronger Jordan, the secular liberal 
political force in the elections of 2013, on the other hand, advocated for more involvement with 
the West and greater internationalism, with a mean value of about 0.25. Nevertheless, none of 
the Jordanian parties exhibited high levels of support for regional and international 
organizations.  This was similar to their voters who favored a more reserved approach to the west 
and international organizations as evident in the figures below (Stepan & Linz, 2013; Yom, 
2015; Al-Anani, 2012). 
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Figure 7.2 Jordanian Parties Mean on Foreign Affairs 
 
Figure 7.3 Jordanian Voters Mean on UN Confidence Broken Down by Parties 
 
 
 The World Values Survey Sixth Wave includes several measures to assess citizens’ views 
on international organizations and cooperation. Figure 7.3 shows Jordanians’ mean scores for 
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their support for the United Nations by party of choice. Similar to their parties, Islamic Action 
Front, as well as the Islamic Center Party, supporters indicating that they do not have much trust 
in the organization. While the WVS does not have a specific code for Stronger Jordan, it did ask 
liberal voters, who likely voted for Stronger Jordan in the elections of 2013, about their views on 
the UN. Voters of the Justice and Development Party and the Justice and Reform parties 
exhibited more trust in the UN.   While Jordanian parties seem to represent their voters on the 
UN question, Jordanian voters held more extreme views than their parties' position on the UN 
(Weird, 2013; Yom, 2015).  
 To better assess whether the positions of Jordanian parties corresponds with the views of 
voters on foreign affairs, another question in the WVS data was checked: the extent to which 
voters trusted the Arab League (Figure 7.4). Similar to the UN results, voters of Islamist parties, 
the Islamic Action Front and Islamic Center Party, have little confidence in this regional 
organization.  Similarly, liberal voters in the Justice and Development and Justice and Reform 
parties exhibited higher confidence ratings in the United Nations which indicates a more 
favorable desire for international cooperation, like the platforms of the liberal party bloc in the 
Kingdom. This strengthens the evidence that the ideological fit between parties and voters on 
foreign affairs matters in Jordan is moderate (Lust, Hourani, & El-Momani, 2011; Roy, 2013; 
Stepan & Linz, 2013).  
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Figure 7.4 Jordanian support for the Arab League 
 
Democracy. 
 The ideological fit between Jordanian parties and their voters is also moderate when 
considering the issue of democracy. Figure 7.5 displays party means on a scale measuring their 
support to procedural and substantive democracy. Higher scores represent more favorable 
preferences toward the political system. It appears that Islamist parties, such as the Islamic 
Action Front and Islamic Center Party, lead the fight for democratic reform in the Kingdom. 
Those parties had means higher than 0.7, indicating their support for democracy in all its forms. 
Surprisingly, the liberal parties exhibited less support for democracy compared to the Islamist 
parties. They received means below 0.5, making them moderately in favor of democracy. This is 
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likely because of the liberal bloc support for the monarchy, and its unwillingness to call for 
decisive and comprehensive democratic reforms such as regime change along the lines of 
replacing the monarchy with a parliamentary democracy (Stepan & Linz, 2013; Suleiman, 2013; 
Tessler & Jamal, 2006). Stronger Jordan and the National Union Party both favored democracy 
to an extent; however, they did not share their voters’ level of support for the political system.  
 
Figure 7.5 Degree by which Jordanians support democracy as a political system 
 
 
Figure 7.6 presents Jordanian voters’ distribution on a question in the WVS asking them 
to what degree they support democracy as a political system. The scale in the survey ranges 
between 1 and 10, where higher scores represent more support for democracy. Voters, regardless 
of their political party affiliation, generally supported democracy. Islamist leaning voters 
exhibited higher support for democracy as seen by values around 8 for both the Islamic Action 
Front and Islamic Center Party. Liberal parties, such as Reform and Development, as well as the 
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Justice and Reform parties received high scores, around 9, indicating a misfit between their 
positions and their parties' preferences on democracy. Similar to IAF and ICP voters, NUP voters 
favored democracy to a lesser degree than the liberal secular camp.  Overall, Jordanian parties 
and voters moderately agree on issues related to democracy.    
 
Figure 7.6 Jordanian support for democracy by party 
 
Corruption. 
 Jordanian parties and voters show moderate agreement when it comes to the issue of 
corruption. All four relevant parties (IAF, ICP, SJ, and NUP) were opposed to corruption. The 
Islamic moderate party, ICP, received the highest score (almost1.0, a perfect score), indicating its 
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strong anti-corruption position.   The party desires the implementation of the highest levels of 
accountability, transparency, and responsibility to the political status quo in the Kingdom. By the 
same token, the Islamic Action Front, the main opposition, received a high score of 0.6 on the 
corruption indicator, indicating its advocacy for gradual reform. Liberal parties received lower 
scores, indicating their support for anti-corruption initiatives, but with less radical political 
reform than desired by the Islamist parties.  
 The World Values Survey includes several items asking Jordanians about their 
perceptions of corruption.  Figure 7.7 displays Jordanians’ views on the frequency that voters are 
bribed, an indicator of political corruption, and broken down by their party of choice. 
Overwhelmingly, Jordanian citizens believe that voters are frequently bribed during election 
campaigns. As another indicator of corruption, Figure 7.8 shows the frequency of perceptions 
among Jordanian citizens regarding the purchasing of elections by the wealthy when broken 
down by party choice. Like voter bribes, Jordanians believe that rich individuals utilize their 
financial resources to influence election outcomes in the country. While both parties and their 
voters agree on the high incidence of political corruption in the kingdom, political parties seem 
to put greater emphasis on corruption by holding more extreme positions than voters. For the 
political parties, corruption is a significant issue because the public evaluates parties based on 
perceptions of their levels of corruption (Slothuus & De Vreese, 2010; Stoll, 2004). Parties that 
shy away from bringing up the issue of corruption are associated with the regime.   The public 
regards them to be both ineffective and supportive of the status quo.   This lowers their 
legitimacy during election campaigns (Watanabe, 2014; Wegner, 2011). Jordanian voters and 
their parties show agreement on corruption.  
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Figure 7.7 Support for anti-corruption measures by Jordanian parties 
 
Figure 7.8 Voters views on the frequency of voter bribes by party 
 
1= Very Often, 2= Often, 3= Not Often, 4= Not at all 
 
Figure 7.9 Voters views on the frequency of wealthy influence on elections by party 
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1= Very Often, 2= Often, 3= Not Often, 4= Not at all 
 
Economy. 
 On economic issues, Jordanian parties and voters show low levels of agreement. Figure 
7.10 displays the parties’ positions on the issue of market regulation. The Islamic Action Front 
and Islamic Center Party seem to favor a more centrist position where the government takes on 
an interventionist role. Similarly, the liberal secular party, Stronger Jordan, also favors a centrist 
position. On the other hand, the National Union Party, a party closer to the government, espouses 
a less interventionist approach to the economy. Nevertheless, this position is also closer to the 
center. In summary, Jordanian political parties favor a centrist position on governmental 
regulation of the economy.  
 While Jordanian parties seem to favor governmental action in regulating the economy, 
except for the Islamic Action Front, they frequently advocate for the privatization of state owned 
enterprises, a position held by the government. The IAF opposes the state’s privatization policy, 
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considering it inefficient and deleterious for the well-being of the Kingdom’s economy and 
social welfare. The National Union Party, the party aligned with the regime, advocates for 
greater privatization and economic liberalization of the state’s economy. The Islamic Center 
Party, as well as Stronger Jordan, the secular party, called for moderate levels of privatization 
(Malik & Awadallah, 2013; Reiter, 2004). Figure 8.11 displays party positions on the extent to 
which the Jordanian government should implement privatization.  
 Parties’ voters seem, by all measures, to advocate for more governmental regulation of 
the market. This differs from what their parties stood for in the general elections of 2013 (Reiter, 
2004; Yom, 2015). Figure 7.12 shows Jordanians’ attitudes on whether the voters of the IAF, 
ICP, and NUP all agreed with more government intervention, contrary to their parties’ platforms. 
By the same token, figure 7.13 displays citizens’ views on whether the government should take 
more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. Voters, those identifying with a party 
label as well as independents, favor more government action here. This evidence demonstrates 
that Jordanian parties, and their voters, do not agree on economic issues.  
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Figure 7.10 Jordanian support for market regulation by party 
 
-1= Absolute market deregulation 
1= Absolute market regulation 
 
Figure 7.11 Jordanian support for privatization by party 
 
 
1= Absolute privatization of state enterprises 
-1- Absolute government ownership of state enterprises 
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Figure 7.12 Jordanian views on state or private ownership of business by party 
 
 
1= Private ownership of business and industry should be increased 
10= Government ownership of business and industry should be increased 
 
Figure 7.13 Jordanian views on government responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided 
for 
 
1= Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for 
10= People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves 
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Culture. 
 Jordanian parties and voters show moderate agreement on cultural issues. Figure 7.14 
displays party positions with respect to the extent to which religious influence should be 
incorporated into political decision making. Islamist parties, the IAF and ICP, support the 
introduction of Islamic law and principles into the legislative and executive processes in the 
Kingdom. On the contrary, liberal parties such as Stronger Jordan and NUP, are more centrist 
with respect to the influence of religion on politics. They do not support secularism explicitly; 
however, they favor a less religious political order where Islam retreats into the private realm. 
On gender equality, Jordanian parties seem to be in agreement that women should be equal to 
men in many aspects of economic, cultural, and social life as evident in Figure 7.15. Islamist and 
non-Islamist parties do not differ greatly on their advocacy for gender equality. Contrary to 
western observers’ expectations, the Islamic Center Party seems to be the most vociferous voice 
for the achievement of gender equality in Jordan (Schwedler & Clark, 2006).  
 Jordanian voters, however, disagree with their parties on gender equality. IAF’s, ICP’s, 
and NUP’s voters believe that men make better political leaders than women. This indicates that 
voters in the Kingdom still favor a patriarchal societal structure where men are viewed as the 
providers and women as mothers and household keepers (Pellicer & Wegner, 2015b; Robbins & 
Jamal, 2016). On religious influence, Jordanian voters have more agreement with their parties, 
favoring an Islam-informed political order. IAF’s and ICP’s voters espouse attitudes calling for 
the introduction of Islamic principles and laws into policy. Nevertheless, this support is not 
absolute, given the means of 7, indicating moderate rather than absolute support for making the 
Jordanian political system more Islamic. NUP’s voters exhibit a less support for the introduction 
of the Islamic way of life into the public sphere with a mean of 5. This position mimics the 
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centrist party position on the issue, yielding close agreement between parties and voters on 
Islamic influence in the political system. Overall, Jordanian parties and voters possess moderate 
levels of agreement on cultural issues.  
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Figure 7.14 How much influence of religion on political decision making by party 
 
1= Absolute Religious Influence 
-1= Absolute Secularism 
 
Figure 7.15 Jordanian support for gender equality by party 
 
 
 
1= Absolute Gender Equality 
-1= Absolute Gender Inequality 
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Figure 7.16 Belief that men make better political leaders by party 
 
 
 
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3= Disagree and 4= Strongly Disagree 
 
 
Figure 7.17 Jordanian favoring of religious interpretation of laws, by party (the extent to which 
religious figures and institutions have power to interpret enacted legislation) 
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Welfare. 
Jordanian parties and voters possess high levels agreement on welfare issues. Figure 7.18 
displays party positions with respect to the welfare state. It appears that all Jordanian parties 
advocate for more welfare, with the Islamic Center Party being the most supportive. The Islamic 
Action Front as well as Stronger Jordan, the traditional Islamist and secular liberal parties, both 
possess similar views with respect to welfare, supporting social programs which make income 
redistribution a priority. The National Union Party, the party closest to the monarchy, gives less 
support to welfare polices compared to other parties.  
 Jordanian voters, regardless of their political affiliation, advocate for making citizens’ 
incomes more equal. This signals tremendous support for the welfare state among the Jordanian 
populous (Robbins & Jamal, 2016; Beinen & Vairel, 2013). Nevertheless, voters of Islamist 
parties, such as the IAF and ICP, hold less intense views on the welfare question compared to 
their parties. On the contrary, the NUP’s voters seem to be more supportive of welfare compared 
to their party. This evidence alludes to the fact that Jordanian parties and voters desire a more 
interventionist state that is actively engaging in wealth redistribution (Blaydes & Linzer, 2012).  
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Figure 7.18 Jordanian belief that the state should espouse the welfare model by party 
 
 
Figure 7.19 Jordanian belief that citizen’s incomes should be made more equal by party 
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Figure 7.19 demonstrates that Jordanians favor the imposition of taxes on rich individuals 
to subsidize improved living conditions for the poor. This signals a strong social support for non-
economic producing groups such as the disabled and the elderly. Jordanian parties, as well as 
independent voters, support vulnerable social groups (El-Said & Harrigan, 2014).  
 
Institutionalization. 
 Mainwaring and Scully (1995) noted that the institutionalization of party systems in the 
developing world is an important indicator of democratization. Parties appear, disappear, merge, 
and split at a significantly higher rate in the party systems of developing countries (Hamid, 
2014). Therefore, exploring the level of institutionalization aids in learning about levels of 
societal linkage, programmatic representation, organizational autonomy, coherence, and, most 
importantly, stability. While the analysis of individual level characteristics at the party level is 
useful, it can be extended to enhance the understanding of the political system as a whole.  
 Jordanian parties differ significantly with respect to how rooted they are in society. Due 
to the absence of party life for three decades, parties have failed to build a strong connection to 
the public based on ideological leanings (Yom, 2015). Further, the strength of political 
personalities, tribal connections, and clienteles has contributed to weakening party-citizenry 
linkages (Weir, 2013). Despite this, the Muslim Brotherhood as a social organization has 
succeeded in building a strong political party, the IAF. The Muslim Brotherhood, and later its 
political wing the Islamic Action Front, have been among the oldest political organizations in the 
country. Further, the IAF possesses a strong organization with high membership rates compared 
to the other parties. The Islamic message of the party, and its continuous opposition to regime 
policies, especially on the Palestinian question, assisted in garnering support from voters. The 
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party also houses an array of social provision venues, where it connects to ordinary Jordanians 
on personal levels in many areas of life (El-Said & Rauch, 2015; El-Said & Harrigan, 2014; 
Trager, 2011).  
Loyalist parties, such as most of those that won a single seat in the last elections, lack any 
robust roots within the Jordanian society. Those parties do not make serious efforts to reach out, 
and citizens do not trust them due to their backing of the existing regime (Weir, 2013). Many of 
these parties re-emerge with new labels, dissolve in short periods of time, or reappear with small 
changes in leadership. Communist and socialist parties ascended in the 1950s, and with deep 
roots in society, lost their advantage when the regime banned political parties and Islamist 
alternatives arrived (Karakaya & Yildirim, 2013). Those parties only hold small pockets of 
influence, such as among the highly educated intellectuals of the kingdom (El-Said & Rauch, 
2015). With the exception of the IAF, Jordanian parties lack any meaningful connections with 
ordinary voters (Bayat, 2003). The Jordanian party system, with many of its small parties formed 
by elites who exploit patron-client relationships, suffers from a lack of issue, policy, and 
program content.       
 Jordanian parties have been dominated by cadres of prominent politicians, powerful 
social organizations, and the regime (Watanabe, 2014). The IAF has been dominated by the 
Muslim Brotherhood, a transnational Islamic movement. Loyalist parties have been manipulated 
by political machines close to the palace. Other small parties have been founded by a single or 
small group of famous politicians (or former government officials) who enjoy the support of 
their networks, tribes, and others (Buttorff, 2015). Leadership of parties is usually held by the 
founder or a small number of individuals. The appearance of party factions and splits constitute 
another phenomenon of the Jordanian party system, where many parties are products of 
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leadership disagreements on a particular issue. The most recent example is the split among the 
Islamic Center Party leadership, which itself resulted from a split with the IAF. Leaders 
disagreed on how the party should handle internal disagreements over ideology, resulting in the 
resignation of key leaders (El-Said & Rauch, 2015).  
 Organizationally, Jordanian parties differ greatly with respect to their size of 
membership, amount of resources, and discipline. The IAF has a larger membership than other 
parties. It also has staff and personnel in all governorates of the Kingdom. The party also holds 
regular meetings, and has low tolerance for candidates who deviate from its core principles (El-
Said & Rauch, 2015). Other parties have fewer members, with many barely meeting the 
minimum requirement set by the Ministry of Internal Affairs for party registry. Many of these 
parties, mostly small loyalist parties, are not organized throughout the Kingdom, and their 
activities are confined mainly to election campaigns. Few of these parties hold regular 
conventions and meetings, as holding them would be meaningless, since the parties lack the 
means to hold their candidates accountable for advocating the parties' issue positions.(Watanabe, 
2014; Yom, 2015).  
 One may assess a party's cohesion by examining its behavior in parliament. Jordanian 
parties have an allocated number of seats. Still, party members, while serving in parliament, 
often switch coalitions and resign from their parties. Further, members of the same party will 
disagree on issues that are being debated in parliamentary sessions (Bank & Sunik, 2014; 
Buttorff, 2015).  
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Table 7.2: Distribution of Vote Choice for Jordan Electorate in the 6
th
 WVS dataset 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid I would not vote 267 22.3 
None 799 66.6 
The Islamic Action Front IAF 33 2.8 
The People's Democratic Jordanian Party (Hashed) 2 .2 
The B'ath Socialist Arab Party (Iraq Faction) 1 .1 
The National Action Front (Haq) 1 .1 
The Popular unity Democratic Jordanian Party 3 .3 
The Constitutional National Party 6 .5 
Justice and Reform Party 2 .2 
Arab Islamic Democratic Movement Party – “Du’a” 2 .2 
Moderate Islamic Party 11 .9 
Risala Party 1 .1 
Welfare Party 3 .3 
Jordanian Hayat Party 1 .1 
Justice and Development Party 2 .2 
United Jordanian Front Party 3 .3 
National Jordanian Party 5 .4 
National Party 3 .3 
Total 1145 95.4 
Missing Don´t know 55 4.6 
Total 1200 100.0 
 
 
Conclusion 
 Table 7.3 indicates that, in the WVS interview, almost ninety percent of Jordanian 
citizens indicated their intention not to vote, or to vote for no party, when asked for whom they 
would vote if national elections were to be held the following day. This suggests that the 
Jordanian public sees parties to be irrelevant. The Islamic Action Front is in truth the only 
relevant party within the system. None of the existing party system classifications fit the 
Jordanian party system. Jordan has many irrelevant parties that compete in relatively free and 
fair elections (Yom, 2015). With a monarchy, a traditional kind of authoritarian regime, there is 
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nothing resembling a modern party system.   Most of the parties are based only upon elites and 
their ties with clients, and not as with modern parties on ideology, linkages to large social 
groups, and issue positions.   
 The Jordanian party system witnessed several transformations. Early in the 1950s, the 
system was characterized by vigorous episodes of political competition between several distinct 
and ideologically based parties. Since these parties were a real threat to the monarchy, it 
outlawed party politics, resulting in the absence of a party system for three decades. King 
Hussein decided in 1989, in response to domestic and international political pressures, to restore 
parliamentary life. From the early 1990s until today, Jordan has seen multi-party competition 
with organizationally and ideologically weak parties (Watanabe, 2014; Weir, 2013; Yom, 2015). 
The Muslim Brotherhood party, the Islamic Action Front, stands out as the only real political 
party with significant organizational resources and a distinct ideology (El-Said & Rauch, 2015).  
 The ideological space of Jordanian parties is diverse. The parties include Islamic parties, 
both traditional and neo-liberal, a communist party, an Arab socialist party, conservative parties, 
loyalist parties, and secular parties. The level of ideological polarization is high, especially 
between opposition parties, typically dividing anti-regime Islamic and communist parties from 
pro-regime conservative loyalist parties (Bayat, 2003). Differences on issues of economic and 
cultural liberalization clearly show the high degree of polarization of Jordanian parties. Stronger 
Jordan takes liberal positions on both economic and cultural issues.  Islamic parties are divided 
on the issue of economic liberalization, with the IAF advocating for a centrist position while the 
ICP opts for a liberal economic order. Conservative loyalist parties advocate regime policies of 
privatization, economic liberalization, and free trade, while having a centrist cultural stance that 
advocates for gradual modernizing (Beck & Hüser, 2015).  
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 Finally, but importantly, the Jordanian party system suffers from weak levels of 
institutionalization. Most Jordanian parties do not possess real on the ground organizations with 
numerous members. They also lack party discipline.  Thus, candidates can deviate from their 
party's ideology. Internal party tolerance toward disagreements is also low, leading to factions 
and high splitting rates (Köprülü, 2014; Weir, 2013; Yom, 2015). All in all, parties in Jordan do 
not differentiate themselves clearly in terms of policy, and thus do not give voters clear choices 
in elections.   
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CHAPTER 8: PARTY POLITICS IN MOROCCO 
 
 Like other Arab states, modern party politics in Morocco has been rooted in their 
independence movement. Early in the twentieth century, political parties in Morocco called for 
the termination of both French and Spanish influence, and advocated for an autonomous nation 
(Singh, 2014). During this phase, parties suffered from weak organizations and incoherent 
programs. The Moroccan elite have dominated the rank and file of early political organizations, 
influencing their direction upon independence and the establishment of the Moroccan kingdom 
(Bendourou, 1996).  
 Moroccan party politics witnessed several phases of restraint and revival. From 1956-
1973, Moroccan party politics went through significant changes until the appearance of 
ideological politics in the mid-1970s. First, following independence, the Istiqlal party (party of 
independence) emerged as a rival to the palace. The party demanded political concessions and 
the introduction of free and fair elections that were banned by the monarchy. This resulted in a 
stalemate, leading to the application of emergency laws by the monarchy and the banning of all 
forms of party politics. After reconciliation in the early 1970s, new parties emerged with distinct 
programs (mainly Islamist and liberals).  
 Amidst the political liberalization era in the 1970s, the Istiqlal Party transformed its 
message from an all-out opposition party to a more centrist and pragmatic one that supported the 
monarchy in many areas. Following a decade of internal reforms and monarchical control of 
political parties, the 1990s witnessed a new wave of coalition building in Moroccan party 
politics. New coalitions formed along both ideological lines and pragmatic concerns. AThe 
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monarch's desire to be amicable towards political parties, and a series of legal reforms in the 
electoral system, resulted in lively parliamentary politics within the kingdom.  
 Contemporary political parties in Morocco come from different ideological camps, 
mainly the Islamist, conservative, liberal, and secular. They vary with respect to levels of 
organization, with more established parties, such as Istiqlal and main Islamist parties such as the 
Party of Justice and Development, possessing mass-based organizations. Recent elections in 
Morocco witnessed fierce campaigning, with parties constructing platforms to contest a free and 
fair election. The Arab Spring has cemented the role of party politics in democratic governance 
and the process of gradual political reform. Despite this, party politics in Morocco still face 
serious challenges, chiefly dealing with the power of the place.  
 
Relevant Parties 
Table 8.1: Distribution of Seats in Moroccan 2011 Elections 
MOROCCO 
Party  
Total 
Seats 
Share of vote 
  
 
(p) 
Justice and Development Party 107 27.1 
Istiqlal Party  60 15.2 
National Rally of Independents  52 13.2 
Authenticity and Modernity Party 47 11.9 
Socialist Union of Popular Forces 39 9.9 
Popular Movement 32 8.1 
Progress and Socialism Party 23 5.8 
Labour Party 18 4.6 
Democratic and social Movement  4 1.0 
Renewal and Equity Party 2 05 
Party of Environment and Sustainable Development  2 05 
Democratic Al And Party 2 05 
Moroccan Green Left Party 1 03 
Freedom and Social Justice Party 1 03 
Democratic Forces Front  1 03 
Action Party 1 03 
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Unity and Democracy Party  1 03 
Source: IPU Database.    100.0% 
 
 Morocco has always had a multi-party system. In nearly all parliamentary elections, no 
single party has dominated the parliaments by holding a majority of seats. The Istiqlal party, the 
PJD, Socialist Forces, and Popular Movement, have all been rooted in Moroccan society, with 
their birth tied to independence movement leaders (Willis, 2004). These parties have organized, 
mobilized, and been the opposition in Morocco over the past half century, making them the most 
relevant parties in the country.   
The Moroccan independence movement shaped contemporary party politics in Morocco. 
Three main parties merged in the late 1950s following the country’s official independence from 
France in 1956: the Istiqlal Party, The National Union of Popular Forces, and The Popular 
Movement. Although these parties have changed their names repeatedly throughout Morocco’s 
electoral history, they still remain powerful in today’s national politics. A few of these parties, 
for example the Party of Justice and Development, trace their roots back to these movements, 
and control sizable numbers of seats in the legislature today.  
 Like Algeria, Moroccan political movements all united behind the goal of bringing an 
end to French control over Moroccan territory. After achieving independence differences in 
ideology, organization, and political tactics began to surface among the parties. Unlike the 
Algerian government that instituted a single party system, the Moroccan palace decided that 
multi-party competition was a better path for political stability. The most powerful party at the 
time was the Istiqlal Party (Party of Independence), formed in 1944 when a group of Moroccan 
freedom fighters petitioned the French administration and requested France's full withdrawal 
from Morocco. This party enjoyed tremendous popularity among Moroccans given its serious 
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efforts, both political and military, toward achieving the eventual cause of Moroccan 
independence. The party was an amalgamation of several other political organizations with two 
main political orientations; Islamist as well as socialist. All party leaders preached socialism, 
however, one group did so with an Islamist tone while the others in their literature renounced the 
influence of religion in government and policy.  
 The socialist camp of the Istiqlal party was frustrated with the dominance of the Islamic 
wing, leading them to split and form their own party known today as the National Union of 
Popular Forces. This party was inspired by social democratic parties in European countries.  It 
was a major contributor to the opposition.   In spite of differences between these parties in 
platforms and in political strategies, they had the same origin. Other political leaders at the time 
expressed intense frustration over the dominance of Istiqlal over the Moroccan electorate. This 
led a group of moderate Islamic leaders coupled with conservative elements of the Morrocan 
political landscape to establish the Popular Movement (PM). The PM was a movement in 
reaction to the Istiqlal. It called for the preservation of Islamic values and principles in Moroccan 
society.  
 The strength of the political parties posed a direct threat to the power of the Moroccan 
palace. Desiring to rule without real opposition, King Hassan the second manipulated the 1963 
election, thereby insuring a government in his favor. The government then moved to ratify the 
constitution proposed in 1962, but faced intense opposition from political parties. Morocco 
witnessed a series of violent incidents between opposition sympathizers and the military. The 
period between 1965 and 1996 in Morocco was marked with rigged elections. The palace parties, 
namely the National Rally for Independents (NRI) and the Constitutional Union (CU), won these 
elections.  The late 1990s witnessed a tremendous change in the approach the monarchy took 
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with respect to parliamentary politics. In the mid-1990s, the Moroccan government instituted a 
series of political reforms allowing for free and fair elections where political parties competed 
for parliamentary seats in 1997.  
 Since the election of 1997, Morocco has had a multi-party political system. Parliamentary 
elections held in 2002, 2007, and 2011, resulted in more than six political parties winning sizable 
numbers of seats.  These parties represent three main families:  Islamist, social democratic, and 
loyalists. The Moroccan party system, in summary, has changed over the years from being a 
multi-party system with three main parties in the late 1950s, to a "party system" thoroughly 
controlled by the monarchy between 1965 and 1996, to a fragmented multi-party system in 
Morocco today.  
 
Ideological Fit  
Foreign Affairs. 
 Moroccan parties and their voters do not agree much with respect to foreign affairs. 
Figure 8.1 shows Moroccan party positions on the extent to which the Kingdom should “be open 
and friendly to western states and institutions such as the US, EU and the UN.” Except for the 
Party of Progress and Socialism, Moroccan parties are in favor of furthering relations with 
Western nations and institutions. Islamist parties, such as the PJD and Popular Movement, as 
well as parties close to the palace, like the CU and AM, are the greatest supporters of 
strengthening relations with the west. Moroccan parties also seem to advocate for increasing the 
kingdoms’ involvement in international organizations such as the United Nations as indicated by 
Figure 8.2.  
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 Moroccan voters seem to contradict their parties’ positions on the normalization of 
relations with the West and western influenced institutions. Figure 8.3 displays Moroccan voters’ 
attitudes towards the United Nations. It shows that Moroccans generally do not look favorably 
upon the United Nations. Further, Moroccan voters are not only suspicious of international 
organizations, they are also wary of regional organizations such as the Arab Maghreb Union. 
Figure 8.4 shows the amount of confidence Moroccan voters have in this Arab organization. It 
appears that Moroccans do not generally favor the organization, opposing their parties’ advocacy 
for the improvement of relations with regional as well as international partners. Therefore, 
Moroccan parties and voters do not agree much on issues of foreign affairs.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Moroccan party positions on involvement with the West 
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Figure 8.2 Moroccan party positions on international involvement  
Figure 8.3 Moroccan voter support for the UN 
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Democracy. 
 On democracy, there's more agreement between Moroccan voters and their respective 
parties. Figure 8.5 shows Moroccan parties’ commitment to the introduction and enforcement of 
democratic procedural and substantive reforms. All parties, irrespective of their ideology, seem 
to be in support of democracy as a political system. Similarly, figure 8.6 displays Moroccan 
voters’ views on whether having a democratic political system is important or not. All voters 
regardless of their party of choice rated democracy as an important feature in a political system, 
and as a good political system to have in the kingdom. This result indicates that Moroccan 
parties and voters agree on the importance of reforming the current Moroccan political system, 
making it more democratic.  
 
 
Figure 8.4 Moroccan voter confidence in Arab-oriented agencies 
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Figure 8.6 Moroccan voters’ views on the importance of democracy 
Figure 8.5 Moroccan party commitment to democratic 
reforms 
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Economy. 
 Moroccan parties and voters do not agree much with respect to economic policy items. 
Figure 8.7 displays party positions on the extent to which the government should regulate the 
Moroccan economy. Socialist parties, such as the Socialist Forces and Socialism and Progress, 
advocate for higher regulatory power over the economy. Similarly, both parties denounce the 
Moroccan states’ active implementation of privatization as evident in Figure 8.8. Socialist voters 
tend to agree with their parties. Figures 8.9 and 8.10 display Moroccan voters’ views on whether 
government should increase its intervention in the economy, and whether the government should 
embark upon redistribution. Both parties and voters agree that the Moroccan government should 
be more involved in the economy. Nevertheless, this outlook is less extreme compared to the 
parties themselves, which took more extreme positions than their supporters.  
 Islamist parties, such as the PJD and PM, are more in favor of liberal economic policies, 
and favor privatization more than the socialist parties. The socialist parties desire the government 
to have a strong position in regulating and controlling the economy. Islamist voters, however, 
seem to position themselves at the center of the economic liberal/socialist spectrum. They favor a 
balanced approach to the economy where the government still exercises some regulatory powers. 
While Islamist parties and voter positions on the economic issues are broadly similar, Islamist 
parties take somewhat less moderate positions.  
 Moroccan parties who are closer to the palace, namely the CU and AM, seem to espouse 
more extreme positions on economic issues compared to their voters. Both parties are advocates 
of state led privatization policies, where CU’s voters seem to be the most supportive of 
government intervention in the economy as evident in Figure 8.9. AM also seems to favor a neo-
liberal economic policies for the Moroccan economy, while its voters seem to favor a more 
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balanced approach. There's less agreement between Moroccan parties and their voters on 
economic issues.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.7 Moroccan party positions on government 
economic regulation 
Figure 8.8 Moroccan party positions on 
privatization 
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Figure 8.9 Moroccan voters’ views on government economic 
intervention 
Figure 8.10 Moroccan voters’ views on wealth redistribution 
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Culture. 
 Moroccan voters and parties show close agreement on cultural issues. Figure 8.11 shows 
Moroccan parties' positions on the extent to which Islam should inform politics in the country. 
Islamist parties (the PJD and PM) as well as conservative parties (the AM and NRI) exhibit 
strong support for the influence of religion on politics. The only party that strongly opposes the 
introduction of Islam into the political system is the socialist leaning Progress and Socialism 
party. Many establishment parties such as the Istiqla, as well as the Constitutional Union, do not 
express clear support for Islamic influence in politics, but don't oppose it either. They favor a 
more balanced view on Islam and politics. The evidence indicates that Moroccan parties do not 
call for an absolute influence of Islam over the political system. They take a moderate stance on 
the issue. Similarly, Moroccan parties support the introduction of modernity into Moroccan 
society. Figure 8.12 demonstrates that Moroccan parties are in favor of modernization.  
 Figure 8.13 represents the views of Moroccan voters on whether religious leaders should 
have an active role in the political system. Generally Moroccan voters, regardless of their 
ideological label, favor a political system where religious leaders’ opinions are heard and 
respected. This support, however, is not absolute. Figure 8.14 represents Moroccans’ preferences 
on whether men should be given priority over women when jobs become scarce. Unlike their 
compatriots throughout the Arab World, Moroccan voters seem to exhibit a liberal cultural 
outlook, favoring some gender equality. This goes hand in hand with advocacy of modernity by 
Moroccan parties. Therefore, one may conclude that there's high agreement between Moroccan 
parties and their voters on cultural issues.  
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Figure 8.11 Moroccan party positions on Islamic influence 
Figure 8.12 Moroccan party positions on modernization 
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Figure 8.13 Moroccan voters’ views on religious leadership in 
politics 
Figure 8.14 Moroccan voters’ views on male preference for 
employment 
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Ideological Polarization. 
 Figure 8.15 displays the ideological map of political parties in Morocco after the most 
recent elections in 2011. On the bottom right corner of the figure, one can see the PJD, as well as 
its predecessor movement the MP, advocating a slightly liberal economic outlook but with a 
conservative cultural bent. Both parties are Islamist. Nevertheless, the FJP is more liberal on 
economic matters, making it similar to neo-liberal Islamist parties in other Arab nations such as 
Egypt and Jordan. The FJP is clearly supportive of more incentives, privatization, and 
decentralization (Pellicer & Wegner, 2014). On the contrary, the Popular Movement still exhibits 
the welfare state platform of traditional Islamist parties inherited from the Muslim Brotherhood 
in the 1950s. These parties tend to be socialist on economic matters, and if not, then at least 
centrist, but rarely liberal (Pellicer & Wegner, 2015). On cultural issues, they favor preserving 
the place of Islam in society and advocate for it becoming a source of policy (Hamzawy, 2008).  
 On the top right corner, one finds a group of parties consisting of the NRI, PAM, and CU. 
The common denominator among these parties is their close relationship with the Moroccan 
palace, and thus they are loyalists. The Moroccan government has launched a tremendous 
economic liberalization program, trying to increase foreign investment, privatization, and 
governmental relief through state services. The loyalist parties favor a neo-liberal economic 
platform similar to that of the palace. These parties are also culturally liberal, calling for the 
removal of Islam from public policy. These parties are secular in contrast to the Islamist parties 
who dominated parliament following the past two elections.  
 The top left corner includes the traditional social democratic parties calling for 
redistribution and Westernization. NUPF and the Progress and Socialist Party are the most 
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relevant parties of this family. Although there are many socialist, Marxist, and communist 
leaning parties in Morocco, they have failed to garner popular support.  
  
Figure 8.15: Moroccan Party Positions on Economics 
And Cultural Liberalism 
 
CulLib refers to cultural liberalism (-1 refers to complete opposition for westernization, 
modernity and foreign cultural assimilation and 1 refers to complete acceptance of 
westernization, modernity and foreign cultural assimilation) 
EconLib refers to economic liberalism (-1 refers to complete government control over the 
economy and 1 refers to complete withdrawal of government from economic regulation 
and control) 
 
Institutionalization.  
 Moroccan parties exhibit wide variation in their levels of institutionalization. Considering 
their roots in society, the older parties of Istiqlal, the NUPF, and Popular Movement enjoy 
extensive links with Moroccans, given their origins in the independence movement as well as 
their charismatic leadership. More recently, the PJD has become more popular among 
Moroccans. This support comes partly from the party’s affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Cavatorta, 2006). The party has also gained more support because of economic growth the 
government has brought to the country during its reign. On the other hand, loyalists parties such 
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as the NRI and CU lack extensive linkages with ordinary Moroccans.  The Istiqlal party is the 
oldest of Moroccan parties with the most experience in parliamentary politics. The party enjoys 
support from a considerable number of Moroccans. This support has steadily decreased over time 
along with the rise of other opposition parties and the transformation of the Istiqlal from being 
the opposition party to becoming an ally of the government on a number of occasions.  
 Moroccan parties enjoy relatively strong organizations.  They have leaders, party offices, 
and money. The Istiqlal, PJD, NUPF, and MP all have party offices around the Kingdom. These 
parties enjoy the support of well-established economic networks. For instance, the PJD obtains 
much of its money from small and medium size business owners. It also attracts Islamic charities 
and not-for-profit organizations with Islamist leanings (Ray, 2013). On the other hand, the 
loyalist parties are funded by networks of political allegiance. Most of their influential members 
are former or current governmental officials or business men (Sater, 2007). The NUPF, as well 
as the Istiqlal, have established long stable networks of support throughout the past five decades.  
Notwithstanding their organizational strength, Moroccan parties suffer from a lack of 
cohesion. Party leaders often disagree on core principles, leading to numerous splits. This started 
when the NUPF splintered from Istiqlal in 1959. The PJD is also a splinter of the MP. Party 
leaders who leave their mother party may rejoin it decades later, and the situation in the 
Moroccan parliament is not any better. Due to the lack of ideological commitment of the party 
rank and file, parliamentary representatives and candidates are found changing party affiliations 
and blocs. This may be due to the perceived benefits they may gain from switching, better odds 
of winning elections or retaining their seats. Another explanation may be due to the lack of 
ideological fit between party leadership and their candidates or representatives in the parliament.   
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 Moroccans parties’ main problem is their domination by opportunistic leadership and, for 
the loyalist parties, lack of autonomy from the palace.   Party founders and key leaders have tight 
control of them. Parties arise and fall with their leaders, and new parties emerge because of an 
influential leader leaving his/her party to form a new one.  The palace and its guard heavily 
influences the message and behavior of loyalist parties. Islamist organizations and clerics 
influence the direction of the PJD and the Popular Movement. Moroccan parties are not 
autonomous organizations (Wegner, 2011). 
 Table 8.2 shows the distribution of vote choice by Moroccans when asked about their 
party of preference in the WVS interview. Approximately eighty percent of the electorate do not 
identify with a party. Also, no party dominates the vote choice as in other Arab nations, pointing 
to the multi-party nature of the Moroccan political system.  
 
Table 8.2: Distribution of Vote Choice for Moroccan Electorate in the 6
th
 WVS dataset 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid The Socialist Union of Popular Forces - USFP  19 1.6 
The Istiqlal or Independence Party - PI  43 3.6 
The National Rally of Independents - RNI  8 .7 
The Popular Movement - MP  19 1.6 
The Party of Progress and Socialism - PPS  10 .8 
The Constitutional Union - UC  9 .8 
The Justice and Development Party - PJD  53 4.4 
Authenticity and Modernity Party - PAM -  24 2.0 
Total 185 15.4 
Missing Not applicable 372 31.0 
No answer Refused 207 17.3 
Don´t know 436 36.3 
Total 1015 84.6 
Total 1200 100.0 
Source: Sixth Wave WVS dataset n=1200 
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Conclusion 
 Morocco’s party system has witnessed significant transformations. Early on, Morocco 
had a genuine multi-party system with mass-based parties opposing the palace. Fearing the loss 
of his rule, the Monarch banned political parties, suppressed any meaningful opposition, and 
transformed the party system.  It became a multi-party system, but one comprised only of loyalist 
parties that competed to show their allegiance to the palace rather than to Moroccan citizens. In 
the mid-1990s, the King wanted liberalization in the economy and politics, returning the country 
to multi-party competition. Since then, Morocco has had a relatively stable party system with a 
large number of parties classified into three main families: loyalists, social democrats, and 
Islamists.  
 Ideologically, Moroccan parties stem from mass movements in the days of independence. 
These movements included a wide array of ideological orientations:  Islamist, socialist, 
communist, and liberal. Lacking a coherent ideology, loyalist parties typically adopted the 
palace’s platform. More recently, this has been a neo-liberal vision for transforming Morocco 
into an international hub for foreign investment and tourism.  
 Moroccan parties enjoy deep linkages with their society. Many of them exhibit robust 
organizations with large networks. On the other hand, Moroccan parties lack cohesion and 
autonomy. These present problems to the stability of the parties, as well as the party system as a 
whole. The Moroccan party system is likely to be far more stable than the party systems of other 
Arab nations. This is because all the parties have accepted that they must operate within the rules 
as set down by the monarchy.  In recent years the monarchy has given the parliament more 
powers, and this has allowed the parties to secure more resources and act with greater autonomy.    
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 This dissertation investigated the dimensionality, meaning and structure of political 
ideology at the political parties’ and mass levels in the Arab world. The evidence suggests that 
political ideology is two-dimensional on the parties’ level. Political parties in Algeria, Egypt, 
Jordan and Morocco are divided on whether Islam should play a significant role in organizing 
the society in Arab polities.  This is a cultural divide. In addition, Arab parties are divided on 
whether the state should continue to adopt neo-liberal economic policies. This is an economic 
divide.  
 This dissertation also examined parties’ positions on political issues across several policy 
domains. Parties in the Arab World emphasize a variety of issues from a number of policy 
domains in their platforms. This observation contradicts the popular depiction of Arab party 
competition as a fight between parties over whether Islam should or should not be the sole guide 
for policymaking. To be sure, Arab parties are divided on whether the state should enact policies 
that fully support Islam, fully support a secular society, or something in-between.  They are also 
divided, however, on economic issues, as well as on democratization. Thus, the evidence does 
not support the ideological polarization hypothesis popular in the journalistic and conjectural 
accounts of Arab political ideology. The hypothesis that the Islam-secular divide is the only 
ideological dimension important in Arab countries' politics is false.   
 The evidence shows that the dimensionality of political ideology in the Arab world at the 
parties’ level is similar to that at the parties' level in the industrialized nations’. Political ideology 
on the parties’ level in Western Europe has been shown to be two-dimensional, including 
economic and cultural dimensions. However, there is an important difference between the Arab 
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world and Western Europe. The issues that comprise the cultural dimension are distinct.  In the 
Arab world, the issue is the proper role of Islam in economics, society, and politics.  In Western 
Europe, it's immigration, and worries about its impact upon both demographics and culture. 
Should countries continue to allow the entry of large numbers of foreigners who look different, 
speak a different language, possess a different religion, and hold sharply different values?    The 
economic dimension, interestingly, is comprised of similar political issues, those related to neo-
liberal economic policies. Arguably, globalization has transformed party competition across the 
globe. Today, neo-liberalism is the dominant economic discourse.  It favors markets and the 
price system, free trade, and minimal governmental regulation.   Party systems in the Western 
world today are divided mainly by the degree of support parties have for the neo-liberal agenda.   
In sharp decline for decades, although still alive, is the discourse of socialism.  It favors greater 
state ownership, planning, and control of the economy.  Party systems still include parties with 
socialist roots, even though their ideology is out of favor.  More time-series cross-country 
research is needed in order to learn more about the effect of globalization on party system 
change.  
  This study found that political ideology on the mass public level in Algeria, Egypt, 
Jordan, and Morocco is multidimensional. In Egypt, it's six-dimensional: foreign affairs, welfare, 
corruption, culture, democracy, and economy. In Algerian, it's also six-dimensional, with foreign 
affairs, democracy, culture, economy, corruption, and social groups comprising the dimensions. 
My analysis found that Jordanian's political ideology is comprised of seven dimensions: Foreign 
Affairs, Welfare, Culture, Corruption, Democracy, Social Groups and Economy. Finally, the 
chapter determined that Moroccan's political ideology is composed of five dimensions: Foreign 
Affairs, Welfare, Culture, Democracy, and Economy. The dimensions extracted in each 
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Exploratory Factor Analysis using the Sixth Wave of the World Values Survey Data are mostly 
orthogonal given the low correlations among the factors.  The overall evidence is that Arab 
citizens do not organize the political world in the same way that Arab elites do.  Their political 
ideologies, to the extent that they exist, are multi-dimensional with the dimensions reflecting 
distinct issue domains.    
 This finding contradicts findings from studies of Western European and American 
publics. Studies there have found that political ideology is two, or at most three dimensional. The 
difference in findings between these studies and my own may be due to several things.   First, 
most studies investigating the dimensionality, meaning and structure of political ideology put 
limits on the number of items that are included.  The items may include only a limited number of 
issues and policies from only a limited number of domains.  Also, the studies may use only one 
method to estimate the dimensionality of ideology. Most studies use only a small number of 
items and this greatly influences the solution that is generated. For example, if a study only uses 
eight survey items, four economic and four cultural, an unsurprising find from the study would 
be a two-dimensional solution, economic and cultural. This study differs from previous research 
by not imposing stringent restrictions on the number of items included.  I include a large pool of 
survey items from the World Values Survey.   
 These findings confirm the popular hypothesis in the ideology literature that the mass 
public has a more complex ideological structure than do elites. This may be interpreted as Arab 
mass publics lack a coherent political ideology, however are able to express their political 
attitudes according to few policy domains. In the Arab World, political parties were shown to 
have two-dimensional structure while their citizens have more dimensions. This finding from the 
Arab World indicates that political parties have limited influence in shaping public opinion. 
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Arguably, party politics in the Arab World is shaped from the bottom up rather than from the 
top-down.  Citizens hold meaningful opinions in distinct policy domains, but the policy domains 
are not themselves organized into a smaller number of dimensions.   The political parties, 
whatever their ideology, must confront this reality if they are to attract supporters and votes.  
 The structure of political ideology of mass publics in the Arab World is more complex 
than in Western Europe or North America where there are just two dimensions, economics and 
culture. In Arab countries, these two dimensions are also important sources of division.  The 
cultural division involves Islam. Religion is more relevant in Arab political ideology than in 
other polities across the globe. This finding is parallel to that of Western Europe during the 
1950s and 60s where religion correlated with voters’ political preferences and behavior. 
 While Islam is still a significant force shaping parties’ positions and voters’ preferences, 
its influence is declining in the face of new agenda items such as economic policy and 
democracy. Modernization, urbanization, and globalization in the Middle East have changed the 
family, the labor force, the character of education, rates of migration and other economic and 
social factors. All such changes will result in permanent changes to the values and preferences of 
individuals, as well to the values and policy preferences that parties espouse.   This will reduce 
the influence of Islam in politics, especially in countries that have witnessed higher levels of 
westernization and modernization. 
 This study has demonstrated that the Algerian, Egyptian, Jordanian, and Moroccan party 
systems are weak and low on institutionalization. Many eligible voters do not identify with a 
party when asked to which party they would cast their vote if national elections would be held on 
the day following the interview. Many relevant parties are embedded within their society's social 
fabric. Further, many parties form quickly, reflecting elite and citizen initiated movements that 
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do not last for long after the election is over. The evidence is clear that these four Arab countries 
have weak party systems.  
The party positions’ data allowed the systematic exploration of party systems in Algeria, 
Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. The Algerian party system has been dominated by the state political 
party: FLN. Right after gaining independence, the Algerian government banned parties and 
instituted the one-party system. Nevertheless, this changed with the restoration of parliamentary 
politics when multi-party competition was allowed in 1989. Since then, Algeria reflected few 
relevant parties, electorally and politically. Those included the FLN, RND, FFS and Islamist 
parties. Algeria today exhibits a multi-party system with a dominant state party.  
 Despite the domination of the FLN over electoral contests in Algeria, the ideological 
polarization in the party system has been high. The Algerian party system is composed of many 
party families: socialist democratic, liberal and Islamist. Liberal parties represented by the FLN, 
after witnessing a platform transformation, espouse a liberal economy, as well as culture where 
Islam does not constitute a main source of legislation. Socialist democratic parties led by the FFS 
calls for a protectionist economic policy while advocating for a secular order. Finally, Islamist 
parties, represented by the Green Alliance, advocate for a moderately liberal economic stance 
while preserving Islam as a main element of Algerian society.  
 Algerian parties differ dramatically with respect to their levels of institutionalization. 
Older parties such as the FLN, FFS and Islamist organizations have stronger roots with Algerian 
society, larger organizations and stable record of legislative contestation. Nevertheless, Algerian 
parties suffer from a lack of autonomy, as well as coherence. Powerful leaders and organizations 
influence the direction and organization of parties.  
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 The Egyptian party system exhibited different phases since the establishment of the 
autonomous kingdom in 1923. The first liberal phase 1923-1952 witnessed a true multi-party 
system dominated by the Wafd party. After the free officers’ revolution of 1952, Egypt had no 
party system since the government banned all parties. Sadat’s opening policies in the late 1970s 
restored party politics to the nation with the dominance of the state party, the NDP. From 1981-
2011, the Mubarak era, Egypt had a one party system controlled by the NDP. Following the great 
revolution of the 25
th
 of January 2011, Egypt held the most free and fair legislative elections 
producing a multi-party system dominated by two Islamist parties: the FJP and AlNour. After the 
military coup led by General Al Sisi in 2013, Egyptian parties have been irrelevant electorally or 
politically, especially in light of the regime suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 The Egyptian party system has been characterized with high degree of ideological 
polarization. Egyptian parties come from different families including the Islamist, social 
democratic, liberal and loyalist, in the days of the Khedive. Islamist parties are further divided 
into neo-liberal and tradition where the former espouses a liberal economic platform, while the 
latter prefer a more welfare vision. Social democratic parties, such as the Egyptian Bloc, in the 
most recent elections espoused a liberal cultural order with Islam in the private sphere and a 
welfare policy outlook. Liberal parties mainly composed of the splinters of the NDP advocate a 
liberal cultural, as well as economic order.  
 Like Algeria, older Egyptian parties such as the Wafd, the New Wafd after 1978, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the NPUP enjoy real support from various segments of the society, as 
well as massive party organizations. Nevertheless, those parties are influenced by their leaders 
and affiliate organizations. They lack an autonomous organization and coherent disciplined 
internal party politics. 
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 The Jordanian party system reflects an interesting type where a plethora or irrelevant 
parties compete for free and fair elections without attaining electoral or political relevance. 
Following the independence, the country witnessed a free multi-party competition episode in 
1957 that was ended by the monarchy’s decree of banning all parties. Upon the restoration of 
parliamentary life in 1989, Jordan has featured multi-party elections with no party system. The 
only relevant party is the Islamic Action Front, which boycotted lections on several occasions 
yielding a parliaments of tribal chiefs, independents and quasi-party affiliated figures.  
 Despite the irrelevance of Jordanian parties, their platforms convey a lively debate 
regarding the direction of policy change within the kingdom, Ideological polarization is starting 
to sharpen beginning in the most recent elections with the rise of new party families, the liberal-
secular, as well as the neo-liberal Islamist. The Jordanian party system has always reflected the 
same party families during the history of the country: loyalists, Islamists, socialist democrats and 
recently liberal secular. Similar to other Arab nations, the wave of economic liberalization and 
globalization has shaped the path of Jordanian economy and society in the past two decades 
given rise to neo-liberal party in all party families.  
 The Jordanian party system is the weakest among the cases considered by this 
dissertation. It features small parties, barely meeting the minimum requirements for formal 
registry, and non-existent organizational resources. More importantly, Jordanians reflect low 
trust in political parties since the latter do not have any profound roots in the Jordanian social 
fabric.  
 The Moroccan party system has figured multi-party competition since its foundation in 
the late 1950s. The most recent elections notes to the existence of multiple relevant actors 
without the domination of any party. Morocco reflects the healthiest party system in the Arab 
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World. Islamist, social democratic and conservative loyalist parties all win votes, and direct party 
competition with a real effect on parliamentary coalitions.  
 Ideological polarization in Morocco is relative high with Islamist parties forming a rival 
to state supported loyalist parties, both conservative and liberal ones. Neo-liberal economic 
changes to the kingdom have also affected party competition since many parties, including 
Islamist and liberal, have adopted the neo-liberal economic agenda. Nevertheless, the place of 
Islam in the political and social spheres still divides the Islamist parties from other parties in the 
system.  
 The Moroccan party system includes several strong parties that were formed during the 
independence struggle with France. The Istiqlal Party, as well as the Socialist or Popular Forces, 
have been dominated since the 1960s with extensive networks linking them with Moroccan 
citizens. The Islamist popular movement and its splinters, chiefly the PJD, have also garnered 
tremendous support from Moroccans and were successful in establishing extensive party 
organizations across the country. Nevertheless, like other parties in the region, Moroccan parties 
suffer from a lack of autonomy, as well as a lack of cohesion.  
 This study involved the construction of a new dataset that measured political parties’ 
positions in four Middle Eastern countries. I analyzed these data to determine the structure  of 
ideology on the party level in the Arab world. The findings provide a resolution to the ongoing 
debate concerning whether or not Arab political parties are polarized on a single dimension, the 
Islamist-secular divide. The findings are unambiguous.  While there is an Islamist-secular divide, 
the cultural dimension, there is also an economic dimension that divides the parties.   Some 
parties advocate for voluntary private choices, for a free market where there is only limited 
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governmental intervention; other parties advocate for collective choices and thus a more active 
role for government in regulating the economy.  
  As a cautionary note, political scientists know that the findings of dimensional analysis, 
whether its multi-dimensional scaling or factor analysis, can vary somewhat depending upon the 
items that are included in the analysis and the specific choices made with respect to statistical 
options.   This analysis improves on many previous studies by including a large number of items 
(both issue and policy) from a large number of domains.  Therefore, the findings of this research 
should have greater validity than those arrived at from the use of fewer and more selective items.  
The similarity of MDS findings with EFA findings further supports their validity.  
 This study and its findings may provide useful advice for other investigating the 
dimensionality of political ideology. Future investigators should be clear, at the outset, about the 
items they are including in their analyses, the domains to which such items belong, and 
theoretical rationale that lies behind the inclusion or exclusion of items and domains.   They 
should give a rationale for the specific statistical methods that they use.  They should even 
consider using multiple methods to see if findings from the use of those methods are similar.     
This study argued for the importance of using more than one analytic method.  Investigators have 
many options, each with their pluses and minuses:  Exploratory Factor Analysis, Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis, Structural Equation Modeling, Partial Least Squares, Multidimensional Scaling 
and Cluster Analysis. The use of multiple methods on the same data to analyze the structure of 
political ideology is helpful because similar findings from using different methods adds to the 
investigator's confidence that those findings are valid and do not reflect the investigator's own ill 
considered, biased, idiosyncratic, and random choices regarding statistical options.   
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This dissertation explores the structure of political attitudes on the political parties’, as 
well as mass public levels in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. I present the dimensionality, 
nature and structuration of political ideologies in these countries. In doing so, I describe the 
determinants, constituents, and components constructing parties’ and citizens’ political maps that 
are constantly competing for electoral, as well as actual, relevance within all societal domains. 
This work provides the first systematic empirical analysis of party systems in Algeria, Egypt, 
Jordan and Morocco. It explores three basic characteristics of the party system in each case: the 
number of relevant parties, level of ideological polarization and the degree of parties’ 
institutionalization.  
The dissertation begins with analyzing political parties’ policy positions obtained from a 
content analysis of their manifestos. The content analysis measure parties’ political preferences 
on thirty political issues distributed on seven policy domains: foreign relations, democracy, 
economy, religion, culture, welfare and social groups   while party politics literature in the Arab 
World is increasingly attempting to identify the most relevant political conflicts in the region, the 
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empirical investigation of parties’ policy preferences in the region is non-existent. I provide 
evidence that political parties’ attitudes structure, political ideology, is organized on two 
dimensions: an economic, as well as a cultural one.  The extent to which the economy should be 
regulated and whether Islam should play an active role in organizing politics and society 
constitute the main conflicts constructing the attitudes structure of Arab political parties in 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco.  
Next, I analyze the attitudes structures of mass publics in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and 
Morocco to compare these to their political parties’ counterparts. Using the Sixth Wave of the 
World Values Survey, 2010-2014, the dissertation concludes that mass publics’ attitudes 
structures in these four Arab nations are differ from their parties’ equivalents’. Ordinary citizens 
in the Arab World seem to structure their attitudes according to four dimensions: Welfare, 
Religion, Economy and Culture. Despite the extensive literature arguing that political elites and 
actors, mainly political parties, influence the structure of attitudes on the mass level, this 
dissertation presents evidence that contradicts such an assessment.   This result indicates that 
elite political preferences may prove irrelevant in shaping mass publics political ideologies in 
certain contexts such as the Arab World. It also corroborates the assumption suggesting that 
political parties compete on a different ideological space than citizens. The attitudes structure on 
the mass level is shown to be more complex than that on the parties’ level.  
Finally, I present an in-depth analysis of Algerian, Egyptian, and Jordanian and 
Moroccan party systems. The evidence indicates that party systems’ number of relevant actors, 
level of ideological polarization and the degree of institutionalization differ across countries. 
Morocco reflects the most stable system with few stable parties, medium level of ideological 
polarization and parties’ with strong organizations and deep roots in society. On the other hand, 
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Jordan exhibits the weakest party system with a single relevant mass party, absent ideological 
polarization and weak parties. Algeria and Egypt withered similar political histories producing 
party systems with a strong state backed party and few strong opposition actors, high ideological 
polarization between Islamists and liberals and few highly institutionalized parties. 
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